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Did the framers and ratifiers of the United States Constitution
think that changes in American society would require changes in the
text or interpretation of the Constitution?' If those who created the
Constitution understood or even anticipated the possibility of major
social alterations, how did they expect constitutional law - text and
interpretation - to accommodate such developments?
The effect of social change upon constitutional law was an issue the
framers and ratifiers frequently discussed. For example, when Anti-
Federalists complained of the Constitution's failure to protect the jury
trial in civil cases, Federalists responded that a change of circum-
stances might, in some instances, render the current form of jury trial
inappropriate and obsolete. Hamilton wrote that
the changes which are continually happening in the affairs of society may
render a different mode of determining questions of property preferable
in many cases in which that mode of trial now prevails .... The exam-
ples of innovations which contract its ancient limits, as well in these
States as in Great Britain, afford a strong presumption that its former
extent has been found inconvenient, and give room to suppose that fu-
ture experience may discover the propriety and utility of other excep-
1. In this article, the following abbreviated references are used: DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
refers to THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (M. Jensen, J. Kaminski & G. Saladino eds. 1976-89); J. ELLIOT refers to TIIE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CON-
STITUTION (. Elliot ed. 1941); M. FARRAND refers to THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CON-
VENTION OF 1787 (M. Farrand & J. Hutson eds. 1966 & Supp. 1987); FIRST FEDERAL
ELECTIONS refers to THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, 1788-
1790 (M. Jensen, R. Becker & G. DenBoer eds. 1976-86); P. FORD, ESSAYS refers to ESSAYS ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (P. Ford ed. 1982); P. FORD, PAMPHLETS refers to
PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (P. Ford ed. 1968); B.
SCHWARTZ, BILL OF RIGHTS refers to THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (B.
Schwartz ed. 1971); H. STORING refers to THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST (H. Storing ed.
1981).
A few words about terminology are necessary. In this article, "debates" refers to written as
well as oral debates, unless otherwise indicated. The meaning attributed to "social change" is
discussed in the text at notes 10-11 infra. Unless otherwise indicated, the terms "Federalist" and
"Anti-Federalist" are used here to refer not only to ratifiers but also to framers of the Constitu-
tion who held views similar to the opinions expressed by Federalists and Anti-Federalists during
ratification. Such usage is convenient in this article, because most framers appear to have held
opinions on the issues examined here not unlike the opinions of later Federalists. Of course, such
usage may be inappropriate for other purposes, and even in this article is subject to the qualifica-
tion that framers and ratifiers were arguing in very different contexts.
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tions. I suspect it to be impossible in the nature of the thing to fix the
salutary point at which the operation of the institution ought to stop,
and this is with me a strong argument for leaving the matter to the dis-
cretion of the legislature. 2
According to Hamilton, a right to a jury in civil cases would become
obsolete and therefore should be left to the legislature rather than be
fixed in the Constitution.
A similar dispute took place in the Virginia ratification convention
on the subject of the common law. Patrick Henry broadly complained
that the Constitution "ought to have declared the common law in
force."' 3 In response, Edmund Randolph argued that common law
and constitutional law had to be kept distinct:
[T]he common law ought not to be immutably fixed.... It is established
only by an act of the legislature, and can therefore be changed as circum-
stances may require it.... The immutable establishment of the common
law would have been repugnant to that regulation. It would, in many
respects, be destructive to republican principles, and productive of great
inconveniences.... the writ of burning heretics would have been revived
.... It may be established by an act of legislature. Its defective parts
may be altered, and it may be changed and modified as -the convenience
of the public may require it.4
The Constitution contained what was "immutably fixed," whereas the
common law was a repository for laws that would have to be "changed
as circumstances may require it."
These statements reveal some understanding of the idea that law
must change with the development of society, but they also suggest a
distinction between constitutional law, which was rigid or permanent,
and other, flexible law. Almost all of the framers and ratifiers assumed
that constitutions should, by their nature, be permanent. 5 Federalists
and Anti-Federalists differed, however, on what could be permanent.
Anti-Federalists typically advocated a constitution that would inflexi-
bly establish the essentials of liberty and republican government,
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 573 (Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
3. Henry in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 14, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at
447.
4. Randolph in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 14, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1,
at 469-70. George Nicholas also replied to Henry: "What would have been the consequence if it
had [been declared in force]? It would be immutable. But now it can be changed or modified as
the legislative body may find necessary for the community." Nicholas in Virginia Ratification
Convention, June 14, 1788, in id. at 451; see also Letter from James Madison to George Washing-
ton, Oct. 18, 1787, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 129-30.
5. Statements here and later in this article to the effect that framers and ratifiers thought the
Constitution "should" be permanent and fundamental are made with the understanding that
constitutions were often considered to be, by definition, permanent. Most past constitutions,
however, had not been permanent, and the framers and ratifiers appear to have understood that
their choices could determine whether or not the U.S. Constitution would in fact have longevity.
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notwithstanding the probability of social development. This was a
probability of which they were well aware, but they saw a permanent
constitution as an obstacle to undesirable social change and to the loss
of liberty that would accompany such change. Federalists (including
most framers) 6 also assumed constitutions should contain what is per-
manent but perceived that quality in fewer provisions than did Anti-
Federalists. According to Federalists, any law that would have to
change according to circumstances could not be permanent. Such law,
moreover, could not conveniently be flexible unless subject to legisla-
tive modification. On the basis of these arguments, Federalists insisted
on excluding from the Constitution all potentially obsolete proposals
- including many provisions Anti-Federalists considered essential.
Thus, what Anti-Federalists thought should be permanently estab-
lished by the Constitution, Federalists often decried as impermanent
and appropriate only for legislative discretion. Nevertheless, Federal-
ists and Anti-Federalists held some beliefs in common. Although they
disagreed about what was permanent and essential, they shared an as-
sumption that constitutions and, more generally, constitutional law
should be permanent, that is, both inflexible and lasting.
Of course, not all framers and ratifiers conformed exactly to the
opinions outlined above. For example, a relatively small number of
Federalists and Anti-Federalists held these views but also acknowl-
edged that the Constitution might have to be adapted, by amend-
ments, to alterations in society. In general, however - notwith-
standing their different perceptions of social change and permanency
- neither Federalists nor Anti-Federalists thought it appropriate for
constitutional law to change in adaptation to social developments.
The general historical question pursued here can be related to the
twentieth-century controversy about constitutional interpretation and
the nature of constitutional law.7 Commentators have frequently as-
sumed that constitutional law inevitably changes or at least should
6. See supra note 1.
7. Although possibly relevant to problems of interpretation, this article is not an investiga-
tion of the framers' and ratifiers' opinions about interpretation. A more fundamental question
will be pursued here. The ideas of the framers and ratifiers will be discussed in order to elucidate
their expectations of social change and their beliefs about how the Constitution might survive
such change. Interpretation will be discussed only to the limited extent necessary to answer this
broader question about social change.
H. J. Powell argues that the framers did not think their own "personal intentions" were "a
definitive or even particularly valuable guide to constitutional construction." Powell, The Origi-
nal Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REv. 885, 944 (1985). This article does not
directly conflict with Powell's conclusions, for this article does not enquire as to the particular
mode of interpretation desired or expected by the framers and ratifiers. On the other hand, to the
extent Powell suggests the framers or ratifiers wanted constitutional law to be flexible or indeter-
minate, this article dissents.
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change with developments in American society - a position tradition-
ally espoused under the rubric of a "living constitution."' 8 From this
point of view, both new applications of the Constitution and changes
in the nature of our society may require alterations in the rules and
generalizations that comprise much of our constitutional law. As
America has developed, so too, it is said, has our understanding of due
process and other constitutional categories. This assumption - that
constitutional law must change with society - is closely related to
another assumption, that constitutional texts and the law interpreted
from them are, in their nature, relatively indeterminate. To meet
changing circumstances (without frequent resort to the amendment
process), constitutional law allegedly must be flexible; and for consti-
tutional law to be flexible, the Constitution must, in one way or an-
other, be indeterminate. 9 This article will explore whether the framers
and ratifiers had a similar understanding of constitutional law.
Another context for the issue examined here is the debate among
historians about the relationship of law to society. That law, including
constitutional law, reflects the society it serves is one of the truisms of
modem historiography. The way, however, in which law reflects its
environment is much debated. A study of how the framers and ra-
tifiers thought the Constitution could accommodate changes in society
will hardly contribute to a resolution of that controversy, but it may
illuminate the history of the debate.
Incidentally, in elucidating the relationship between society and
law, historians have made many different assumptions about "social
change" and how it should be defined. This article concerns the fram-
ers' and ratiflers' anticipation of what they occasionally called chang-
ing "circumstances" or "exigencies" - in other words, a wide variety
of developments, including some not conventionally designated "social
change." For lack of a better label,10 however, that phrase will here be
8. Some commentators attribute such an understanding of the Constitution to the framers
and ratifiers. Others, in contrast, insist that the Constitution was framed for the circumstances of
the late eighteenth century rather than later periods and that, therefore, it has been especially in
need of adaptation. The historical assumptions of these commentators will be questioned by this
article.
9. A wide variety of interpretive devices can provide some flexibility in interpretation, and all
or almost all of them are based to some degree on the existence or creation of indeterminacy. For
example, judges may find or create textual ambiguities; they may conclude that the Constitution
embodies principles or general language as authoritative as the text; they may reach similar con-
clusions about the purposes of provisions (purposes broader than what the framers and ratifiers
aimed to accomplish); they may determine that the Constitution requires them to apply the "con-
cept" of due process (to take one example) rather than any particular "conception" of due pro-
cess; they even may ask how the framers and ratifiers, if alive today, would have dealt with a
particular modem circumstance.
10. This article uses "social change" rather than the framers' and ratifiers' "changing cir-
November 1989]
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used to refer to the many types of change the framers and ratifiers
considered when creating the Constitution. As a result, this article
will treat as "social change" developments that could be more nar-
rowly categorized as economic, political, cultural, or moral. Not only
changes that alter the fundamental nature of society but also less sub-
stantial alterations and events may be within this broad understand-
ing. Although so expansive a view of "social change" will give little
comfort to those accustomed to a more conventional definition, it will
at least prevent an artificial exclusion of subjects the framers and ra-
tifiers thought relevant. 1
A caveat: The inquiry pursued here concentrates on the views of
the framers and ratifiers while they were creating the Constitution
rather than the development of their ideas before or after that task,
and this focus greatly affects the evidence that will be used. Fortu-
nately, the record of oral and written debates about the Constitution is
extensive. As a result, it is possible to rely largely upon the statements
of the framers and ratifiers themselves.' 2 Other contemporary expres-
sions of opinion are cited to indicate the thoughts to which the framers
and ratifiers were exposed and may have been sympathetic.' 3
Although often highly polemical, the arguments of the framers, ra-
tifiers, and their contemporaries can reveal much about their assump-
tions. 14 Some conceivably relevant evidence, however, will not be
cumstances," because "social change" seems more concrete and because it focuses on framers'
and ratifiers' concern about what are often considered sociologically significant developments.
11. It should also be noted that although many of the framers and ratifiers of the Constitu-
tion were very prescient, this article does not attempt to determine whether they were accurate
prognosticators. Their acuity will on occasion be pointed out but only to show that they under-
stood the potential for change in American society.
12. An assessment of the incompleteness and corruption of the record ofdebates at the fram-
ing and ratifying conventions may be found in Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The
Integrity of the Documentary Record, 65 TEXAS L. REV. I (1986). Hutson points out that these
records often abbreviated or modified what was said. Yet even debates that were not completely
recorded or were rewritten for polemical purposes can reveal much about the assumptions of
those arguing and those they sought to persuade. Although the debates have lost more than just
their bulk as a result of the reporting and editing, the historian of ideas can place some confi-
dence in them, if he (or she) seeks patterns of opinion, and if, when dealing with seriously cor-
rupted records, he does not rest too much of his argument on a single word or phrase in a single
speech.
13. Expressions of opinion, however, especially Anti-Federalist opinion, may have been more
moderate in the framing and ratifying conventions than out of doors. The constraints of polite
behavior that usually prevailed in the conventions had less effect on the written debate, especially
when that debate was anonymous. The conventions brought together relatively small groups of
men, many of whom were known to one another either personally or by reputation. Animosities
often had to be subordinated to the various requirements of courtesy, gentlemanly behavior,
republican egalitarianism, social deference, and a natural deference to reputed and conspicuously
displayed ability.
14. The necessities of persuasion - particularly the adoption of opponents' assumptions for
rhetorical reasons - may have contributed to the appearance of overlapping opinions. The over-
lap, however, was not merely rhetorical. Indeed, the polemical approach of many on each side
[Vol. 88:239
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relied upon. In particular, subsequent expressions of opinion (even if
only slightly later) and retrospective accounts of opinions allegedly
held during the making of the Constitution may be misleading sources
of evidence. Opinions expressed after ratification may have been dif-
ferent from views held during that contest. Moreover, recollections of
views held earlier may have been the product of hindsight. In light of
the plethora of contemporary evidence, the possibility of changes in
opinion, and the difficulty of assessing the effect of hindsight, it seems
unnecessary and unwise to depend on later and riskier sources.15 In
its examination of the Bill of Rights, this article makes similar distinc-
tions about the relevant evidence. 16
I. EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY THEORIES OF SOCIAL
AND LEGAL CHANGE
Before discussing the framers' and ratifiers' views on how the Con-
stitution could accommodate changes in society, it is useful to examine
the intellectual context of their beliefs. Citing Kuhn's view of para-
digms and Pocock's notion of ideology, Banning has written:
No man's thought is altogether free. Men are born into an intellectual
universe where some ideas are native and others are difficult to conceive.
Sometimes this intellectual universe is so well structured and has so
may have created the appearance of greater disagreement on general political assumptions than
actually existed.
15. Occasionally, however, they will be mentioned for purposes of context or comparison.
16. It is understood that there are dangers in attempting to identify the views of any group of
persons such as the framers and ratifiers. Even within smaller groups, individuals frequently do
not share opinions beyond the most superficial levels of understanding. This article requires
particular caution, because it seeks the framers' and ratifiers' views on an issue that some of them
addressed only indirectly or in a now outmoded vocabulary.
On some issues, evidence survives concerning the opinions of only a few persons, not infre-
quently the most voluble, the most perspicacious, and the most articulate proponents of their
point of view. In the case of Madison, Hamilton, and Wilson, for example, it is apparent that
their fellow Federalists did not always entirely agree with them. More commonly, the record is
silent as to whether other Federalists understood or concurred. The role of Madison, Hamilton,
and Wilson as leaders in the spoken and written debates suggests that their views found consider-
able support.
What the framers and ratifiers thought and what they were capable of saying were, of course,
very different. For example, Madison stated his analysis of factions with a sophistication and
penetration peculiar to him. Some Federalists who heard or read Madison's opinions probably
felt that they concurred, yet it is utterly improbable that they all could fully understand or de-
scribe the point of view themselves without greatly simplifying and thereby modifying it. Thus in
the ratification debates, some Federalists expressed opinions similar but not identical to
Madison's. Even if derivative, their statements were slightly different. Did they disagree with
Madison on the question of factions? They probably thought not.
The varying capabilities of the framers and ratifiers were not the only causes of differences
between what was thought and what was said. The framers and ratifiers could be less than
candid, and some were quite skillful in this respect. Like all more-or-less public debates, the
debate on the Constitution does not always directly reveal the beliefs of the participants. This is
not, however, a reason for abandoning an inquiry about those opinions. It merely suggests a
need for caution.
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strong a hold that it can virtually determine not only the ways in which a
society will express its hopes and discontents but also the central
problems with which it will be concerned. In 1789 Americans lived in
such a world. The heritage of classical republicanism and English oppo-
sition thought, shaped and hardened in the furnace of a great Revolu-
tion, left few men free. This universe contained no familiar ways of
thinking about gradual constitutional improvement .... 17
As will be seen, however, a variety of theories of society or law were
familiar to many Americans, and these theories assumed at least two
approaches to the possibility of change. Some acknowledged social
and legal change; some suggested law to be relatively static. Conse-
quently, when developing their ideas on the Constitution's accommo-
dation of social change, Americans could choose among, and draw
upon, potentially conflicting intellectual traditions.18
A. The Theories
One of the oldest theories on the relationship between legal and
social change involved natural law - rules of morality that men were
thought to ascertain through the use of "right reason." Of course,
many natural law writers acknowledged the need for variation in
human laws. Such was the position of Thomas Aquinas. 19 Similarly,
another great apologist of another church, Richard Hooker, employed
natural law to justify Anglican deviations from the practices of the
early church fathers, and he was, therefore, especially attentive to dif-
ferences in obligations over time.20 More frequently, however, partic-
ularly in connection with constitutional issues, a very different
emphasis was apparent. To the extent natural and positive law not
only reflected moral precepts but also more directly embodied them,
17. Banning, Republican Ideology and the Triumph of the Constitution, 1789 to 1793, 31 WM.
& MARY Q. 167, 178-79 (1974). In contrast, it is suggested here that at least a substantial por-
tion of educated Americans had a mixed intellectual inheritance and therefore were not unfree in
the sense suggested by Banning. For a broad reexamination of the study of ideologies, see R.
LERNER, The Constitution and the Thinking Revolutionary, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION 38 (R.
Beeman, S. Botein & E. Carter II eds. 1987).
18. An elegant contribution to the literature on social and legal change is P. STEIN, LEGAL
EVOLUTION (1980). For a recent examination of eighteenth-century theories of social change in
an American context, see D. McCoY, THE ELUSIVE REPUBLIC (1980). There is also an exten-
sive literature on the history of the idea of progress. See, e.g., J. BURY, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS
(1920); S. POLLARD, THE IDEA OF PROGRESS (1968).
19. E. LEWIS, MEDIEVAL POLITICAL IDEAS 12 (1954).
20. F. PAGET, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE FIFTH BOOK OF HOOKER'S TREATISE OF THE
LAWS OF ECCLESIASTICAL POLITY 101-03 (1899). Natural law was permanent and binding, but
positive laws could, thought Hooker, be either permanent or mutable, according to their subjects
and circumstances. R. HOOKER, Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity, in THE WORKS 272-73, 388
(I.xv. 1 & III.x.5) (1888). See also natural law discussions of desuetude and the duration of laws,
e.g., Burlamaqui, Principles ofNatural and Politic Laws, I.x. 14.
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they were, apparently, immutable, and law that was immutable might
bind even kings.
These strong suggestions of permanence were to a degree under-
mined by a new development in the discussion of "natural law": the
analysis that continued to address natural law but explicitly posited a
state of nature in which that law was supposed to be binding.21 The
sovereign to which individuals in a state of nature surrendered their
natural liberty, whether a monarch or the people, could choose to alter
the law as it saw fit. The attempts of some theorists to describe con-
tractual limits on government did not diminish the possibility of
change. In America, where notions of contractual limits and popular
sovereignty were well-received (and frequently combined), 22 it was
said that the people had a right to alter their constitution "at any time,
for any cause, or for no cause, but their own sovereign pleasure. '23
Without implying that law would necessarily be mutable, such ideas
could call into question any assumptions that constitutional law
should be unchanging.
Nevertheless, natural law theories continued to nurture expecta-
tions of unchanging constitutional law. Contractual limitations on
government were often described as "fundamental law" - a phrase
long associated with immutable limitations. Moreover, just as many
Americans thought that all positive law should reflect the moral
precepts of natural law, so too some hoped that constitutional law
would be drafted on the basis of the unchanging principles of human
nature and politics that increasingly were becoming known.24 Indeed,
improved knowledge of human nature would permit the drafters of
constitutions to identify the limitations fundamental or essential to the
preservation of liberty, and what was fundamental to liberty did not
seem to be something that should change.
Another highly influential approach to the development of law and
society rested on ideas about the antiquity of the common law and the
21. Often, this later theory is said to concern the "law of nature," as distinguished from the
earlier "natural law" theory. Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century writers, however, did not al-
ways use these labels in this way.
22. Americans could find these ideas already combined in Vattel's writing. J. GOUGH, THE
SOCIAL CONTRACT 161 (2d ed. 1957).
23. B. Hichborn, Oration Delivered At Boston (March 5, 1777), in PRINCIPLES AND ACTS
OF THE REVOLUTION IN AMERICA 22 (H. Niles ed. 1822).
24. According to John Adams, the "heavenly bodies... do not appear to be governed by
laws more uniform or certain than those that regulate the moral and political world." John
Adams on the Constitution, N.Y. Journal (Feb. 23, 1788), in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 193; see also D. BOORSTIN, THE MYSTERIOUS SCIENCE OF LAW ch. 1 (1967); Hoeflich,
Law and Geometry: Legal Science from Leibniz to Langdell, 30 AM. J. LEGAL. HIST. 95 (1980);
Shapiro, Law and Science in Seventeenth Century England, 21 STAN. L. REv. 727 (1969).
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English constitution.25 Common lawyers, arguing and writing chiefly
in the seventeenth century, developed a theory that the common law,
the English constitution, and particularly the House of Commons,
were of ancient origin and had existed since the earliest mists of antiq-
uity. Historically, this claim was false. Politically, it had immense
appeal, for it supported assertions on behalf of the common law and
soon also Parliamentary sovereignty and Englishmen's rights. Conse-
quently, the assertion that there was an ancient constitution played a
crucial role in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political debates on
both sides of the Atlantic. What is striking for purposes of this inquiry
was not only its insistence that the institutions of the common law and
the English constitution had existed from time immemorial but also its
implication that the basic structure of English society was unchanging.
The common law, however, gave rise to more than one perspective
on legal change. Although ancient, the common law was customary
and therefore potentially flexible, and on this basis, some seventeenth-
century English historians developed a new understanding of the rela-
tionship between law and society. 26 Among these historians were Sel-
den and Spelman, whose early explorations of feudal law suggested
that the legal system had undergone great changes. The physician and
tory polemicist, Robert Brady, took their work to its logical conclu-
sion. Troubled by both the historical inaccuracies and the political
consequences of the ancient-constitution theory, Brady investigated
the antiquity of the common law and Parliament. In so doing, he dis-
covered the distinctive nature of feudalism and feudal law. He estab-
lished that the structure of English society, landholding, and
government had been fundamentally different in feudal times from
what they were in the late seventeenth century, and that in the feudal
period the common law and the English constitution had been corre-
spondingly different. As Pocock has shown, Brady thus suggested
that law and society can change and that they changed together. In-
deed, Brady seems to have implied that modifications in the law were
caused by social developments. 27
Although, for political reasons, Brady's approach was hardly pop-
25. For the information in this and the next paragraph, I have relied upon J. PococK, THE
ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW (1987) [hereinafter J. POCOCK, FEUDAL
LAW].
26. Of course, this perspective was "new" only within the limited context of seventeenth- and
eighteenth-century British legal thought. For earlier views of legal change, also prompted by
acquaintance with feudal law, see Kelley, Clio and the Lawyers: Forms ofHistorical Conscious-
ness in Medieval Jurisprudence, 5 MEDIEVALIA ET HUMANISTICA (n.s.) 25 (1974). See also E.
KANTOROWIcz, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIAEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY
273-84 (1957); text accompanying supra note 20.
27. J. POCOCK, FEUDAL LAW, supra note 25, at 197-98, 208-09.
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ular, a related analysis became an important element of English polit-
ical thought, largely through the writing of Matthew Hale and, much
later, Edmund Burke. In his influential history of the common law,
Hale used metaphors to concede the unchanging nature of the com-
mon law and yet simultaneously assert its mutability:
[W]e may with just Reason say, They are the same English Laws now,
that they were 600 Years since in the general. As the Argonauts Ship
was the same when it returned home, as it was when it went out, tho' in
that long Voyage it had successive Amendments, and scarce came back
with any of its former Materials .... 28
With this image, Hale acknowledged the antiquity and legitimacy of
the seventeenth-century constitution. Having done this, he could
safely and more accurately discuss changes in the law and their rela-
tion to developments in society:
Laws, the further they go from their original Institution, grow the larger,
and the more numerous: In the first Coalition of a People, their Prospect
is not great, they provide Laws for their present Exigence and Conven-
ience: But in Process of Time, possibly their first Laws are changed,
altered or antiquated, as some of the Laws of the Twelve Tables among
the Romans were: But whatsoever be done touching their Old Laws,
there must of Necessity be a Provision of New, and other Laws and
Emergencies, that in a long Tract of Time will offer themselves. 29
Hale's account of common law contributed to a tradition that es-
chewed the two extremes of static law and law subject to dramatic or
revolutionary change.30 Hale thus contributed to a later perception of
common law as the embodiment of what was best in English political
culture - an acceptance and even veneration of inherited institutions
combined with a slow, careful, and almost imperceptible adaptation of
those institutions to the changing exigencies of society.31 From this
perspective, the English constitution was successful because it could
incrementally keep pace with the development of society yet could also
maintain the appearance of unchanged antiquity, which was essential
to its legitimacy.
Already, it should be apparent that two rather different under-
28. M. HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW OF ENGLAND 40 (C. Grey ed. 1971)
(originally published in 1713); see also id. at xxi-xxiii.
29. Id. at 41.
30. Hale was well aware of this dichotomy. See Hale, Considerations Touching the Alteration
or Amendment of Lawes, in I F. HARGRAVE, A COLLECTION OF TRACTS 249 (1787).
31. This tradition is usually associated with its most eloquent proponent, Edmund Burke.
Hale's contribution has been discussed by J. POCOCK, Burke and the Ancient Constitution: A
Problem in the History of Ideas, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME 216-24 (1971). Burke may
have drawn some of his ideas from the Scottish theorists and historians as well as from Hale.
Note that Burke's appreciation of common law traditions was connected to his concern about the
effect of abstract political principles - a concern that has striking parallels in the sixth edition of
Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments, published in same year, 1790, as Burke's Reflections.
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standings of legal and social change could be drawn from the available
theories. One understanding acknowledged the mutability of law -
including constitutional law - in conformity with changes in society.
The other emphasized what was immutable, especially in constitu-
tional law. Americans, it will be seen, increasingly employed both
forms of analysis, recognizing the adaptive nature of most law but be-
lieving constitutional law was permanent.
Before closing this account of theories on social and legal change,
it is necessary to examine some largely nonlegal theories, the oldest of
which was apparent in the rudimentary account of social development
associated with Aristotle and Polybius. These writers and others de-
rivative of them recognized the phenomenon of political decay and
described how democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy could degener-
ate into, respectively, anarchy, oligarchy, and tyranny. Each of the
various types of government constituted a stage in an almost inevitable
cycle of degeneration. Aristotle and Polybius deplored such changes
and became influential as advocates of the mixed government, in
which the characteristics of each of the other types of government har-
monized or perhaps balanced each other.32 Although these were theo-
ries of government, they implied and eventually came to be
understood as social theories too. For example, Montesquieu argued
that each type of government could survive a different degree of lux-
ury, sophistication, and individual selfishness, a democracy or republic
requiring the greatest frugality and self-sacrifice from its citizens. 33
Further, it was a simple and logical step for classical and especially
seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English writers to discuss the
constitutions of the one, the few, and the many in terms of social
classes. Such social analysis of constitutions was well known, even
platitudinous, in both England and America. 34
An additional approach to society and law is apparent in the An-
glo-American political thought that made use of classical ideas, espe-
cially as reinterpreted by Machiavelli - an approach that has been
labelled, among other things, "civic humanism. ' '35 Writers in this tra-
32. According to M. Lienesch, Federalists thought "a perpetually balanced federal Constitu-
tion seemed capable of continuing forever.... The Federal Constitution was created to apply
equally to every age, never running down, wearing out, or falling into despair. As far as these
Federalists writers were concerned, the new republic could continue in this state forever .. "
M. LIENESCH, NEW ORDER OF THE AGES 135 (1988).
33. MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF LAWS (D. Carrithers ed. 1977) (T. Nugent trans. 1750).
34. For the Polybian analysis and its reception in America, see H. COLBOURN, THE LAMP
OF EXPERIENCE 191 (1965); B. BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 67-76 (1967); M. LIENESCH, supra note 32, at 68.
35. "Civic humanism" is a modern term for the republican analysis of government associated
with Machiavelli, Harrington, and others. Frequently, it is referred to by the more traditional
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dition frequently sought to explain how a government could remain
stable and survive. In classical and, more emphatically, civic human-
ist analysis, the virtue or public-spiritedness of the citizens would re-
strain their passions and discourage the factionalism that had
undermined most governments; in reality, however, such virtue or self-
restraint seemed to be a scarce commodity. Consequently, various
post-Renaissance political writers struggled to find a means of en-
couraging civic virtue or otherwise promoting stability. Among other
things, they turned to the ancient solution of mixed government,
through which the interests of the one, the few, and the many would,
perhaps, balance each other.
To a considerable extent, the civic humanist writers of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries assumed that the form of government
is affected both by the mores of the citizenry and by class structure.
The changing mores of the citizens were thought to lead to transfor-
mations in the forms of government. Perhaps already in classical
times and certainly by the seventeenth century, the classical mixed
government was believed to be grounded upon social classifications -
in England, the monarch, the aristocracy, and commoners. Similarly,
when Harrington described the imaginary republic of Oceana, he
sought to base it on the stable foundation of a large class of landown-
ing gentry.36 When transposed in the eighteenth century from Eng-
land to America, where landowning farmers were abundant,
Harrington's vision lost its aristocratic character and became strik-
ingly egalitarian. For Harrington and the many who followed him,
land became a precondition for civic virtue, and changes in social
structure were understood to have a profound effect upon the form of
government and its stability.37
Although they recognized that social structure influenced the form
of government, civic-humanist writers did not escape the vocabulary
of virtue. Authors influenced by civic humanism or interested in re-
publican government frequently thought that the permanence and sta-
and felicitous "republicanism." In this article, however, it is necessary to distinguish among the
various meanings of the word "republicanism," and therefore that word is used only to mean a
participatory type or nature of government. Note that persons who employed the analysis of
civic humanism did not always favor or even discuss republican government.
Civic humanism has given rise to a vast literature. This essay draws upon J. POCOCK, THE
MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (1975); J. POCOCK, Civic Humanism and ts Role in Anglo-American
Thought, in POLITICS, LANGUAGE AND TIME, supra note 31, at 80 [hereinafter J. POCOCK, Civic
Humanism]; 1 H. STORING, supra note 1. As has recently been pointed out, civic humanism did
not have as much continuity with classical thought as has sometimes been suggested, and espe-
cially in its Anglo-American form it was frequently consistent with liberalism. See T. PANGLE,
THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM (1988).
36. J. HARRINGTON, THE COMMONWEALTH OF OCEANA (1656).
37. Id.
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bility of government depended upon the nature and stability of a
government's social foundations. 38 In particular, political writers
found a basis for the preservation of republican government in the fru-
gal, independent, and virtuous citizen. They attributed importance to
the ownership of land, largely because land could provide the indepen-
dence so necessary for virtue. Consequently, rather than discuss
change, many eighteenth-century Englishmen and Americans tended
to refer to decline and degeneration, and rather than address questions
of social change as such, they were apt to talk of a loss of virtue, a
corruption of manners, or an increase in luxury.
Thus, civic humanism gave rise to a very one-sided consideration
of social and legal changes and their effect on each other. It usually
presented social change in the narrow and negative vocabulary of
moral decay and assumed that such change inevitably led to the de-
generation of government. Advocates of republican government
therefore hoped to establish laws that would maintain or at least not
undermine the manners and morals necessary for the preservation of
republicanism. They sought to delay constitutional degeneration by
staving off the decay of manners.
More than civic humanism, the work of Montesquieu reveals a di-
rect and theoretical interest in the relationship between law and soci-
ety. Montesquieu argued that laws could be efficacious only by
reflecting the spirit of their society. Laws and systems of government
had to vary from country to country according to a variety of factors,
including climate and size of territory. Montesquieu thus argued that
laws and systems of government should to some degree be determined
by the nature of the society that they would affect.39 He did not di-
rectly address the effect that changes in a society would have upon the
laws. Yet his work clearly implied that changes in society should af-
fect the laws, including the constitution of government. 40
By far the most sophisticated concept of social and legal change
was the notion of progress and the increasing refinement of society
38. In addition, the permanence of government was naturally associated with a fixed rather
than a changing social structure. John Nelson has written that "[c]ommon to the founders was
the assumption that economic disruption portended political unrest and social upheaval." J.
NELSON, LIBERTY AND PROPERTY xiii (1987).
39. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 33, bk. 1, ch. 3, at 104-05.
40. From the opposite perspective, he argued that laws were capable of affecting society.
Like many who were influenced by civic humanism, he was an advocate of laws that would
maintain in the people those qualities that would preserve the system of government, whether a
republic, aristocracy, or monarchy. For a discussion of the relationship between Montesquieu's
ideas and the notion of legal change, see P. STEIN, supra note 18, at 15-19. Among the French,
Fontenelle and Gouget also developed theories of social and legal change but were not as influen-
tial in the English-speaking world as Montesquieu or the Scots.
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elaborated by some Scottish moral philosophers.41 Drawing on an ec-
lectic intellectual inheritance, including the theories outlined above,
some Scots began systematically to explore how societies progress over
time. The issue was not purely speculative, for educated Scots could
not help but observe the backwardness of their country. They ex-
amined the development of commerce, arts and sciences, living stan-
dards, morals, and tastes. Hume's influential examination of these
subjects challenged the classical and civic humanist assumption that
commerce and luxury necessarily posed dangers to free govern-
ments.42 In accord with Hume's somewhat progressive view of soci-
ety, Smith, Dalrymple, Ferguson, Kames, and Millar outlined versions
of social development in four historical stages.4 3 In general, they
traced human society from periods of barbarism, during which men
and women subsisted by hunting and gathering, to later times of pas-
toral existence, then agriculture, and finally extensive commercial de-
velopment. It was this commercial stage that they perceived Britain to
be just then entering.44 To these Scots, the development of societies
seemed progressive, and, for most, such development was largely ad-
vantageous. In this respect, the Scots departed sharply from the tradi-
tion of civic humanism, which addressed social change almost
exclusively in terms of decay and degeneration. Thus, the Scots pro-
duced what are frequently considered to be the first systematic theo-
ries of progressive social change - the earliest historical sociology. 45
In their theories, the Scots described how human institutions, in-
cluding law and government, changed and adapted over time to keep
pace with the advancement of society. Hume, Dalrymple, Kames,
41. Bacon contributed much to the development of the idea of progress but is relegated to a
footnote because his publications were not as directly related to social change and were not as
clearly influential upon the framers and ratifiers as were the writings of the Scots. Bacon envi-
sioned that scientific study could lead to extraordinary improvements in knowledge and material
comforts. His account of a utopia, in The New Atlantis (1627), suggested the possibility of what
then must have seemed fabulous changes. The book now seems astonishingly prescient.
The view of human progress that could have been perceived in accounts of the development
of society from the state of nature is not discussed here, because these accounts were not histori-
cal, and, to the extent they were perceived as such, they were rendered obsolete by, among
others, the Scots. For the attitudes of Hutcheson and Hume toward seventeenth-century con-
cepts of the state of nature, see P. STEIN, supra note 18, at 11-12.
42. Robertson, The Scottish Enlightenment at the Limits of the Civic Tradition, in WEALTH
AND VIRTUE 137, 157 (1983).
43. P. STEIN, supra note 18, at ch. 2. For the sources of the four-stages theory in the work of
Montesquieu, Stair, and natural lawyers, see MacCormick, Law and Enlightenment, in THE ORI-
GINS AND NATURE OF THE ScoTrISH ENLIGHTENMENT 160 (R. Campbell & A. Skinner eds.
1982).
44. Ferguson doubted whether such change was an unmixed blessing. A. FERGUSON, A
HISTORY OF THE ORIGINS OF CIVIL SOCIETY (1767).
45. For general accounts of the Scottish social theories, see G. BRYSON, MAN AND SOCIETY
(1945) and R. MEEK, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND THE IGNOBLE SAVAGE (1976).
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Smith, Ferguson, and Millar argued that laws and governments had
first been as rudimentary as the barbaric societies they served and had
gradually become more sophisticated as changes in society made such
institutional improvements necessary or desirable.4 6 Since antiquated
law could retard the development of society, legal reform was an apt
means of facilitating social progress. Thus, the Scots argued that the
form and nature of government would and ought to change with soci-
ety's continued development.4 7
Of course, many of these theories addressed social change and its
relationship to legal development only indirectly or for peripheral rea-
sons. Moreover, many of the theories were at times used in conjunc-
tion or confused combination with one another. Nevertheless, they
clearly presented rather varied accounts, and if Americans were aware
of these theories, they could easily have perceived at least two rather
different perspectives on the relationship between social change and
law - including constitutional law.
B. American Awareness of Such Theories
Most of the theories that touched upon questions of social and
legal change were well known in America. For some such theories, it
is a commonplace that Americans were aware of them; for others, por-
tions of the evidence must be assembled here.
That Americans knew the work of Montesquieu has long been un-
derstood and is evident from countless eighteenth-century American
writings. It is now also apparent that a relatively wide range of late
eighteenth-century Americans were familiar with some accounts of
natural law, with the notion of the ancient constitution, and with civic
humanism.48
In contrast, American awareness of the adaptability of common
law is not altogether clear. Even prior to the influence of Brady and
Hale, the ideas upon which they built were known. Already in 1639,
46. On this subject generally, see P. STEIN, supra note 18, at 23-50. For discussion of Hume,
see Robertson, supra note 42, at 151-77. For Kames, see Lieberman, The Legal Needs of a
Commercial Society: The Jurisprudence of Lord Kames, in WEALTH AND VIRTUE, supra note
42, at 203.
47. Although introduced by Scottish writers, these ideas soon were widely known and advo-
cated in England.
48. For classical and civic humanist thought, see B. BAILYN, supra note 34, and G. WOOD,
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787 (1969). For the ancient constitution,
see J. POCOCK, Civic Humanism, supra note 35, at 96-99. Although there is a dispute as to how
Americans made use of natural law, see infra text at note 65, there is agreement that they studied
natural law treatises. B. BAILYN, supra note 34, at 180-206; Berns, Judicial Review and the
Rights and Laws of Nature, 3 Sup. CT. REV. 49, 67, 76-77 (1982). For more on their reading of
natural law, see infra note 71.
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most of the magistrates and some of the elders of Massachusetts op-
posed a written statement of fundamental law, on the ground that
"such laws would be fittest for us, which should arise pro re nata upon
occasions, etc., and so the laws of England and other states grew, and
therefore the fundamental laws of England are called customs, consue-
tudines." 49 American familiarity with such ideas, however, was not
always so well documented. Although on occasion in the eighteenth
century Brady was cited, there is no evidence that he was well
known.50 Hale may have been more influential, albeit chiefly among
lawyers.51 In his 1790 law lectures, Wilson paraphrased Hale on legal
and social change, and it is probable that other American lawyers
knew Hale's work on this subject.52
The American reception of Scottish thought has been discussed by
Douglas Adair, Garry Wills, and Stephen Conrad, among others, but
an account more focused on the Scottish sociology must be consid-
ered.5 3 Having studied at Scottish universities, James Wilson's knowl-
edge of Scottish sociology was more extensive than that of most of his
49. 1 J. WINTHROP, WINTHROP'S JOURNAL "HISTORY OF NEW ENGLAND," 1630-1649, at
323-24 (J. Hosmer ed. 1908).
50. Richard Bland apparently derived some notions of constitutional change from Brady's
writings. See Bland, An Inquiry into the Rights of the British Colonies, in AMERICAN POLITICAL
WRITING OF THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760-1805, at 67, 70-72 (1983); see also From the Craftsman,
in id. at 62-63. In the framing Convention, Pinckney gave an account of English constitutional
history that may have reflected the views of Brady or Spelman. M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
410 (June 25, 1787).
51. At least five libraries in colonial Virginia contained Hale's History. W. BRYSON, CENSUS
OF LAW BOOKS IN COLONIAL VIRGINIA 53 (1978). In 1760, a leading New York lawyer, Wil-
liam Smith, recommended to a law student a list of reading that included Hale's History. C.
WARREN, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN BAR 170 (1911). In 1782, James Kent abridged the
book. Id. at 182.
52. According to Wilson:
It is the characteristic of a system of common law that it be accommodated to the circum-
stances, the exigencies, and the conveniences of the people, by whom it is appointed. Now,
as these circumstances, and exigencies, and conveniences insensibly change; a proportioned
change, in time and in degree, must take place in the accommodated system. But though
the system suffer these partial and successive alterations, yet is continues materially and
substantially the same. The ship of the Argonauts became not another vessel, though almost
every part of her materials had been altered during the course of her voyage.
1 WORKS OF J. WILSON 453-54 (J. Andrews 2d ed. 1895).
53. See Adair, "That Politics May Be Reduced to a Science'" David Hume, James Madison,
and the Tenth Federalist, in FAME AND THE FOUNDING FATHERS 93 (T. Colbourn ed. 1974); G.
WILLS, INVENTING AMERICA (1978); G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA (1981); Conrad, Polite
Foundation: Citizenship and Common Sense in James Wilson's Republican Theory, 1984 Sup.
CT. REV. 359. Adair and Wills have concentrated on Madison's development of Hume's ideas in
Federalist Number 10; Wills has also studied the influence of the Scots (especially Hutcheson and
Kames) upon Jefferson and others of the revolutionary generation; Conrad has elegantly demon-
strated how Wilson made use of Reid's "common sense" philosophy. This article relies on their
scholarship but focuses on one aspect of it: American knowledge of Scottish sociology. In this
regard, note that F. McDonald has recently argued that Scottish ideas on progress were influen-
tial in America. F. McDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF
THE CONSTITUTION 119-23, 131-35 (1985).
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American contemporaries. He wrote a history of property and in 1790
gave a series of law lectures that were thoroughly imbued with the
modem sociology and its account of legal change. On the subject of
social change, Wilson believed that "[ilt is the glorious destiny of man
to be always progressive.... [A]ll may be carried to a degree of perfec-
tion hitherto unknown; perhaps, hitherto not believed."5 4 Of legal
change, he explained:
In the first association of a community, their prospect is not enlarged,
their wants are comparatively few: but as the society increases, their
views expand, and their wishes multiply: what is the consequence? New
laws and provisions, suited to the growing multitude of successive exi-
gencies, must be made....
The same principle of accommodation in a system of common law,
will adjust its improvement to every grade and species of improvement
made by the people, in consequence of practice, commerce, observation,
study, and refinement. 55
Wilson continued with an account of how some laws are made obso-
lete by changes in society and throughout his lectures gave extensive
examples of all types of social and legal change. Of course, Wilson
knew more about Scottish thought than most of his American contem-
poraries and, conveniently for the historian, pronounced his version of
it at length. Yet Wilson was not alone in his pursuit of the historical
sociology.
A substantial number of the framers and ratifiers probably studied
the Scottish sociology in American schools. As Adair has pointed out,
nine members of the Constitutional Convention, including James
Madison, attended Princeton, where the Edinburgh-trained Professor
Witherspoon transmitted his version of the Scottish enlightenment, in-
cluding the historical sociology. 56 Not only at Princeton, according to
Adair, but also "at William and Mary, at Pennsylvania, at Yale, at
King's, and at Harvard, the young men who rode off to war in 1776
54. 1 WORKS OF J. WILSON, supra note 52, at 126.
55. Id. at 454.
56. Witherspoon's surviving lectures did not directly address the question of changes in soci-
ety or law. See J. WITHERSPOON, AN ANNOTATED EDITION OF LECTURES ON MORAL PHILOS-
OPHY (J. Scott ed. 1982). It is improbable, however, that his students would have been unaware
of at least some of the Scottish sociological ideas. Witherspoon is known to have discussed Rob-
ertson's Charles Vand he included, among others, Hutcheson, Hume, and Ferguson in his read-
ing list. R. KETCHUM, JAMES MADISON, A BIOGRAPHY 43-45 (1971). Goguet was also
mentioned. Id. at 189-91. Of course, this is not to suggest that Witherspoon altogether approved
of these authors. Note that in 1782, when Madison prepared a list of books to be purchased for a
congressional library, he included Ferguson's Civil Society, Hume's Political Essays and History
of England, Robertson's Charles V and History of Scotland, and Smith's Wealth of Nations. 6
THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 65-115 (W. Hutchinson and W. Rachal eds.) (1969), cited in
G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA, supra note 53, at 20.
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had been trained in the texts of Scottish social science."'57 Scottish
treatises "had become the standard textbooks of the colleges of the late
colonial period."58
The framers and ratifiers also had opportunities to learn about
Scottish ideas on their own, for Scottish books arguing that changes in
society led to changes in the law were well-represented in American
libraries. A study of 121 American library and booksellers' lists dat-
ing from 1700 to 1790 (92 of which date from before 1777) reveals the
following: 49 lists contained Hume's Essays; 65 had his History of
England; 19 had Ferguson's Essay on the History of Civil Society; 55
showed Kames' Sketches of the History of Man; and 28 Smith's Wealth
of Nations.59 All of these works proposed that society had changed
and was still in the process of changing. All but Kames' Sketches as-
serted that as a result of changes in society, law and government had
also undergone alterations. 60 Of course, it is difficult to determine the
extent to which these writers were read or how they were interpreted,
but the relatively high representation of these authors in surviving li-
brary and booksellers' lists clearly indicates at least that their ideas
were available to Americans and even that they elicited some
interest.61
57. Adair, supra note 53, at 95.
58. Id. For the general influence of the Scots on American education, see D. SLOAN, THE
SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE AMERICAN COLLEGE IDEAL (1971). Although students
probably read moral and philosophical volumes far more frequently than books on the historical
sociology, they could not easily have escaped some knowledge of the latter.
59. Lundberg & May, The Enlightened Reader in America, 28 AM. Q. 262 (1976). In 1775,
Madison purchased a volume by Ferguson, probably his Essay. 1 I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON 77
(1941). Thirty-one lists had Ferguson's History of the Roman Republic. Id. At least four of the
framers and ratifiers are known to have read The Wealth of Nations. L. Piscatelli, The Meaning
of Direct Taxes in the U.S. Constitution (unpublished manuscript) citing, inter alia: Letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, April 27, 1785, in 8 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 111
(1971); Letter from Rufus King to Elbridge Gerry, June 5, 1785, 1 LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE
OF RUFUS KING 109 (1894); Stevens, Adam Smith and the Colonial Disturbances, in ESSAYS ON
ADAM SMITH 203 (1975) (regarding B. Franklin); H. FORD, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 256
(1920). One writer defended the Constitution by citing Wealth of Nations for the proposition
that in some cases a standing army is not dangerous to liberty. Civis Rusticus, Va. Independent
Chronicle, Jan. 30, 1787, in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 338. James Kent -
not a framer or ratifier - was reading the book during the autumn of 1787. Letter from James
Kent to Nathaniel Lawrence, Nov. 9, 1787, in 14 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 75.
60. Kames addressed the effects of social change upon the law less directly in his Sketches
than in certain other works, but the American circulation of those other writings is as yet un-
clear. By 1773, at least two libraries in Virginia had his Historical Law Tracts, which had been
published in 1758. W. BRYSON, supra note 51, at 59. The course of legal reading given to Ezra
Stiles, Jr., included Kames' History of Law. C. WARREN, supra note 51, at 181. Robertson's
histories, especially his account of Charles V, discussed the development of law in different stages
of society. A similarly relevant English work was Gibbon's Decline and Fall (see ch. 44), which
was on 11 of the 1700-1790 lists studied by Lundberg and May. Lundberg & May, supra note
59.
61. Note that Ferguson's Essay and Kames' Sketches were republished in America in the
1770s. Hamilton was referring to a relatively well-known source when, in the last number of The
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Thus, Americans could make use of very mixed intellectual tradi-
tions on social and legal change- traditions which assumed at least
two general approaches. Having been exposed to the older ideas of
natural law, the notion of the ancient constitution, and civic humanist
concerns for permanence, Americans were familiar with the concept
of permanent, immutable law. On the other hand, a significant
number of Americans, including many who played prominent roles in
the framing and ratifying of the Constitution, had become acquainted
with the theories of Hale and the Scots that society undergoes change
- change that requires or causes a corresponding development of
legal and governmental institutions.62 Americans could also find sug-
gestions of adaptive law in the work of Montesquieu. By means of
these various theories and their two conflicting approaches to legal
and social change, Americans inherited, not a monolithic ideology, but
competing ideas about the relationship between the law and social de-
velopments. 63 As will be seen, the framers and ratifiers drew upon
both approaches, turning to one for their understanding of constitu-
tional law and to the other for their perspective on ordinary law.
Federalist, he quoted at length from Hume's essay on The Rise and Progress of the Arts and
Sciences - an essay in which Hume discussed directly the improvements in government that
occurred with the more general advancement of man. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 85
(A. Hamilton), at 594. In the New York ratifying convention, Hamilton revealed a clear under-
standing of the relationship between the development of commercial wealth in England and as-
sertions of political and legal rights there. See Hamilton in New York Ratification Convention,
2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 264, 354.
62. Also associated with this approach was the work of Brady and Montesquieu and some
aspects of classical and civic humanist analysis.
63. The jumble of different intellectual influences is apparent in the writings of James Wilson,
who relied on Hale and the Scots for accounts of how law changed with social development, but
who also referred to ancient English law and natural law. The odd combination of perspectives,
juxtaposing the authority of King Alfred with that of Lord Kames, seems awkward to modern
readers, but it accurately reflected the diversity of views available to Americans.
Two relevant traditions not mentioned in the text were equity and the continental doctrine on
reasons of state. Equity deviated from rules of law to prevent injustice. The continental doctrine
did so to satisfy needs ofstate. These traditions did not address changes in society, but they both
offered solutions to the legal problems caused by, among other things, a society that outgrew its
law.
In addition, note that seventeenth- and eighteenth-century English writers on economic and
social policy produced many pamphlets and books that often suggested - even if not always in
theoretical terms - a relationship between law and social developments. The economic litera-
ture is discussed by W. LETWIN, THE ORIGINS OF SCIENTIFIC ECONOMICS: ENGLISH ECO-
NOMIC THOUGHT, 1660-1776 (1963); E. HECKSCHER, MERCANTILISM (1935). See also J.
APPLEBY, ECONOMIC THOUGHT AND IDEOLOGY IN SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND
(1978); Appleby, Modernization Theory and the Formation of Modern Social Theories in England
and America, 29 COMP. STUD. IN SOCY. & HIsT. 259 (1978). But see Winch, Economic Liber-
alism as Ideology: The Appleby Version, 38 ECON. HIsT. REV. 287 (1985). For a discussion of
mercantilism and economic theory in the context of America and the legitimization of interest,
see Matson & Onuf, Toward a Republican Empire: Interest and Ideology in Revolutionary
America, 37 AM. Q. 496, 502 (1985).
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II. THE NEWER CONCEPT OF A CONSTITUTION AND THE IDEA
OF PERMANENCE
American analysis of the Constitution's relationship to social
change was complicated by the existence of at least two different con-
ceptions of a constitution. From one perspective, a constitution was
the arrangement and nature of government, which was embodied in
practice or in custom and law. Americans, however, had also inher-
ited a somewhat different and relatively new understanding of a consti-
tution, according to which a constitution consisted of express
restraints on government. Although the two conceptions occasionally
merged, they also could be distinct.
The newer understanding of a constitution developed over a long
period but particularly in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
through the combination of developments in both common law and
natural law. During the seventeenth century, England's constitutional
customs were widely considered fundamental law - law that re-
strained the government, including to some degree Parliament. 64 Eng-
land's dramatic constitutional struggles and the discussion of such
events in terms of ancient legal custom gave importance and currency
to English constitutional traditions and shaped them into powerful,
albeit incomplete, limitations on government.
These English constitutional ideas were complemented by modem
natural law treatises, which gave Americans a philosophical account
64. The importance of English legal traditions for the development of American constitution-
alism has been suggested by Stanley Katz. Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary
Interpretation, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION, supra note 17, at 30, 36-37; see also Greene, From
the Perspective of Law: Context and Legitimacy in the Origins of the American Revolution, 85 S.
ATL. Q. 56 (1986); Lutz, Bernard Bailyn, Gordon S. Wood, and Whig Political Theory, POL. SCi.
REVR. III (Fall 1977); 1 & 2 J. REID, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION (1986-1987). Bernard Bailyn argues that the newer understanding of constitu-
tional law developed chiefly in America in the 1770s. B. BAILYN, supra note 34, at 182-84. Katz
points out, however, that Bailyn's account fails adequately to recognize the importance of earlier
English constitutional struggles and ideas. The concept of constitutional limitations had a prom-
inent history in England long before 1776. On constitutionalism in general, see Stourzh, Consti-
tution: Changes in Meanings of the Term from the Early Seventeenth to the Late Eighteenth
Century, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 35 (T. Ball & J. Pocock eds. 1988).
Consistent with Katz's point of view, it should be noted that the growth of Parliamentary
sovereignty did not prevent many Englishmen from believing that the constitution placed some
restraints on Parliament. Seventeenth-century opponents of Parliamentary power asserted that
Parliament had violated the fundamental constitution. Even some who had once quarrelled with
the Crown reacted to Parliamentary abuses by suggesting that Parliament was subject to consti-
tutional restraints. See, eg., C. MCILWAIN, THE HIGH COURT OF PARLIAMENT AND ITS
SUPREMACY 86-92 (1910, reprinted 1962). The idea of fundamental restraints on Parliament
survived into the eighteenth century, as can be illustrated by the arguments that Parliament
violated the constitution by not having frequent elections. For example, see the protest of 31
peers against the Septennial Act (1716): "[WMe conceive that frequent and new parliaments are
required by the fundamental constitution .. " SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HIs-
TORY 623 (C. Stephenson & F. Marcham eds. 1937).
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of fundamental law - a fundamental law established by the consent of
the people and containing express reservations of rights.65 Older ac-
counts of a natural law known through right reason had suggested
that there could be limitations on the sovereign, although these restric-
tions were not typically perceived as enforceable. A newer version of
"natural law," however, produced clearer ideas of enforceable consti-
tutional protections for rights. Drawing on observations about human
nature as revealed in a hypothetical state of nature, many post-
Hobbesian writers argued that men formed governments to protect
themselves.66 In the state of nature, men are subject to no common
superior, and each enjoys a liberty guided only by what many writers
65. This discussion of the importance of contract theory for American constitutionalism re-
flects the conclusions of: Berns, supra note 48; J. APPLEBY, CAPITALISM AND A NEW SOCIAL
ORDER: THE REPUBLICAN VISION OF THE 1790s 21 (1984); Howe, European Sources of Polit-
ical Ideas in Jeffersonian America, 10 REVIEWS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 28, 32-33 (1982); Onuf,
State Politics and Ideological Transformation: Gordon Wood's Republican Revolution, 44 WM. &
MARY Q. 612 (1987); Banning, Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of Revolutionary
Thinking, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 64, at 194 (1988); M.
WHITE, THE PHILOSOPHY OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION (1978); Kramnick, Republican Re-
visionism Revisited, 87 AM. HIsT. REV. 629 (1982); Schmitt & Webking, Revolutionaries Anti-
Federalists, and Federalists: Comments on Gordon Wood's Understanding of the American
Founding, POL. ScI. REVR. 195 (Fall 1979); J. DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLI-
TICS: VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1984). Bailyn and, to
a degree, Wood suggest that American notions of constitutional law were relatively original to
Americans, that such ideas were developed during the Revolutionary period, and, most impor-
tant, that they embodied the older, noncontractual natural law analysis at least as much as, if not
more than, the modem contract theory. B. BAILYN, supra note 34, at 175-89; G. WOOD, supra
note 48, at 259-305; see also Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REV.
703, 715-16 (1975); Grey, Origins of the Unwritten Constitution: Fundamental Law in American
Revolutionary Thought, 30 STAN. L. REV. 843, 891-92 (1978). In various ways, the other writers
cited above in this note suggest another point of view.
Although some Americans of the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary period did discuss
constitutional law in terms suggestive of the older natural law analysis, they were in this regard
hardly typical. Moreover, such of the older analysis as is apparent in American writings c. 1760-
1790 is usually confused by those writings with the newer, contractual approach. (The contro-
versy about the degree to which Locke's work on government was known to the colonists does
not greatly affect this article's account of the American understanding of constitutional law, for
Locke's was only one of a variety of natural law treatises that were studied here. In this regard,
note that Lutz has recently suggested that Sidney was as important for Americans as Locke. D.
LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 114 (1988).)
This article devotes more space here to the natural law than the common law influences on
the American understanding of a constitution, because the natural law analysis may be less fa-
miliar. Also, to the degree that common law contributed to American perceptions of the content
rather than the concept of a constitution, common law does not require as much discussion here
as does natural law.
66. Of course, this article's brief characterization of the writers on the law of nature cannot
even begin to describe the great variations among their opinions. Many of those who wrote after
Pufendorf held opinions somewhat different than his. Typically, they accepted natural law as
moral law binding in the state of nature but often did not emphasize to the same degree as
Pufendorf that such law could be viewed as a description of how men pursue their individual
interests. Note also that the ideas of a state of nature, of the natural desire and right to preserve
oneself, and of government by consent were hardly novel in the seventeenth century. It was,
however, in that century that they first were analyzed in a systematic way as the foundation for a
contractual view of society and government.
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optimistically called "natural law." In the writing of Pufendorf, for
example, natural law consisted of reasoned observations about human
nature and enlightened self-interest that looked uncannily like some
traditional moral obligations. A desire for self-preservation was the
chief characteristic of human nature, and respect for the preservation
of other men constituted self-interest. Inevitably, however, the latter
truth was not recognized by all persons. Although, for Pufendorf and
a great many eighteenth-century Englishmen and Americans, natural
law was a binding obligation in the state of nature, "natural law" was,
in the words of Pufendorf, "not strong enough to secure the peace of
mankind. ' 67 It was for this reason that men agreed to enter society
and submit to government. According to Pufendorf and various sub-
sequent contractual writers, government at this point was merely nas-
cent or primitive but sufficient to join the people in another contract
called "fundamental" law.68 To obtain security, the people relin-
quished to government much of the liberty they possessed in the state
of nature, but to protect themselves from their new government the
people stipulated in the compact the liberty they reserved. Some writ-
ers seemed to suggest the compact would be in writing.69 Thus, natu-
ral law was transformed from precepts of moral knowledge known
through right reason to a series of observations or assumptions about
human nature, and from these it was apparent that men formed gov-
ernments and constitutions by contract.70
Having long appreciated Magna Charta, the English Bill of Rights,
and some colonial charters and constitutions, Americans were particu-
larly receptive to the idea that constitutions could be created and writ-
ten rather than inherited and rooted in custom. A created and written
fundamental law that protected rights from even legislative infringe-
ment must have appeared to Americans to be, not an abstract theory,
but an accurate description of their legal heritage, experiences, and
needs.
As a result of the way in which it was studied, natural-law theory
(especially the modern descriptions of the state of nature and contrac-
67. S. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE ET GENTIUM LIBRI OcTo bk. VII, ch. i, sec. 11, at
965 (J. Scott ed. 1934).
68. Some writers were not so clear as to the number of contracts to be supposed. Moreover,
some thought an indivisible sovereignty resided in the people.
69. Note that the word "constitution" contributed to expectations of a written document.
See, e.g., J. FORTESCUE, DE LAUDIBUS LEGUM ANGLIE 37 (ch. XV) (1942).
70. Some writers, such as Locke, considered government to be a trusteeship. Most colonists,
however, did not draw such fine distinctions among the various theories based on analysis of the
state of nature. Note that, according to J.P. Reid, a form of contract theory was derived from
common law sources. Reid, In Our Contracted Sphere: The Constitutional Contract, the Stamp
Act Crisis, and the Coming of the American Revolution, 76 COLUM. L. REv. 21, 22 (1976).
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tual constitutions) seemed particularly applicable to questions of law.
In the eighteenth century, in both England and America, modern nat-
ural law treatises were read as texts on morals and jurisprudence. 71
Understood in this context, the modem natural law volumes were di-
rectly pertinent to practical problems of law and government and
therefore, increasingly, could be cited as legal arguments without any
sense of awkwardness. Thus, Blackstone began the first book of his
Commentaries with a chapter explaining the rights of Englishmen in
terms of the liberty existing in the state of nature.72 The jurispruden-
tial study of modem natural law treatises encouraged lawyers and
others to view such accounts as legal analysis.
What in England, however, justified the last revolution, in
America could be used to justify the next.73 Whereas Englishmen em-
ployed natural-law contract theory to explain their customary consti-
tution, Americans in the 1760s and 1770s were increasingly
discontented with their position under that constitution and turned to
the modem natural law analysis in their assertions of independence. 74
More pertinent to this article, they could draw from their legal heri-
tage and the modem natural law theory with which it so neatly coa-
lesced the possibility of a newly created, written constitution that
would restrain the legislature as well as the rest of government. 75
Thus, when the constitutional crisis in America forced Americans to
think about constitutions in an unusually concrete fashion, they were
well prepared to have a clear understanding of a written constitution.
In the mind of anyone aware of the theories that recognized the
71. Stewart, Dissertation Exhibiting the Progress of Metaphysical, Ethical, and Political Phi-
losophy, in I THE COLLECTED WORKS 93, 172-93 (1854, reprinted 1971); A. HADDOW, PO-
LITICAL SCIENCE IN AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSITIES, 1636-1900 chs. 1-2, 4-6 (1939);
C. WORDSWORTH, SCHOLAE ACADEMICAE 121-32 (1877); Hamburger, The Development of the
Nineteenth Century Consensus Theory of Contract, LAW & HIsT. REV. (forthcoming Fall 1989).
72. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 121-45 (1765).
Blackstone was very cautious about the contractual analysis of government and constitutions,
but he did summarize Locke's views. Id. at 52.
73. Bailyn suggests that the application of natural law analysis to legal and constitutional
issues was largely American and revolutionary. B. BAILYN, supra note 34, at 160-229. This
would seem to be, at best, an incomplete view of the matter. See supra note 65. Note also that
modern natural law theory was used to justify resistance and even revolution in the 1680s. See J.
GOUGH, supra note 22, at ch. 9.
74. Cf Katz, The American Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in BEYOND CON-
FEDERATION,'supra note 17, at 23. Earlier, they had claimed the rights of Englishmen and for
this purpose had had to use natural law theory only occasionally. Now, they rejected the English
constitution and in so doing frequently employed modern natural law theory. Their apparently
sudden adoption of arguments from modem natural law treatises was possible because they were
already familiar with such treatises through their study of morals and jurisprudence.
75. It is no surprise that common law notions of constitutionalism could be integrated so
neatly with ideas of contractual limitations on government, for both traditions developed in re-
sponse to similar problems.
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existence of legal and social change, this newer concept of a constitu-
tion might have posed particularly difficult questions, for Americans
by 1776 had come to believe that constitutions ought to be permanent.
Drawing on the older view of natural law, the tradition of the ancient
constitution, and civic humanism, Americans thought constitutional
law should be permanent and unchanging.76 Permanency was pre-
cisely what had eluded republican constitutions or government in the
past. Just as many Americans desired liberty and the republican na-
ture of their governments to last permanently, so too they wanted the
written limitations that embodied the principles of republicanism and
liberty to endure.
In 1776, it was assumed that a constitution had to be permanent,
in the sense of being lasting and even rigid, subject only to alteration
by the people. 77 It was necessary
that certain great first principles be settled and established, determining
and bounding the power and prerogative of the ruler, ascertaining and
securing the rights and liberties of the subjects, as the foundation stam-
ina of the government; which in all civil states is called the constitution,
on the certainty and permanency of which, the rights of both the ruler
and the subjects depend. 78
Constitutions not only were permanent but also were contrasted with
"temporary laws."' 79 Thus already in 1776, it was asserted that "[m]en
entrusted with the formation of civil constitutions should remember
that they are painting for eternity."80
Various scholars have argued that Americans continued to hold
such opinions after the Revolution. 81 Cecelia Kenyon has shown that
76. In addition, note that corporate charters, including some colonial charters, could be de-
scribed as "perpetual."
77. The relationship between social change and the newer concept of a constitution was to
some extent considered by the authors of the post-Revolutionary state constitutions, but they
apparently did not contemplate the possibility of far-reaching social change as directly as did the
men of 1787 and 1788. For an account of their attitudes, see Kenyon, Constitutionalism in Revo-
lutionary America, in CONSTITUTIONALISM 84 (Nomos XX, J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds.
1979).
78. M. MATHER, AMERICA'S APPEAL 22-23 (1775), quoted in G. WOOD, supra note 48, at
271. For Wood's and Bailyn's understanding of these quotations, see supra note 65.
79. FOUR LETTERS ON IMPORTANT SUBJECTS 16 (1776), quoted in B. BAILYN, supra note
34, at 182-83.
80. THE GENUINE PRINCIPLES OF THE ANCIENT SAXON OR ENGLISH CONSTITUTION 34
(1776), cited in B. BAILYN, supra note 34, at 184. For more on the "many other statements of
the idea of a fixed constitution published by 1776," see B. BAILYN, supra note 34, at 182-84 &
n.25.
81. While making final revisions, my attention has been drawn to M. LIENESCH, NEW OR-
DER OF THE AGES (1988). According to Lienesch, Federalists believed their scientific study of
"balance" in politics gave them an opportunity to establish a perfect and permanent constitution.
Id. at 134-35. Although Federalists did hope for a permanent constitutional law, and although
many of them may have expected scientific study of human nature and politics to facilitate the
drafting of a permanent constitution, the view that such permanence was largely the product of
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those who created the post-Revolutionary state constitutions hoped
for lasting documents that would postpone the loss of liberty. 2 These
were to be constitutions that "no length of Time will corrupt and
which will endure as long as the Sun and Moon .. ,,83 Later, in
Marbury v. Madison, Marshall wrote that the "principles" of the Con-
stitution "are deemed fundamental [and] permanent" and, except by
means of formal amendment, "unchangeable. ' 84 From this starting
point, Walter Berns has reconsidered the usual understanding of Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland.85 "Marshall's meaning is not that the Constitu-
tion may be adapted to 'the various crises of human affairs,' but that
the legislative powers granted by the Constitution are adaptable to
meet those crises .... It was not Marshall's view that the Constitution
must be kept in tune with the times. .... -86 Although Berns discusses
these ideas in connection with cases decided long after ratification of
the Constitution, he implies that such views were held by the framers
and ratifiers.87 Indeed, he goes on to examine modem natural-law
analysis and concludes that late eighteenth-century Americans would
have assumed constitutions were not subject to judicial adaptation.
It remains to be seen what the debates on the Constitution reveal.
Did the framers and ratifiers think of constitutions as permanent?
And how did they expect constitutions to accommodate social
change?88
"balance" in politics or the Constitution does not appear to have been held by many framers or
ratifiers. The notion of balance was far more important for the permanence of the constitution in
the sense of the nature or arrangement of government than the constitution in the sense of the
limitations on government. According to Lienesch, moreover, Anti-Federalists wanted rights to
be "indelibly inscribed" in a constitution but were content to have such a constitution rewritten
when it became "dated." Id. at 147. A rather different perspective may be found in Kenyon's
work and also in this article. For Kenyon's views, see infra text accompanying note 82. What
Lienesch considers generally to be an Anti-Federalist position is here treated as the view of a
minority.
82. Kenyon, supra note 77, at 115.
83. Id. This quotation referred to the Massachusetts Constitution.
84. Berns, supra note 48, at 52, quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176-77
(1803).
85. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
86. Berns, supra note 48, at 52-53.
87. W.E. Nelson believes that the Constitution was viewed in the early nineteenth century as
"intended to endure for ages to come." Nelson, Continuity and Change in ConstitutionalAdjudi-
cation (Book Review), 78 YALE L.J. 511 (1969) (quoting McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316,
415 (1819)).
88. Before examining the views of such persons as did trouble themselves to think about
changes in society and how such changes might affect the Constitution, it is necessary very briefly
to consider the possibility that many in the Convention and in the ratifying debates did not
contemplate much social change or perhaps did not engage in much contemplation of any sort.
Clearly, however, it would have been difficult for most framers and ratifiers to avoid knowing
about at least some of the repeated arguments that American society might change, whether the
Federalist argument that the Constitution would improve the American economy or the Anti-
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The framers and ratifiers did assume that constitutions should be
permanent. Anti-Federalists took a perspective similar to that which
Kenyon detected among earlier constitution-makers, and Federalists
held views similar to those found by Berns in the opinions of Marshall.
What supporters and opponents of the Constitution had in common
was that both anticipated the possibility of great change in American
society and nevertheless believed that constitutions were to be perma-
nent. They assumed that constitutions were to be unchanging and in-
flexible in response to social development. 89
III. ANTI-FEDERALISTS ON THE CONSTITUTION
AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Most Anti-Federalists thought that a constitution and the republi-
can nature of government should be made as permanent as possible,
notwithstanding the probability of social change. Rather than attempt
to accommodate social change, however, as did the Federalists, Anti-
Federalists frequently sought to defy it.
A. The Permanency of Liberty and Republican Government
The effect of social change upon the permanency of liberty and
republican government in America is a common theme in Anti-Feder-
alist writings and speeches. Even if the Constitution, in the sense of its
formal, written limitations, were to survive, there was still a possibility
that a republican constitution would cease to exist, that the govern-
ment would no longer be republican in nature. In the past, republican
governments had been notably short-lived. Anti-Federalists argued
that the Constitution - that is, the Constitution as drafted rather than
a constitution as it ought to be - would lead to equally dire results, in
part as a result of the changes the Constitution would encourage in
American society.
Drawing on the tradition of civic humanism, many Anti-Federal-
ists argued that the foundations of civic virtue and republican govern-
ment were precarious; specifically, they complained that the
Constitution itself would encourage social change inimical to republi-
Federalist argument that the Constitution would encourage the corruption of American man-
ners. Since these issues will be examined in some detail later in this article, it will suffice at this
point to note that the possibility of considerable changes in American society was widely dis-
cussed in connection with the new Constitution.
89. Note, parenthetically, that it is convenient in the next two parts of this article to examine
the views of Americans on the accommodation of social change both in connection with the
traditional conception of a constitution as the arrangement or nature of the government (gener-
ally expected to be republican) and in connection with the newer conception that a constitution
was a written constraint on government.
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canism. The Constitution, as presented for ratification, would permit
or accelerate a decline in virtue and thereby would cause a revolution
in American morals. Commenting on the Anti-Federalists, the histo-
rian Herbert Storing has written:
Wherever they looked in the new Constitution the Anti-Federalists saw
threats to civic virtue. The federal city provided for would breed monar-
chical institutions and courtly habits, with their oppressive tendencies
and with the effect "above all [of] the perpetual ridicule of yirtue." The
standing army would be not only a potential instrument of oppression
but a source of moral corruption. With interests and habits different
from the rest of the community, a standing army "will inevitably sow the
seeds of corruption and depravity of manners. Indolence will increase,
and with it crimes cannot but increase. The springs of honesty will grad-
ually grow lax, and chaste and severe manners be succeeded by those
that are dissolute and vicious. When a standing army is kept up, virtue
never thrives." Commerce itself ... seemed to threaten republican sim-
plicity and virtue. Commerce is the vehicle of distinctions in wealth, of
foreign influence, and of the decline of morals.90
Some qualifications of Storing's view are necessary. The Anti-Federal-
ist argument that the Constitution would undermine civic virtue was
rarely if ever put forth with as much completeness, clarity, and coher-
ence as it was by Storing. On a narrower point, Anti-Federalists may
have worried more about commerce with foreign nations and particu-
larly the danger of foreign luxuries than about commerce itself.91
Notwithstanding these caveats, many Anti-Federalists did argue
that the Constitution would promote social changes dangerous to vir-
tue. Opponents of the Constitution insisted that it would contribute to
the development of an aristocratic social and political elite, consisting
of the wealthy, the talented, and the well-connected, who would ob-
tain most federal offices and reside in the federal city. Under the Con-
stitution, this aristocracy would be one of a multiplicity of distinct
interests, the very existence of which would threaten virtue and the
republicanism of the government. 92
Anti-Federalists' arguments, however, did not reflect exclusively
the ideas of civic humanism; their arguments about social change, like
90. 1 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 20-21 (footnotes omitted).
91. See, e.g., Williams in New York Ratification Convention, June 21, 1788, in 2 J. ELLIOT,
supra note I, at 240; Locke in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 31, 1788, in 4 J.
ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 239.
92. Such a government would not rest on a permanent social foundation and so could not
itself be permanent. E.g.: "There can be no fixed and permanent government that does not rest
on the fixed and permanent orders and objects of mankind." Essays by a Farmer, in 5 H. STOR-
ING, supra note 1, at 43; see also id. at 42. "If there are advantages in the equal division of our
lands, and the strong and manly habits of our people, we ought to establish governments calcu-
lated to give duration to them ...." Observations... in a Number of Letters from the Federal
Farmer.... in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 251 [hereinafter Lettersfrom the Federal Farmer].
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their other attacks on the Constitution, drew upon a varied intellectual
heritage, including seventeenth-century English traditions suspicious
of power as an instrument of tyranny.93 For example, the creation of a
Federal elite was feared not only as a threat to independence and vir-
tue but also because of its more directly political consequences.
Among other things, such an elite would impoverish the people by its
extravagant emoluments and would deprive ordinary citizens of polit-
ical power.94 A related development feared by Anti-Federalists for its
political effects was the creation of a powerful and potentially oppres-
sive federal government. Independently of analysis developed from
civic humanism, such a government would endanger liberty.
Whether by undermining the social foundations of virtue or by in-
troducing changes in society that invited abuses of power, the Consti-
tution would, according to Anti-Federalists, encourage alterations in
American society inimical to the preservation of republican govern-
ment and liberty. Anti-Federalists thus argued on the assumption that
it was possible to prevent or at least delay social changes that would
challenge "the permanency and duration of free government."95
B. The Permanent Constitution
Anti-Federalist arguments against the Constitution reveal some
distinct expectations about the relationship between social change and
constitutional law. In the minds of many Americans, including Anti-
Federalists, liberty and republican government could be permanently
established only by means of permanent constitutional protections. 96
Thus, although Anti-Federalists did not want the proposed constitu-
tion to take effect or to last, they considered a permanent constitution
essential.
93. See generally C. KENYON, THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS xxi-cxvi (1966); Katz, The Ameri-
can Constitution: A Revolutionary Interpretation, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION, supra note 17, at
23; T. PANGLE, supra note 35; Banning, Some Second Thoughts on Virtue and the Course of
Revolutionary Thinking, in CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 194 (T. Ball & J.
Pocock eds. 1988) [hereinafter Banning, Second Thoughts]; Wood, Interests and Disinterestedness
in the Making of the Constitution, in BEYOND CONFEDERATION, supra note 17, at 69; see also
supra note 64. The disproportionate space devoted in this section to the tradition of civic human-
ism does not reflect a judgment that Anti-Federalists drew on it more than on the English polit-
ical and legal traditions that were intertwined with civic humanism. Rather, the civic-humanist
strain in Anti-Federalist arguments requires greater attention here because it more directly ad-
dressed the effects of social change.
94. C. KENYON, supra note 93.
95. Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 329. According to
the Federal Farmer, "[i]f it is not.., in our power to preserve republican principles, for a series
of ages, in all the departments of government, we may a long while preserve them in a well
formed legislature." Id. at 304.
96. In this respect, civic humanism and hopes for republican government had become asso-
ciated with contractual and common law notions of constitutional restraints.
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Some Anti-Federalists acknowledged that the country would grad-
ually change even if the Constitution were not adopted and that when
such change occurred a substantial alteration in government might be
appropriate. Thus, Grayson of Virginia expected an "American char-
acter" to develop but felt that, "[w]e are yet too young to know what
we are fit for."'97 America, he thought, was not sufficiently populated
on the frontiers to justify "making new experiments now in govern-
ment." Citing Montesquieu, he insisted on the need for "the construc-
tion of government [to] be suitable to the genius and disposition of the
people, as well as a variety of other circumstances." 98 He believed
that one day "the American character" would be "better known, and
the government established on permanent principles...." Only then,
for example, would a fleet be appropriate.99
Similarly, Harrison, also of Virginia, argued:
I see an earnest desire in gentlemen to bring this country to be great and
powerful. Considering the very late period when this country was first
settled, and the present state of population and wealth, this is impossible
now. The attempt will bring ruin and destruction upon us. These things
must not be forced. They must come of course, like the course of rivers,
gently going on. 1°°
Harrison did not deny the possibility of future greatness and power for
America, but he anticipated gradual change and did not want a power-
ful national government before America was ready for it.101
97. Grayson in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 11, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1,
at 278.
98. Id. at 279.
99. I hope that ... all ideas of having a fleet, in our infant situation, will be given over.
When the American character is better known, and the government established on perma-
nent principles, - when we shall be sufficiently populous, and our situation secure, - then
come forward with a fleet; not with a small one, but with one sufficient to meet any of the
maritime powers.
Id. at 289.
100. Harrison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 25, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note
1, at 629.
101. For another example of this perspective, see Letter from W.S. Smith to Thomas Jeffer-
son, Dec. 3, 1787, in 12 PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 390 (1955). One Federalist commenta-
tor attributed such arguments to artful opponents of the Constitution. Such Anti-Federalists
said
that it appears to them, such a system of perfection is more than we ought to aim at, at
present; and that it is their opinion, such noble regulations are rather calculated for a coun-
try that has had a long career of glory and greatness, than for one which is but wishing to
make a beginning - and many of them add they do not believe it will go down, as they
doubt whether there is yet virtue enough in America to support so good a government.
One of the People, Mass. Centinel, Oct. 17, 1787, in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1,
at 393. Pinckney used a similar argument for other purposes:
Much has been said of the constitution of G[reat] Britain. I will confess that I believe it to
be the best constitution in existence; but at the same time I am confident it is one that will
not or can not be introduced into this Country, for many centuries.
Pinckney, Draft Speech, June 25, 1787, in M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 115 (Supp. 1987).
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Anti-Federalists could even go so far as to abandon the ideal of a
permanent constitution. In language that blended the notion of popu-
lar sovereignty and Scottish ideas on social and legal development, one
Anti-Federalist noted that governments tended not to hold "the same
progressive tenor with the society," and argued for the preservation of
"the inestimable right of having in our power at all times to new
model our government according to circumstances, and to vary its
course at certain periods; since it is really in this power that the sover-
eignty of the people consists."' 10 2 Another Anti-Federalist took less
pleasure in recognizing
the impossibility of framing a good constitution on any one invariable
foundation so firmly as never to be shaken. The best that can be devised
will at last be vitiated by the corroding hand of time, and can only be
kept pure by continually modifying it according to circumstances .... 103
This was, he thought, a "melancholy truth."' 4
In general, however, Anti-Federalists insisted that constitutions
should permanently establish in writing the limitations fundamental to
liberty and republican government. According to Anti-Federalists, a
bill of rights was necessary to "secure" liberty for their "posterity" or
"for ages to come."' 1 5 A "Georgian" wrote: "Let your suffrages at
elections never be suffered to be regulated by laws at pleasure, but let it
be stated and fixed. Let the trial by jury in civil and criminal cases,
and the liberty of the press, be forever sacred and inviolable."'' 0 6
"Cato" explained that, on the one hand, a constitution "fixes barriers
which the ambitious and tyrannically disposed magistrate dare not
overleap, and on the other, becomes a wall of safety to the commu-
nity .... -107 Cato argued that such a barrier, consisting of precise
limitations in the Constitution, would be especially necessary for the
protection of liberty if American society were to change: "It is alleged
that the opinions and manners of the people of America are capable to
resist and prevent an extension of prerogative or oppression, but you
must recollect that opinion and manners are mutable, and may not
102. Letter From a Delegate Who Has Catched Cold, in 5 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 269,
271. He also wrote: "If all the nations of Europe the more civilized, were in possession of such a
regulation, they should not lament certainly under ridiculous and barbarous laws, institutions
and customs, which are in contradiction with their actual morals and their learning." Id. at 271.
103. A True Friend, Dec. 5, 1787, in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 219.
104. Id.; see also infra text at note 137. For the relationship between such sentiments and the
amendment process, see infra text at note 226.
105. Such sentiments, moreover, continued to be expressed after ratification of the Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., I FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 239, 260, 278 (Pa.); I id. 454
(Mass.); 3 id. 414 (N.Y.).
106. A Georgian, Gazette of the State of Georgia, Nov. 15, 1787, in 3 DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY, supra note I, at 243.
107. Clinton, Letters of Cato, in P. FORD, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 266.
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always be a permanent obstruction against the encroachments of gov-
ernment .... -108 According to James Monroe, "The spirit of the
times might secure the people of America perhaps for a great length of
time against it; but fundamental principles form a check, even when
the spirit of the times hath changed, indeed they retard and controul
it."1°9 Anti-Federalists sought to establish liberty and republican gov-
ernment not only on mutable and possibly inadequate social founda-
tions but also on what appeared to them to be the more permanent
guarantee of enduring and inflexible constitutional limitations.110  It
has been seen above that Anti-Federalists objected to the Constitu-
108. He continued: "that the progress of a commercial society begets luxury, the parent of
inequality, the foe to virtue, and the enemy to restraint; and that ambition and voluptuousness,
aided by flattery, will teach magistrates where limits are not explicitly fixed to have separate and
distinct interests from the people . I..." d. at 266.
109. Monroe, Some Observations on the Constitution, in 5 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 292.
For similar sentiments, see Letter from Joseph Spencer to James Madison, Feb. 28, 1788, in 16
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 252, 254.
110. In a comment that suggested not only his own views, Madison observed that a bill of
rights would "satisfy the public mind that their liberties will be perpetual." 2 B. SCHWARTZ,
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 1025-26. According to Patrick Dollard of South Carolina, his
constituents wanted a bill of rights, "ascertaining and fundamentally establishing, the unalienable
rights of men ...... Dollard in South Carolina Ratification Convention, May 20, 1788, in 4 J.
ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 337. Another Anti-Federalist argued: "In entering into the social com-
pact, men ought not to leave their rulers at large, but erect a permanent landmark by which they
may learn the extent of their authority, and the people be able to discover the first encroachments
on their liberties." R. Whitehall in Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Nov. 28, 1787, in 2
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 393. According to Agrippa, "It is an excellence that
it should be permanent, otherwise we are exposed to perpetual insecurity from the fluctuation of
government." [Winthrop?], Letters of Agrippa, in P. FORD, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 116. Jeffer-
son wrote to Donald in 1788 that bills of rights are "fetters against doing evil, which no honest
government should decline." Rumble, James Madison on the Value ofBills of Rights, in CONSTI-
TUTIONALISM 128 (Nomos XX, J. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1979). According to the Federal
Farmer, "it is fit and proper to establish, beyond dispute, those rights which are particularly
valuable to individuals, and essential to the permanency and duration of free government." Let-
tersfrom the Federal Farmer, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 329. A bill of rights was "never
to be infringed or altered." An Old Soldier, Conn. Gazette, Jan. 4, 1788, in 15 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 258; see also Cassius, To the People of the State of New York, County
Journal, March 3, 1789, in 3 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 438; An Impartial
Citizen, Petersberg Va. Gazette, Jan. 10, 1788, in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at
293. Note that R.H. Lee wrote of the Constitution's failure to provide for juries in civil cases
that "[t]he evil is found resting upon constitutional bottom, and the remedy upon the mutable
ground of legislation, revocable at any annual meeting." Letter of R.H. Lee to Governor Ed-
mund Randolph, Oct. 16, 1787, in 5 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 115; see also Letter from R.H.
Lee to J. Gordon, Feb. 26, 1788, in 8 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 418-19; Letter
from W. Russell to W. Fleming, Jan. 25, 1788, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note I, at
468.
Anti-Federalists frequently said that Americans were preparing a constitution for posterity,
the ages, or millions yet unborn. See e.g., Randall in Massachusetts Ratification Convention,
Jan. 17, 1787, in 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 40; Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 H.
STORING, supra note 1, at 249; Essays by Candidus, in 4 id. at 130; Essays by DeWitt, in 4 id. at
18; Essay by A Newport Man, in 4 id. at 253; Essays of An Old Whig, in 3 id. at 39. The Rev.
James Madison hoped for forms of government with "that Permanence which, if possible, may
be everlasting." Letter from the Rev. James Madison to James Madison, June 11, 1787, 10
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 45.
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tion's propensity to encourage dangerous developments in American
society and argued instead for a constitution that would not facilitate
and, perhaps, would even forestall such social change. Here, it has
become apparent that they also wanted a constitution that would es-
tablish liberty and republican government in spite of social change.
Federalists frequently recognized that Anti-Federalists were at-
tempting with "paper barriers" to protect what could survive only
during the continuance of virtue and a spirit of liberty.II1 Anti-Feder-
alists were seeking in part to stave off the political consequences of
social change with "parchment provisions." This was futile, according
to Federalists, because the survival of liberty depended upon founda-
tions more substantial than written restraints. Moreover, such re-
straints might soon become obsolete. For example, when defending
the Constitution's apportionment clause, which permitted considera-
ble congressional discretion, Hamilton argued:
[T]his matter, sir, depends on circumstances. It is impossible, in the first
instance, to be precise and exact with regard to the number; and it is
equally impossible to determine to what point it may be proper in future
to increase it. On this ground I am disposed to acquiesce. In my reason-
ings on this subject of government, I rely more on the interests and opin-
ions of men, than on any speculative parchment provisions whatever. I
have found that constitutions are more or less excellent as they are more
or less agreeable to the natural operations of things. 112
Hamilton scoffed at Anti-Federalists' reliance on written provisions
and particularly at their reliance on provisions that disregarded the
possibility of changes in American society.
IV. FEDERALISTS ON THE CONSTITUTION AND SOCIAL CHANGE
Although Federalists (including most framers) shared with Anti-
Federalists an expectation that a constitution should be rigid, that it
should permanently establish fundamentals essential to liberty and re-
publican government, they feared that many of what Anti-Federalists
considered fundamentals would in fact be rendered obsolete by
111. See, e.g., Dickinson, Letters of Fabius, in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 186;
Webster, Government, 1 AM. MAG. 137, 140 (1788); Uncus, Md. Journal, Nov. 9, 1787, in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 77-78, 81; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 83
(Hamilton), at 564; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 84 (A. Hamilton), at 580; Letter from
James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 297;
Letter from G.L. Turberville to James Madison, April 16, 1788, in id. at 24; Letter from G.L.
Turberville to James Madison, June 16, 1789, in 12 id. at 224-25. When Jefferson argued in favor
of occasional "rebellion," he was expressing an extreme version of the belief that liberty requires
more than paper protections. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to W.S. Smith, Nov. 13, 1787, in 14
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 464-65.
112. Hamilton in New York Ratification Convention, June 21, 1788, in 2 J. ELLIOT, supra
note 1, at 251.
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change. 113 Whereas Anti-Federalists argued for including various
rights and other provisions in the Constitution in order to make those
provisions permanent, Federalists often attempted to exclude such
provisions in order to preserve the permanence of the Constitution.
Federalists emphasized that a permanent constitution could not be
written in a way that made it depend upon temporary circumstances.
In many instances, they hoped that a potentially obsolete provision or
phrase could be reformulated or adjusted to make it consistent with
permanence. What could not be made permanent through this pro-
cess of tinkering had to be excluded altogether and left to federal or
state discretion.
A. The Permanency of Liberty and Republican Government
Like their opponents, Federalists frequently expressed a desire to
establish liberty and republican government as permanently as possi-
ble. Federalists, however, platitudinously repeated that only ratifica-
tion of the Constitution could protect or establish those objectives for
posterity. 114 They took a very different view than did Anti-Federalists
of future changes in American society and of the means of preserving
liberty and republican government.
Federalists did not contemplate the future more than Anti-Feder-
alists, but, when describing what they saw, Federalists tended to use a
more positive rhetoric than did their opponents. Anti-Federalists were
perfectly capable of discussing future changes in society. Some even
argued that American society would develop progressively, if the Con-
stitution were not adopted. Perhaps because of their personal convic-
tions, however, and certainly because of their position in the
ratification debate, Anti-Federalists frequently employed the tradi-
tional rhetoric of civic humanism, which associated social change with
113. On the use of "Federalists" in this article to include most framers, see supra note 1. It
will be seen that the framers and Federalists simultaneously shared and qualified different aspects
of the Anti-Federalist argument that the Constitution should permanently establish the essentials
of liberty and republican government. The idea that the Constitution should establish and fix
such essentials probably appealed to almost all framers and ratifiers, including Federalists. Fed-
eralists, however, simultaneously had a more complex response to social change and threats to
liberty.
114. For example, Randolph said in the Virginia Ratification Convention: "We became con-
temptible in the eyes of foreign nations; they discarded us as little wanton bees, who had played
for liberty, but had no sufficient solidity or wisdom to secure it on a permanent basis ...." 3 J.
ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 27. In the Pennsylvania Convention, Wilson said that the framers had
aimed to establish a government "by which the peace, freedom, and happiness of the United
States should be permanently insured." 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 348. A
great many other statements simply referred to preserving republican government or liberty for
posterity.
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moral and political decay. As a result, they appeared to be, at the
least, ambivalent about social change.
In contrast, Federalists often argued that positive developments
were possible, if the Constitution were to be ratified. They typically
agreed with Anti-Federalists that virtue had a role in preserving lib-
erty and republican government,11 5 but they did not rely as much
upon the analysis of civic humanism. Although far from uniformly
optimistic, they hardly perceived the Constitution as a threat to virtue
or liberty. 1 6 Some Federalists argued that social change was inevita-
ble and even occasionally assumed it was progressive. Wilson's Scot-
tish views on this subject have already been discussed.'" 7 But he was
not alone. A number of proponents of the Constitution asserted the
progressive nature of the science of politics and their confidence that
the new document was better drafted than any previous form of gov-
ernment.11 8 It would, they said, promote wealth and prosperity.
115. Federalists tended to argue that the Constitution could not guarantee liberty in the
absence of virtue. See, e.g., Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 20, 1788, in 3 J.
ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 536-37; Ellsworth, The Landholder, VI, The Connecticut Courant,
Dec. 10, 1787, in P. FORD, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 166; The Republican: To the People, The
Connecticut Courant, Jan. 7, 1788, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 527-28; Let-
ter from John Trumbull to Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., Feb. 26, 1788, in 16 DOCUMENTARY HIs-
TORY, supra note 1, at 213-14; Letter from George Washington to the Marquis de Lafayette,
Feb. 7, 1788, in id. at 70. Hamilton thought that the preservation of rights depended upon public
opinion and the spirit of the people and government rather than upon "fine declarations." THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 84 (Hamilton), at 580. Madison's views on virtue are discussed
by Banning, Second Thoughts, supra note 93, at 194, 206-07. See also supra note 111.
116. Moreover, in reaction to the dire predictions of Anti-Federalists, Federalists occasion-
ally questioned the possibility of anticipating the future and expressed a willingness to accept
some small risks. In the Connecticut Ratification Convention, Governor Huntington responded
to Anti-Federalist claims that the Constitution would undermine republican government:
The Author of Nature has given to mankind a certain degree of insight into futurity. As far
as we can see a probability that certain events will happen, so far we do well to provide and
guard. But we may attempt to go too far; it is in vain to think of providing against every
possible contingency.
Huntington in Connecticut Ratification Convention, Jan. 9, 1788, in 3 DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY, supra note 1, at 556. Similarly, a letter in the Connecticut Courant admitted of the Con-
stitution that "we pretend not to foresee all the consequences which may follow from its
reception," and then argued that "[a]ll ... we can know is that the new plan of government
appears to be well calculated to secure our liberty .... [W]e are willing to run the small risk
occasioned by our ignorance of future events ...." To the Honorable Richard Henry Lee,
Esquire, The Connecticut Courant, Dec. 24, 1787, in 3 id. at 511.
117. See supra text accompanying notes 54-55.
118. In the debates about the Constitution, Federalists had little reason to discuss progress
outside of the context of the Constitution, but on occasion they did discuss progress generally. In
criticizing the debating tactics of some delegates to the Connecticut Ratification Convention, one
commentator wrote:
[A]s there is and ever has been a constant revolution in all manners, habits, and customs,
either ancient or modern, some in quicker and others in a more dull succession, we hope
upon this principle the time is come for the passing away of this baneful usage, a custom not
less barbarous in society than the hideous daubings of the tawny tribes.
The People, New Haven Gazette, Oct. 11, 1787, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at
360. Wilson anticipated that America "may take the lead in literary improvements" and that the
language of the United States was the one that "shall become most generally known in the civi-
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Some argued it would produce an extensive empire and future national
importance. Moreover, the Constitution would encourage rather than
undermine virtue. By prohibiting state issuances of paper money and
breaches of contract, the Constitution would remove temptations to
selfish, immoral, and politically dangerous conduct.
Among the Federalist attempts to preserve liberty and republican
government in the face of insufficient virtue, Madison's analysis of fac-
tions has become particularly well known. In Federalist Number 10,
he observed that "[a] landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a mer-
cantile interest, a monied interest, with many lesser interests, grow up
of necessity in civilized nations ... ." Civilized societies would divide
into interests according to "the various and unequal distribution of
property" and for this and other reasons would fall prey to the faction-
alism that had undermined liberty in every previous democracy and
republic.1 19 As is widely familiar, Madison believed an extended re-
public could avoid some of the dangers of factions and thereby help to
secure liberty and republican government.
Much of Madison's analysis of factions was designed to remedy a
problem that had, he understood, first developed in the distant past.
His approach also sought, however, to preserve republicanism and lib-
erty from dangers that might develop in the future. According to
Madison, factionalism might increase in the United States120 but
would be its own cure.1 21 The undesirable consequences of factions
would tend to dissipate in the extended republic. 122
lized world," thereby imparting "great importance over the nation [the United States] that shall
use it." The "great improvements" made by America in the science of government "will induce
the patriots and literati of every nation to read and understand our writings on that subject, and
hence it is not improbable that she will take the lead in political knowledge." Wilson in Penn-
sylvania Ratification Convention, December I1, 1787, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
1, at 582. No doubt Wilson took special pleasure in contemplating the world-wide appreciation
of "our writings."
119. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 10 (Madison), at 59. As Adair has shown,
Madison derived this analysis from Hume. Adair, supra note 53, at 98-106. For an interesting
comparison with Federalist No. 10 and No. 51, see Ferguson's analysis of interests and liberty,
including his balance-of-power analogy. A. FERGUSON, AN ESSAY ON THE HISTORY OF CIVIL
SOCIETY 208, 265 (pt. III, sees. 2 & 6 (1809)).
120. Madison wrote: "The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man; and
we see them every where brought into different degrees of activity, according to the different
circumstances of civil society." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 10 (Madison), at 58.
121. "The degree of security.., will depend on the number of interests and sects; and this
may be presumed to depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended under
the same government." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 51 (Madison), at 352.
122. Id. at 351-52. Carol Weisbrod suggests that Madison did not condemn all interest
groups. See Weisbrod, Toward a History of Essential Federalism: Another Look at Owen in
America, 21 U. CONN. L. REV. (forthcoming 1990).
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B. The Permanent Constitution
Having examined some Federalist ideas about how the republican-
ism of the new government could withstand changes in American soci-
ety, this article can now inquire how Federalists thought the
provisions of the Constitution could survive such changes. Not only
did Federalists want permanency for republican government in
America but one of the means by which they sought to achieve a last-
ing republicanism was the establishment of permanent constitutional
limitations - ones that would avoid obsolescence. Many Federalists
understood that American society might (in both the near and distant
future) undergo alterations of considerable magnitude and therefore
desired a constitutional law that would survive those transformations.
The Federalist perspective was based on widely held assumptions
about the difference between constitutional and ordinary law - a dis-
tinction between law that was permanent and law that was mutable,
between that which could be fundamental and that which varied ac-
cording to circumstances. Rules that had to be mutable required the
flexibility of ordinary law. Moreover, they did not belong in the Con-
stitution; if included in that document, they would undermine it.
Therefore, Federalists endeavored to exclude from the Constitution
such rules and structures as would need to be adapted flexibly to
changes in American society.
This is not to say that Federalists had uniform expectations about
the Constitution's durability. Some spoke of decades; others, of centu-
ries. As will be seen, however, almost all Federalists hoped that the
Constitution's provisions would be permanent. In creating the Consti-
tution, the framers took great care to formulate it in a way that would,
they hoped, permit it to last almost indefinitely, and Federalists de-
fended the document on the ground that it had, indeed, been framed
for the future.123
123. A few pessimistic opinions about the period of time the Constitution would last have
recently been cited with some frequency. Many other statements were very optimistic.
Whatever their varied expectations about the time the Constitution would actually remain in
effect, Federalists sought a document that could be permanent. (Note that discussions of appor-
tionment prompted many of the recorded predictions about the Constitution's longevity.)
Both Federalists and Anti-Federalists assumed constitutions should be permanent. Since the
latter did not like the 1787 Constitution, they hoped it would not last but expressed fears that it
would. In contrast, Federalists started with the same assumption about constitutions in general
but on occasion feared that the Constitution would not survive very long.
Incidentally, discussions about how the Constitution could accommodate social change were
occasionally intertwined with debates about how republican government could survive such
change. Therefore, although this Part of this article concerns the Constitution, the republican
nature of the government will also at some points be examined.
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1. General Statements
The Federalists, and perhaps many of the framers, were well aware
of the dangers of not anticipating change, for it was, in part, the lack
of foresight of those who had prepared the Articles of Confederation
that made the 1787 Convention necessary. The Convention had been
called to prepare such alterations as would "render the federal consti-
tution adequate to the exigencies of Government & the preservation of
the Union."'124 At the beginning of the Convention, Randolph spoke
of the "defects of the confederation" and in so doing turned to the
exigencies that had been unanticipated by that document:
[H]e professed a high respect for its authors, and considered, them as
having done all that patriots could do, in the then infancy of the science,
of constitutions, & of confederacies, - when the inefficiency of requisi-
tions was unknown - no commercial discord had arisen among any
states - no rebellion had appeared as in Mass[achusetts] - foreign
debts had not become urgent - the havoc of paper money had not been
foreseen - treaties had not been violated - and perhaps nothing better
could be obtained from the jealousy of the states with regard to their
sovereignty.125
The framers of the Constitution were meeting precisely in order to
cure the obsolescence of the existing constitution. 126
The Constitutional Convention as a body made hardly any general
statements of political theory either in the Constitution or elsewhere,
yet a desire for a permanent constitution was the subject of some gen-
eral statements by official groups belonging to the Convention. In lan-
guage similar to that which was eventually used by Anti-Federalists,
the North Carolina delegates wrote to Governor Caswell in June 1787
that a union of states "preserving their Civil Liberties and connected
together by such Tyes as to Preserve permanent & effective Govern-
ments ... is a Circumstance that has not Occurred in the History of
men .... -127 Nevertheless, the permanence of both liberty and gov-
124. Resolution of Congress, Feb. 21, 1787, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 14.
125. Convention Notes of James Madison, May 29, 1787, in 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
18-19.
126. Newspaper commentaries were even more explicit than the above quotations. As the
Convention was gathering, a Baltimore newspaper noted, "The articles of confederation ... were
as wisely drawn as the then situation of the country would permit: ... our attention was natu-
rally absorbed, by objects of magnitude that surrounded us, while only time and reflection, could
make us acquainted with more important ones at a distance." Baltimore Maryland Gazette, May
22, 1787, in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 112. In June, a Philadelphia newspa-
per remarked: "The present Confederation may be compared to a hut or tent, accommodated to
the emergencies of war - but it is now time to erect a castle of durable materials .... Philadel-
phia Independent Gazetteer, June 27, 1787, in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at
148.
127. Letter from North Carolina Delegates to Gov. Caswell, June 14, 1787, in 3 M. FAR-
RAND, supra note 1, at 46.
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ernment was the North Carolinians' hope. Among the documents of
the Committee of Detail is a draft of the Constitution (in the writing of
Randolph and corrected by Rutledge).1 28 It begins with the only sur-
viving general discussion by the Committee or its members about how
to draft a constitution: "In the draught of a fundamental constitution,
two things deserve attention," the first being: "To insert essential
principles only, lest the operations of government should be clogged
by rendering those provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought
to be accommodated to times and events."' 129 The key to the writing
of a constitution was not just the inclusion of "essential principles" -
a goal Federalists and Anti-Federalists shared - but also the exclu-
sion of anything that would have to be accommodated to later times
and events. Like many other Federalists, the authors of this document
apparently made the optimistic assumption that the provisions that
would have to change with time - and therefore had to be excluded
- were not essential.
General statements made by individuals, both during the Philadel-
phia Convention and later, were in accord with the pronouncements of
official groups. As the delegates were gathering in Philadelphia, Wil-
liam Pierce of Georgia wrote a letter to George Turner of South Caro-
lina in which he compared Rome and America:
[T]he creation of Pra[e]tors, of Tribunes, of the Decemvirs etc. gave such
an unsettled Spirit to the People, that they were never satisfied but when
they were in pursuit of expedients to suit the various situations to which
they were constantly shifting. Unless we can settle down into some per-
manent System very shortly, our condition will be as fickle and incon-
stant, as that of the Romans .... 130
In words that he more or less repeated on various other occasions,
Wilson pointed out to the Pennsylvania ratifiers that the Constitu-
tional Convention not only had to accommodate the varied situations
of the existing states but also had to look ahead to
innumerable states yet unformed, and to myriads of citizens who in fu-
ture ages shall inhabit the vast uncultivated regions of the continent.
128. Whether they composed the document is uncertain.
129. 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 137. Some confusion may arise because of a change in
grammar since the eighteenth century. The words "unalterable, which" would today be written
"unalterable that." More generally, although modern readers may conclude that the "essential
principles" of the Constitution were "those provisions.., which ought to be accommodated to
times and events," the meaning of this sentence was, in fact, different. It meant that the opera-
tions of government should not be clogged by rendering permanent and unalterable those provi-
sions which ought to be accommodated to times and events. Any doubt about this should be
resolved by the many discussions of permanency, discussed below, all of which support this
article's interpretation of the statement in the Committee's draft.
130. Letter from William Pierce to George Turner, May 19, 1787, in M. Farrand, supra note
1, at 10 (Supp. 1987).
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The duties of that body, therefore, were not limited to local or partial
considerations but to the formation of a plan commensurate with a great
and valuable portion of the globe.131
He then went on to mention "the commercial scenes... [that] will be
exhibited on" the numerous rivers that "are intended to enrich the
dominions of the United States."' 132 In the same speech, he said that
they were selecting "that system of government, under which they
would wish that they and their posterity should live." 133 Some who
became Anti-Federalists may have agreed or at least acquiesced in
such sentiments. During the ratification controversy, Ellsworth wrote
that Gerry had been willing during the Constitutional Convention "to
concede every state interest that should be in the least incompatible
with the most substantial and permanent system of general govern-
ment .... ,,134 A contemporary evaluation of opinion in the summer
of 1787 was given by Edward Carrington: "The prevailing impression
as well in, as out of, Convention, is, that a federal Government
adapted to the permanent circumstances of the Country, without re-
spect to the habits of the day, be formed ... ,,135 A permanent consti-
tution had to be adapted to permanent rather than temporary
circumstances. 36
131. Wilson in Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Nov. 26, 1787, in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY supra note 1, at 340 (A.J. Dallas version).
132. Id. at 350 (T. Lloyd version). The two versions of Wilson's speech are relatively similar
with respect to the passages cited in this article.
133. Id. at 353 (T. Lloyd version); see also id. at 342 (A.J. Dallas version).
134. Ellsworth, The Landholder, VI, The Connecticut Courant, Dec. 10, 1787, in P. FORD,
ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 174.
135. Letter from Edward Carrington to Thomas Jefferson, June 9, 1787, in 3 M. FARRAND,
supra note 1, at 38. Carrington wrote to Madison in support of a constitution "calculated for the
permanent fitness, and not the momentary habits of the country .... Letter from Edward
Carrington to James Madison, June 13, 1787, in 10 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 52. Carrington
was not a member of the convention but did attempt to keep informed about it.
136. In the winter of 1787, Rufus King expressed his hope that "a more permanent and
vigorous government" would be established. Letter from Rufus King to E. Gerry, Feb. 11, 1787,
in 1 THE LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF RUFUS KING 202 (C. King ed. 1834). Pinckney said:
"[Tihis Cofistitution is not framed to answer temporary purposes. We hope it will last for ages
- that it will be the perpetual protector of our rights and properties." Pinckney in South Caro-
lina Ratification Convention, May 20, 1788, in 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 335; see also Tweed
in South Carolina Ratification Convention, May 20, 1788, in 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 333.
Franklin said that the Constitution was "a Transaction ... to exist in the Posterity of a great
Nation .... Letter from Benjamin Franklin to the Editor of the Federal Gazette, Apr. 8, 1788,
in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 296-97. "A Briton" referred to "certain principles in govern-
ment which our Magi hoped to render as durable as time." Gazette of the State of Georgia, Dec.
13, 1787, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note I, at 255. Another writer hoped Americans
would "be able peaceably to establish a government equal to the present exigencies of the country
and made capable of anticipating the important changes which await it." To the Political
Freethinkers of America, N.Y. Daily Advertizer, May 24, 1787, in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 115; see also Letter from William Short to James Madison, Dec. 21, 1787, in 10
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 342; Corbin in Va. Gen. Assembly, Oct. 25, 1787, in 8 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 113; Americanus II, Va. Independent Chronicle, Dec. 19, 1787,
The Constitution and Social Change
Of course, there were exceptions. Respectful of the people's right
to amend their constitution, and eager to provide assurance that
amendment would be possible, some Federalists suggested that
amendments could, among other things, adapt the Constitution to new
circumstances.' 37  For these Federalists, the fact that adaptation
would occur by amendment conferred a degree of legitimacy upon ad-
aptation.t13  More generally, Federalists recognized that adaptation by
means of amendment might be necessary for constitutional provisions
that had not been successfully drafted to avoid obsolescence.1 39 Nev-
ertheless, these Federalists were advocates of a permanent constitu-
tion. When acknowledging the possibility of, or need for, amendments
in 8 id. at 248; Civis Rusticus, Va. Independent Chronicle, Jan. 30, 1788, in 8 id. at 339; Pa.
Gazette, Sept. 5, 1787, in 13 id. at 125; Z, Philadelphia Freeman's Journal, May 16, 1787, in 13
id. at 98; Philadelphia Independent Gazetteer, June 26, 1787, in 13 id. at 145; Maryland Journal,
Sept. 28, 1787, in 13 id. at 263; cf Federalism, Maryland Journal, Sept. 26, 1788 (letter to
Goddard), in 2 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 121.
137. A few of Wilson's speeches hint at this view. See Wilson in Pennsylvania Ratification
Convention, Nov. 26, 1787, in 1 WORKS OF J. WILSON supra note 52, at 544; Law Lectures, in 1
id. at 369; G. WOOD, supra note 48, at 613-14. Shortly after ratification, Jonathan Jackson of
Massachusetts discussed the possibility that "upon new exigencies or alterations of circumstances
easy judicious reforms [would be] made." Letter from Jonathan Jackson to William Eustis, Dec.
1788, in I FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 591. John Dickinson wrote somewhat
ambiguously that "by a gradual progress, we may from time to time introduce every improvement
in our constitution, that shall be suitable to our situation." Dickinson, Letters of Fabius, in P.
FORD, supra note 1, at 209.
Some statements about amendment were not inconsistent with the view that amendment was
a means of adapting to social change, but did not really address the issue. One of the more
suggestive examples was Madison's 1789 proposal for a preamble to the Constitution, which
contained the proposition "[t]hat the people have an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible
right to reform or change their Government, whenever it be found adverse or inadequate to the
purposes of its institution." Madison in House of Representatives Debate, June 8, 1789, in B.
SCHWARTZ, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 1026. Similarly, Pelatiah Webster wrote that the
document "will always be liable to amendment, whenever any mischiefs or abuses appear in the
government, which the Constitution in its present state, can't reach and correct." Webster, Re-
ply to Brutus, Nov. 4, 1787, in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 126.
Earlier, Thomas Pownall had written that the constitutions of some states contained "a heal-
ing principle" if "there be any thing which in future times and circumstances might require a
change." T. POWNALL, A MEMORIAL ADDRESSED TO THE SOVEREIGNS OF AMERICA 53
(1783). The historian Gordon Wood cites this as a reference to amendment. G. WOOD, supra
note 48, at 614. Although Wood's interpretation is not necessarily incorrect, Pownall's example
of the healing principle was "the establishment of a Census, and other means." This suggests the
policy of avoiding obsolescence.
138. As has been seen, such ideas could also be apparent in Anti-Federalist arguments. See
supra text at note 102.
139. For example, as will be seen, when it was pointed out that the apportionment ratio
might one day become obsolete, Ellsworth suggested that future amendments would rectify the
problem if it ever arose. See infra text accompanying note 163. Immediately after Ellsworth
expressed this willingness to rely on amendments to adapt the Constitution to changing circum-
stances, other framers proposed a rule that would avoid the need for such adjustments. No one
objected. See id. Ellsworth apparently believed that adaptation would be necessary for language
that could not be made permanent. See also Convention Notes of James Madison, June 29,
1787, in I M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 469; Convention Notes of Robert Yates, June 29, 1787,
in id. at 475. During ratification, Ellsworth was very articulate about the need for permanent
language. See, e.g., infra note 163.
November 1989]
Michigan Law Review
to adapt the Constitution, they were merely acknowledging the theo-
retical and practical limitations to their goal of permanence.
A number of other Federalists, however, did question the possibil-
ity and desirability of a permanent constitution. According to "Pub-
licola," even if the Constitution were
completely adapted to our present situation, so as to be unexceptionable
to all, time would render it defective - Improvements in commerce and
manufactures, in arts and sciences; an increase in population, and an
alteration in manners, would render amendments to the new constitution
necessary - nothing in this world can be permanent. .... 140
Drawing on, among other things, the ideas of Montesquieu, Noah
Webster condemned "perpetual constitutions" as unwarranted at-
tempts to "control . . . future generations." 1 4 1 Americans had as
much right to perpetuate the jury as the English in Norman times had
to bind their descendants to the ordeal. Webster heaped scorn on the
advocates of "unchangeable constitutions.'1 42  He acknowledged,
however, that he was broaching sentiments "repugnant to the princi-
ples received by my countrymen."' 143 On this, he was correct. 144
140. Publicola, State Gazette of N.C., March 20, 1788, in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 438. For a similar perspective from a foreign observer, see Letter from Antoine
de la Forest to Comte de Montmorin, Sept. 28, 1787, in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
1, at 259. Some statements were slightly ambiguous:
In proportion as knowledge and virtue prevail in our country, it will become as common for
men to change and improve their governments, civil and ecclesiastical, as it is for men to
alter and improve their houses, when the encrease of their families, or a change in their
circumstances, make it necessary.
Pa. Gazette, Aug. 22, 1787, in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 190. The assertion
that improved knowledge of politics would permit improvement of the Constitution was a com-
mon sentiment, typically suggesting that the document would be made more perfect and there-
fore more likely to be permanent. This passage, however, suggests that the Constitution should
be changed according to circumstances.
141. Webster, On Bills of Rights, 1 AM. MAG. 13, 14 (Dec. 1787).
142. Webster, Government, 1 AM. MAG. 137, 139 (Feb. 1788).
143. Id. at 204, 209 (March 1788). Webster's essays are cited by G. WOOD, supra note 48, at
377.
144. Although Webster argued that constitutions could not be made "unalterable," he ac-
knowledged that he "would except the right of elections." Webster, Government, I AM. MAG.
137, 137 (Feb. 1788). Moreover, in his Examination, Webster advocated "irrevocable laws in
every state, destroying and barring entailments," and he supported the Constitution. Webster,
Examination, in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 59.
A comparison between Webster and another extraordinary linguist, Sir William Jones, is
irresistible. During the last half of the eighteenth century, on different sides of the globe, each of
these men undertook the study of language. Subsequently, each wrote an important account of
law that reflected and, perhaps, drew upon his earlier linguistic analysis.
In an astonishing variety of languages, Jones traced the relics of their common ancestry and
thereby proved that there had been a single source for what have since become known as the
Indo-European languages. Thereafter, he sought to elucidate the law of bailments from an eclec-
tic variety of legal systems by looking for their shared elements - an approach that comported
with some familiar ideas of natural law. In contrast, Webster became well known for pursuing
another line of inquiry. Although he made arguments about language not unlike those of Jones,
he also advocated that American spelling should conform to the pronunciation of contemporary
Americans. Similarly, during ratification, he opposed the idea that future generations of Ameri-
[Vol. 88:239
The Constitution and Social Change
Two years later, in a letter from Paris, Jefferson similarly ques-
tioned "[w]hether one generation of men has a right to bind another"
and concluded that "no society can make a perpetual constitution, or
even a perpetual law." It was an idea, he wrote, that just then "comes
into my head." 145 According to Jefferson, a challenge to the idea of a
permanent constitution "seems never to have been started either on
this or our side of the water." 146 On this, as has been seen, Jefferson
was almost correct. 147
2. Nondiscretionary Provisions
The Federalists' desire to establish constitutional provisions that
would be both permanent and nondiscretionary - that would avoid
obsolescence without simply giving discretion to the federal or state
governments - can be illustrated by the debates concerning the sec-
ond branch of the legislature, the first branch, and the western states.
When discussing the need for members of the second branch of the
legislature to serve for extended terms, Madison gave a detailed ac-
count of America's changing social structure and its effect on Ameri-
can values and government. Pinckney had insisted that America did
not and for a considerable time would not have the various ranks and
extremes of wealth and poverty that so troubled Europe.148 Madison
responded that "[i]n all civilized Countries the people fall into differ-
ent classes . . . . There will be creditors & debtors, farmers,
merch[ants] & manufacturers. There will be particularly the distinc-
tion of rich and poor.... We cannot... be regarded even at this time,
as one homogeneous mass . . . . ,49 Moreover, the future held worse
in store, and the Constitution had to accommodate this too:
In framing a system which we wish to last for ages, we sh[ould] not lose
cans should be constrained by a constitutional law no longer in accord with American society.
For both Jones and Webster, their study of language may have contributed to their analyses of
law, but whereas Jones examined the variety of language and law to discover what was common
to all nations, Webster attempted to demonstrate the inevitability of variety - what was unique
to each nation and time.
145. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Sept. 6, 1789, in 15 THE PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 392, 392, 395-96 (J. Boyd ed. 1958).
146. Id. at 392. In late 1787, Jefferson had approved of a "permanent form of government."
Enclosure in letter of Dec. 31, 1787, in 12 id. at 478 (1955). Indeed, in 1788, Webster criticized
Jefferson for his insistence on a constitution unalterable by an ordinary legislature.
147. The notion had a precedent not only in the writings of Webster but also those of Milton.
Justifying Parliamentary sovereignty, Milton asked: [Could our forefathers bind us to any cer-
tain form of government more than we can bind our posterity?" J. MILTON, BRIEF NOTES ON
DR. GRIFFITH'S SERMON (1660), quoted in C. MCILWAIN, supra note 64, at 94.
148. Convention Notes of James Madison, June 25, 1787, in 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
397-404.
149. Convention Notes of James Madison, June 26, 1787, in 1 M. FARRA1ID, supra note 1,
at 422.
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sight of the changes which ages will produce. An increase of population
will of necessity increase the proportion of those who will labour under
all the hardships of life, & secretly sigh for a more equal distribution of
its blessings. These may in time outnumber those who are placed above
the feelings of indigence. According to the equal laws of suffrage, the
power will slide into the hands of the former. No agrarian attempts have
yet been made in this Country, but symptoms of a leveling spirit, as we
have understood, have sufficiently appeared in ... certain quarters to
give notice of the future danger.150
Madison feared that the growth of an indigent, laboring class would
give rise to a demanding "leveling spirit" or egalitarianism. Therefore,
when discussing the second branch, he advocated terms of a "consid-
erable duration," which would, he thought, accommodate the dangers
of egalitarianism better than frequent elections.
Sherman responded tartly that "[t]he more permanency it has the
worse if it be a bad Gov[ernment]," but he became more concilia-
tory.' 5 ' Although he said that frequent elections would "give perma-
nency to the Government," he suggested that six- or four-year terms
would be sufficient. 152 Hamilton "concurred" with Madison's re-
marks and added some of his own. According to Hamilton, "[t]he
difference of property is already great amongst us. Commerce and in-
dustry will still increase the disparity. Your government must meet
this state of things, or combinations will in process of time, undermine
your system."' 53 Madison and Hamilton held unusually sophisticated
views on the future of American class structure and how the second
branch of the legislature could accommodate it, but there was nothing
unusual about their assumption that a permanent constitution was
desirable.' 54
A similar interest in permanent, nondiscretionary structures may
150. Id. at 422-23.
151. Id. at 423 (remarks of Sherman).
152. Id. at 423.
153. Convention Notes of Robert Yates, June 26, 1787, in id. at 432. Madison's account is
not inconsistent with this. Another example of Hamilton's anticipation of social change and its
effect upon the legislative branch may be found in Federalist Number 60. While addressing the
possibility that a particular class of electors would come to dominate the legislature, Hamilton
argued that the differences between inhabitants of different states would "occasion a material
diversity of disposition in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions in
society." In presenting this argument he acknowledged that such differences probably would
diminish with time: "[A]n intimate intercourse under the same government will promote a grad-
ual assimilation" in some respects, "but not sufficiently, he thought, to eliminate such differences.
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 60 (Hamilton), at 404-05.
154. In the ratification debates, Federalists defended the terms of representatives and sena-
tors on the ground that they would require time to acquaint themselves with the information
necessary for them to fulfill their duties. An example concerning representatives that is also
interesting for its anticipation of change is Ames' comment in the Massachusetts Ratification
Convention: "The time, I hope, will come, when this excellent country will furnish food, and
freedom.., for fifty millions of happy people. Will any man say that the national business can
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be observed in the debates about the first branch, the House of Repre-
sentatives. In particular, the problem of apportionment of representa-
tives to that branch led the Convention to consider at length
America's future population and territory. The solution of a ratio was
attractive because of the common belief that the nation would require
an increase in representatives as it advanced in population.' 55
After the Convention, in Federalist Number 55, Madison expressed
his understanding of the ratio. Countering the claim that the initial
sixty-five representatives was a dangerously small number, Madison
said that he could not conceive there were then or in the near future
would be sixty-five or a hundred men who would willingly betray the
trust committed to them. He modestly added, however: "What
change of circumstances[,] time[,] and a fuller population of our coun-
try may produce, requires a prophetic spirit to declare, which makes
no part of my pretensions."'' 56 Yet Madison did seek to anticipate at
least the possibility of future developments and their effect on the Con-
stitution. In the very next number of the Federalist, he explained the
effect of the "changes of time" on the internal affairs of the states:
At present some of the states are little more than a society of husband-
men. Few of them have made much progress in those branches of indus-
try, which give a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation.
These[,] however[,] will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced
population; and will require on the part of each state a fuller representa-
tion. The foresight of the Convention has accordingly taken care that
the progress of population may be accompanied with a proper increase of
the representative branch of the government. 157
Madison's description of the development of society and of how gov-
ernment must keep pace with it sounds very much like an application
of Scottish historical sociology in the novel context of an American
constitution.
Some opponents of a ratio based on population attempted to have
apportionment left to the discretion of the federal legislature. Morris
reported on behalf of a committee appointed to consider apportion-
ment that "as the present situation of the States may probably alter as
well in point of wealth as in the number of their inhabitants, that the
be understood in one year?" Ames in Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Jan. 15, 1787, in 2
J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 10.
155. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 84 (Hamilton), at 584; Hamilton in New York
Ratification'Convention, June 20-21, 1788, in 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 238-39, 251; Ells-
worth, The Landholder, VI, The Connecticut Courant, Dec. 10, 1787, in P. FORD, ESSAYS supra
note 1, at 152; The Republican, To the People, The Connecticut Courant, Jan. 7, 1787, in 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 530; Remarks of Randolph & Wilson, in Convention
Notes of James Madison, July 12, 1787, in 1 M.oFARRAND, supra note 1, at 594-95.
156. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 55 (Madison), at 376.
157. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 56 (Madison), at 382.
November 1989]
Michigan Law Review
Legislature be authorized from time to time to augment ye. number of
Representatives." 158 He later tried to justify this broad legislative dis-
cretion by questioning the possibility of finding a permanent rule: "If
we can't agree on a rule that will be just at this time, how can we
expect to find one that will be just in all times to come[?] Surely those
who come after us will judge better of things present, than we can of
things future." 15 9 The Convention, however, did not abandon the so-
lution of a ratio.160
Yet some discretion was necessary. A ratio posed the danger that
representatives might in the distant future become too numerous.
During the Convention, Madison objected to a fixed ratio as a perpet-
ual rule. "[I]f the Union sh[ould] be permanent," the future increase
of population would "render the number of Representatives exces-
sive." 61 His remarks prompted this colloquy:
Mr. G[orha]m. It is not to be supposed that the Gov[ernment] will
last so long as to produce this effect. Can it be supposed that this vast
Country including the Western territory will 150 years hence remain one
nation?
Mr. Elseworth. If the Gov[ernment] should continue so long, altera-
tions may be made in the Constitution in the manner proposed in a sub-
sequent article.' 62
Although Ellsworth thought that the amendment process could be
used to update the ratio if it should become obsolete in the distant
future, Sherman and Madison suggested instead a rule that would be
permanent - representation "not exceeding" one for every 40,000 -
and this was accepted without dissent.163 Toward the conclusion of
158. Convention Notes of James Madison, July 9, 1787, in 1 M. FARRAND, supra note I, at
559.
159. Convention Notes of James Madison, July 11, 1787, in 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
583. See also the committee report delivered by Morris in the Convention Notes of James
Madison, July 9, 1787, in l id. at 559-60, and King's argument in the Convention Notes of James
Madison, July 6, 1787, in l id. at 541. For Mason's views contra see The Convention Notes of
James Madison, July 11, 1787, in l id. at 578.
160. See Convention Notes of James Madison, Aug. 8, 1787, in I M. FARRAND, supra note
1, at 594-95.
161. Convention Notes of James Madison, Aug. 8, 1787, in 2 id. at 221.
162. Id.
163. Id. Later, Ellsworth adopted the permanency argument: "[W]hen the whole [of
America] is populated it will constitute a legislature unmanageable by its numbers. Convention
foreseeing this danger, have so worded the article, that if the people should at any future time
judge necessary, they may diminish the representation." Ellsworth, The Landholder, IV, The
Connecticut Courant, Nov. 26, 1787, in P. FORD, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 152.
The possibility that a ratio based on population might eventually lead to an excessive number
of representatives was raised earlier by King as an argument for apportionment based on prop-
erty: "[The Ratio of Representation proposed could not be safely fixed, since in a century & a
half our computed increase of population would carry the number of representatives to an enor-
mous excess .... Convention Notes of James Madison, July 6, 1787, in I M. FARRAND, supra
note 1, at 541.
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the Convention, the 40,000 was changed to 30,000. In the Penn-
sylvania ratification convention, Wilson defended the "not-exceeding"
formula: "IT]he present number of their inhabitants will be doubled
in twenty-five years, and according to that progressive proportion, and
the ratio of one member for thirty thousand inhabitants, the House of
Representatives will, within a single century, consist of more than six
hundred members." t64 An excessive number of legislators within a
hundred years had to be avoided. 165
The two branches of the legislature were not the only subjects that
prompted discussion of how nondiscretionary provisions could be
made permanent. The need to incorporate western states was a press-
ing issue in the late 1780s. 166 It prompted thought about the shape of
the United States in both the near and distant future and therefore
gave rise to concern about the permanency of the Constitution's
structure.
In objecting to provisions that would ensure eastern domination of
the Union, Sherman argued that "there was no probability that the
number of future States would exceed that of the Existing States" and
that "[i]f the event should ever happen, it was too remote to be taken
into consideration at this time."1 67 He continued, "Besides We are
providing for our posterity, for our children & our grand Children,
164. Wilson in Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Nov. 20, 1787, in 2 J. ELLIOT, supra
note 1, at 442; see also Coxe, An Examination, in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 143.
165. The legislative discretion permitted by the apportionment clause was disliked by some
Anti-Federalists. Madison and some "friends to the constitution" also favored amendment, be-
cause, in the view of Madison, "it should not be left in the discretion of the Government to
diminish" apportionment below that initially provided for by the Constitution. Madison in
House of Representatives Debate, June 8, 1789, in B. SCHWARTZ, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1,
at 1032; see also id. at 1077-87. A bizarre (or perhaps satirical) editorial in a Pennsylvania news-
paper criticized the apportionment clause both for not being based on a ratio (which in fact it
was) and for not preventing an excessive number of representatives (which in fact it did). Never-
theless, the argument is of interest:
If we consider the vast extent and increasing population of the United States, it will appear
that a representation upon this principle (though proper to begin with) cannot last very long.
It must grow far too unwieldy for business and the Constitution must therefore be mended
and patched with new work. Let your government be invariably fixed; so far, at least, as
human foresight can go, and age will secure it respect and veneration from the multitude.
In framing a government, we should consider a century to come as but a day, and leave the
least possible for posterity to mend. Errors sanctified by long usage are not easily relin-
quished. Their age attaches the people and renders a reform difficult. There is even danger
in reforming the errors of a government, but there is more in letting them along. Hence we
ought to aim at PERMANENCY in every part of a constitution intended to endure.
Freeman's Journal, Sept. 26, 1787, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 146.
166. In recent years, a number of historians have examined the influence of the western
territories upon the political thought of late eighteenth-century Americans. Among these schol-
ars is Professor Peter Onuf, who has argued that perceptions of the west influenced the develop-
ment of republican thought in the 1780s. See Onuf, Liberty, Development, and Union: Visions of
the West in the 1780s, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 179 (1986).
167. Convention Notes of James Madison, July 14, 1787, in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
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who would be as likely to be citizens of new Western States, as of the
old States. On this consideration alone, we ought to make no . . .
discrimination [between western and eastern states]."'1 68 Although
Sherman said he was willing to discount a remote contingency, he said
this as an argument for what he apparently conceived to be the perma-
nent solution. Sherman knew in a very literal sense that "[w]e are
providing for our posterity."' 169
The framers and ratifiers had some glimpses of the vastness of the
future United States. Mason argued for equal treatment of new states
as the only way to prevent them from rebelling. He anticipated that
they might "in time.., be both more numerous & more wealthy than
their Atlantic brethren," and he predicted that they would force Spain
to give them access to the Pacific, which was "the natural outlet for
their productions."'' 70 At the Pennsylvania ratifying convention, Wil-
son elaborated on one of his favorite themes:
[T]heir views could not be confined to a small or a single community, but
were expanded to a great number of states .... Nor were even these the
only objects to be comprehended within their deliberations. Numerous
states yet unformed, myriads of the human race, who will inhabit regions
hitherto uncultivated, were to be affected by the result of their
proceedings. 171
"We are representatives," he said, "not merely of the present age, but
of future times; not merely of the territory along the seacoast, but of
regions immensely extended westward.... I wish the honorable gen-
tlemen would think not only of themselves, not only of the present
age, but of others and of future times."' 72 In sum, although the fram-
ers and ratifiers could not prognosticate the precise future of the
American west, some of them attempted to discern its main features
and construct constitutional structures that would accommodate it. 173
168. Id.
169. Id. So too in the debate about the second branch, Sherman doubted the attractiveness
of a permanent constitution if it were a bad constitution, but he apparently supported what was
considered permanent language. See supra text at note 152.
170. "[T]hough Spain might for a time deprive them of the natural outlet for their produc-
tions, yet she will, because she must, finally yield to their demands." Convention Notes of James
Madison, July 11, 1787, in I M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 579.
171. 1 WORKS OF J. WILSON, supra note 52, at 526.
172. Wilson in Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Dec. 4, 1787, in 2 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 477-78.
173. Among the other issues that prompted discussion of fixed constitutional rules and the
danger of obsolescence was the question whether the states or the people should elect their legis-
lators. Hamilton argued that the people should elect the first branch of the legislature, because,
among other things, "the State Gov[ernments] might gradually dwindle into nothing. The sys-
tem therefore sh[ould] not be engrafted on what might possibly fail." Convention Notes of
James Madison, June 21, 1787, in 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 358-59. Later, Wilson in-
sisted that the second branch also be elected by the people, giving as one of his reasons that,
"[w]hen we are laying the foundation of a building, which is to last for ages .... it ought to be
[Vol. 88:239
November 1989] The Constitution and Social Change
3. Discretionary Provisions
Although Federalists wished to establish the government upon
nondiscretionary limitations and structures, they realized that in many
instances nondiscretionary provisions could become obsolete. In such
cases, therefore, they sought to achieve permanency by giving the fed-
eral government (and occasionally the states) broad discretion. Some
examples of this approach, relating to the two branches of the legisla-
ture and the incorporation of western states, have already been ex-
amined. Whereas, however, the debates on the legislature and the
western states chiefly concerned nondiscretionary language and
touched upon discretionary solutions only incidentally, for many other
subjects the surviving debates focused directly on discretion as a
means of attaining permanence. Therefore, such subjects are ex-
amined together in this section. The examples discussed below - by
no means the only examples - are drawn from the debates on com-
pensation, qualifications of candidates, the time and place of elections,
revenue, the military, and juries. These debateS that concentrated on
discretion demonstrate the willingness of Federalists to sacrifice con-
stitutional rules or limitations for the sake of a permanent constitu-
tion. They thereby provide further evidence of the extent to which
Federalists identified the Constitution as the place for rules that were
permanent - that would not need to be adapted flexibly to
circumstances.
Legislators' compensation was one of the issues that forced the
well laid." Convention Notes of Robert Yates, June 25, 1787, in 1 id. at 413; see also Convention
Notes of James Madison, June 25, 1787, in 1 id. at 405.
On the power of each state in the second branch, Wilson argued:
[T]he rule of suffrage ought on every principle to be the same in the 2d. as in the 1st. branch.
If the Government be not laid on this foundation, it can be neither solid nor lasting, any
other principle will be local, confined & temporary. This will expand with the expansion,
and grow with the growth of the U. States.
Convention Notes of James Madison, June 30, 1787, in I id. at 483.
When urging that the Constitution should restrict suffrage for the House of Representatives
to freeholders, some framers made arguments based on the changes they anticipated in America's
social structure. Dickinson sought "the restriction of the right to [freeholders] as a necessary
defence ag[ainst] the dangerous influence of those multitudes without property & without princi-
ple, with which our Country like all others, will in time abound." Convention Notes of James
Madison, Aug. 7, 1787, in 2 id. at 202. As a debate developed about the exclusion of non-
freeholders, including merchants and industrial employees, Dickinson's point was pursued. Ac-
cording to Morris, "We should not confine our attention to the present moment. The time is not
distant when this Country will abound with mechanics & manufacturers who will receive their
bread from their employers. Will such men be the secure & faithful Guardians of liberty?" 2 id.
at 202. Madison also took up the theme. "In future times a great majority of the people will not
only be without landed, but any other sort of, property." The people without property would,
said Madison, become either a threat to property and liberty or, more probably, easily bribed
instruments of the opulent and ambitious. Iid. at 203-04. See also J. MADISON, Observations on
Jefferson's Draft of a Constitution for Virginia, in 11 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 281, 287-88
(1977).
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framers to turn to federal legislative discretion as the only permanent
solution. As with judges' compensation, the danger of inflation was
well understood and would not permit an amount to be fixed in the
Constitution. Another possible solution was state control of federal
salaries. This appealed to some but was rejected. Wilson pointed out
that conceivably "the states may become unfederal, and they may then
shake the national government."' 174 Madison seconded: "Our atten-
tion is too much confined to the present moment, when our regula-
tions are intended to be perpetual."' 175 Like fixed wages, state control
of salaries was inconsistent with permanence. Madison expressed
hopes of fixing compensation in the Constitution "by taking a stan-
dard which w[oul]d not vary with circumstances."'' 76 His proposal for
such a standard - that salaries be tied to the value of a certain
amount of wheat - was not, however, sufficiently permanent. 77 As
Morris presciently observed in a similar debate about judges' salaries:
The value of money may not only alter but the State of Society may
alter. In this event [the value of] the same quantity of wheat... would
not be the same compensation. The Amount of salaries must always be
regulated by the manners & the style of living in a Country. i78
Thus, the framers were left with the prospect of giving federal legisla-
174. Convention Notes of Robert Yates, June 22, 1787, in 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
377.
175. Id. at 378.
176. Convention Notes of James Madison, June 22, 1787, in 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
373. In the Virginia Ratification Convention, Madison said:
I will acknowledge that their compensations, if practicable, should be fixed in the Constitu-
tion itself, so as not to be dependent on Congress itself, or on the state legislatures. The
various vicissitudes, or rather the gradual diminution, of the value of all coins and circulat-
ing medium, is one reason against ascertaining them immutably; as what may be now an
adequate compensation, might, by the progressive reduction of the value of our circulating
medium, be extremely inadequate at a period not far distant.
3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 369; see also id. at 372. Note that Virginia and some other states
had, at various times during their histories, required certain payments to be made in specified
commodities, such as tobacco.
177. For his proposal, see Convention Notes of James Madison, June 12, 1787, in I M. FAR-
RAND, supra note 1, at 215-16. For a slightly different but related approach, see Ellsworth's
views, in Convention Notes of James Madison, Aug. 14, 1787, in 2 id. at 292.
The June 22 debate about whether a fixed standard could be formulated was left unresolved,
the Convention agreeing "that the practicability offixing the compensation should be considered
hereafter in forming the details." Convention Notes of James Madison, June 22, 1787, in 1 id. at
374-75.
178. Convention Notes of James Madison, July 18, 1787, in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
45. Morris made this remark in response to Madison's suggestion that "[t]he variations in the
value of money, may be guarded ag[ainst] by taking for a standard wheat or some other thing of
permanent value." Id. Like Morris, Hamilton later argued that "fluctuations in the value of
money, and in the state of society, rendered a fixed rate of compensation in the constitution
inadmissable." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 79 (Hamilton), at 531-32; see also Mason's
remarks in Convention Notes of James Madison, Aug. 27, 1787, in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1,
at 429; Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 20, 1788, in 3 id. at 332; McKean in
Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Dec. 10, 1787, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
1, at 540-41, 544-45.
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tors discretion over their own compensation. 179 That the framers ac-
cepted this unattractive solution reveals how very much they
considered permanency an essential attribute of a constitution. What
could not be permanent could not be included. 180
The acceptance of legislative discretion for the sake of constitu-
tional permanency is also apparent in the discussions of legislative
elections. Wilson opposed a disqualification of candidates who were
debtors on the ground that in the future, as during the Revolutionary
War, the government might need to borrow funds, and persons who
patriotically raised money for the government by borrowing from the
public should not be excluded from the legislature. "We should con-
sider," he warned, "that we are providing a Constitution for future
generations, and not merely for the peculiar circumstances of the mo-
ment."' " In a later discussion, Ellsworth argued that "[t]he different
circumstances of different parts of the U.S. and the probable difference
between the present and future circumstances of the whole, render it
improper to have either uniform or fixed qualifications."' 18 2 Ells-
worth's desire to "leave this matter to... Legislative discretion" elic-
ited a response from Madison that such discretion might be abused
and, further, that qualifications of the electors and the elected were
"fundamental articles in a Republican Gov[ernmen]t and ought to be
fixed by the Constitution" - a reminder that Federalists retained
some traditional expectations about what matters had to be included
in the document.1 83
With respect to the times, places, and manner of elections, the
framers left discretion in the states and Congress. In the Virginia rati-
fying convention, Madison explained that exclusive state regulation of
elections would destroy the federal government, and that the times,
places, and manner of elections "could not be fixed in the Constitution
179. For Federalist assertions and explanations of this solution (or variants thereof), see
Dickinson in Convention Notes of James Madison, Aug. 14, 1787, in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note
1, at 292; Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 14, 1788, in 3 id. at 313-14. Note
that the framers were even cautious enough to settle upon language that refers to "compensa-
tion" rather then "salaries."
180. Concerning the $20 value-in-controversy requirement of the seventh amendment, see
infra text accompanying notes 213-15.
181. Convention Notes of James Madison, July 26, 1787, in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
125. Langdon expressly agreed with "the reasons given by Mr Wilson." 2 id. at 125.
182. He continued, "[W]hat may be accommodated to the existing State of things among us,
may be very inconvenient in some future state of them." Convention Notes of James Madison,
Aug. 10, 1787, in 2 id. at 249.
183. Id. at 249-50. Similarly, just several days earlier, Madison had opposed a discretionary
provision on suffrage for the House, since "suffrage is certainly one of the fundamental articles of
republican Government, and ought not be left to be regulated by the Legislature." Convention
Notes of James Madison, Aug. 7, 1787, in id. at 203.
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without involving great inconveniences. They could then have no au-
thority to adjust the regulation to the changes of circumstances. The
question then is, whether it ought to be fixed unalterably in the state
governments, or subject to the control of the general government.' 84
The language concerning legislative elections had to be able to accom-
modate "changes of circumstances." In the ratification debates, other
Federalists also raised such arguments, including the suggestion that
federal control was necessary because war against foreign invaders or
among the states might interrupt state governments. 185
The federal government's power to raise money by taxation or bor-
rowing prompted very extensive discussions of the Constitution's per-
manency, particularly by those, such as Madison and Hamilton, who
thought about the appropriateness of restrictions on federal revenues.
Federalists sought powers of taxation that would be adequate
notwithstanding changes in the economy. Dickinson argued: "The
power of taxing exports may be inconvenient at present; but it must be
of dangerous consequences to prohibit it with respect to all articles
and for ever." 186 Madison said further: "As we ought to be governed
by national and permanent views, it is a sufficient argument for giving
ye power over exports that a tax, tho' it may not be expedient at pres-
ent, may be so hereafter." 187 Although other framers disputed the
184. Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 14, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note
1, at 408.
185. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 59 (Hamilton), at 398; No. 61 (Hamilton), at 414;
Letterfrom New York Connecticut Journal, Oct. 24, 1787, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 384-85; Ames in Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Jan. 21, 1788, in 2 J. ELLIOT,
supra note 1, at 48; Gov. Johnston in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 25, 1788, in 4
id. at 50. For the war argument, see Sumner in Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Jan. 17,
1788, in 2 Id. at 32; Iredel in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 25, 1788, in 4 id. at
53-54. In a letter to Theophilus Parsons, George Cabot worried that if Anti-Federalists
should insist that it might and ought to have been fixed immovably in the Constitution, it
will be difficult to answer them. For I cannot see why a rule might not have been made of a
kind that should answer that description, and yet accommodate itself to the changes in
population, &c ....
Letter from George Cabot to Theophilus Parsons, Feb. 28, 1788, in 16 DOCUMENTARY HIs-
TORY, supra note 1, at 249. In the Pennsylvania ratification convention, Wilson defended the
legislative discretion by looking to future political tactics:
Another thing may possibly happen, I don't say it will; but we were obliged to guard even
against possibilities, as well as probabilities. A legislature may be willing to make the neces-
sary regulations, yet the minority of that legislature may, by absenting themselves, break up
the house and prevent the execution of the intention of the majority. I have supposed the
case, that some state governments may make no regulations at all.
Wilson in Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Nov. 28, 1787, in 2 id. at 403. Wilson was
being either sarcastic or excessively tactful, for the departure of a minority to prevent a quorum
was a maneuver with which Pennsylvanians were all too familiar.
186. Convention Notes of James Madison, Aug. 21, 1787, in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note I, at
361. He continued by saying that "[h]e thought it would be better to except particular articles
from the power." Id.
187. Id.; see also Dickinson's comments, id. Fitzsimmons was "for giving a power of laying
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question of taxes on exports, they did not challenge the need to antici-
pate future circumstances.
In the Federalist, Madison further developed the taxation issue by
discussing imports: "[T]he extent of revenue drawn from foreign com-
merce, must vary with the variations both in the extent and the kind of
imports .. " ,,188 It was this rather than the progress of population
that would determine the appropriateness of taxes on imports:
As soon as domestic manufactures are begun by the hands not called for
by agriculture, the imported manufactures will decrease as the numbers
of people increase. In a more remote stage, the imports may consist in a
considerable part of raw materials which will be wrought into articles for
exportation .... A system of Government, meant for duration, ought to
contemplate these revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to
them.189
The Constitution's provisions for revenue had to provide for "revolu-
tions" or changes in the American economy, even those that would
occur in "a more remote stage." 190 As a result, those provisions had
to permit wide discretion rather than fix particular means of raising
revenue. Similar views were expressed by Hamilton and Livingston in
the New York ratification convention.191
Not only the sources and methods of taxation but also the unpre-
the tax when a proper time may call for it - This would certainly be the case when America
should become a manufacturing country." Id. at 362.
188. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 41 (Madison), at 276.
189. Id. at 276-77.
190. In the Virginia Ratification Convention, Madison said: "Although the impost may even
increase during the term of twenty-five years, yet when we are preparing a government for
perpetuity, we ought to found it on permanent principles, and not on those of a temporary na-
ture." Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 12, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1,
at 310; see also id. at 309.
191. In New York, Hamilton argued about the "objects of revenue":
To ascertain this division of objects [of revenue] is the proper business of legislation: it
would be absurd to fix it in the Constitution, both because it would be too extensive and
intricate, and because alteration of circumstances must render a change of the division indis-
pensable. Constitutions should consist only of general provisions: the reason is, that they
must necessarily be permanent, and that they cannot calculate for the possible change of
things [Le., prognosticate future events].
Hamilton in New York Ratification Convention, June 28, 1788, in 2 id. at 364; see also id. at 363,
369. Livingston argued "that, at a future period, this would be a manufacturing country ....
But the gentleman [Melancton Smith], in answer to this, says we ought not to look forward to a
future period. What, then, must be this government of a day? It is the third time we have been
making a government, and God grant it may be the last." Livingston in New York Ratification
Convention, June 30, 1788, in id. at 386; see also id. at 341. For Melancton Smith's comment,
see text accompanying infra note 219.
The Constitution's prohibition of direct taxes not in proportion to the census encouraged
dependence upon indirect taxes, and therefore Hamilton undertook to show that these "con-
sumption" taxes "must always constitute the chief part of the revenue raised in this country."
Direct taxes, particularly those on land, required evaluations, and "in a country imperfectly
settled and progressive in improvement, the difficulties are increased almost to impracticability."
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 21 (Hamilton), at 134-35. Thus, direct taxes would hardly
be feasible, let alone desirable, for a long time.
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dictability of the need for revenue required broad federal discretion.
Hamilton wrote:
[W]e are not to confine our view to the present period, but to look for-
ward to remote futurity. Constitutions of civil Government are not to be
framed upon a calculation of existing exigencies; but upon a combination
of these, with the probable exigencies of ages .... There ought to be a
CAPACITY to provide for future contingencies, as they may happen;
and, as these are illimitable in their nature, it is impossible safely to limit
that capacity. 192
He pursued this theme to the principle that "[i]n framing a Govern-
ment for posterity as well as ourselves, we ought in those provisions
which are designed to be permanent, to calculate not on temporary,
but on permanent causes of expence."' 193 Other Federalists advocated
similar views, albeit less elegantly and usually in connection with their
anticipation of future wars.194
A few Anti-Federalists discussed the possibility of war in their ar-
guments for allowing the federal government to issue bills of credit.
When the Constitutional Convention considered a proposal to elimi-
nate language authorizing the federal government to "emit bills on the
credit of the U. States," Mason - who became an Anti-Federalist -
expressed doubts about the motion. "Though he had a mortal hatred
to paper money, yet as he could not foresee all emergenc[i]es, he was
unwilling to tie the hands of the Legislature. He observed that the late
war could not have been carried on, had such a prohibition ex-
isted."' 195 Gorham promptly assured Mason that "The power as far as
192. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 34 (Hamilton), at 210-11.
193. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 34 (Hamilton), at 213-14.
194. For a general statement, see Sedgwick in House of Representatives Debate, Aug. 22,
1789, in B. SCHWARTZ, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 1137. Other general statements were
made together with more specific arguments about war. See THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2,
No. 23 (Hamilton), at 147; No. 36 (Hamilton), at 229; Hamilton in New York Ratification
Convention, June 27, 1788, in 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 351, 364; Livingston in New York
Ratification Convention, June 27, 1788, in id. at 334, 343 ("a constitution should be calculated
for all circumstances"); Gore in Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Jan. 22, 1788, in id. at
66; Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 16, 1788, in 3 id. at 95-96, 249; Letter
from Samuel H. Parsons to William Cushing, Jan. 11, 1788, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY,
supra note 1, at 570; Randolph in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 7, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT,
supra note 1, at 127-28.
Other comments concerning taxation included Madison's response to a suggestion that ex-
ecutions levied by federal officers might interfere with thbse levied by state officers. Madison
expostulated: "Is it not in the power of the general government to employ the state officers? Is
nothing to be left to future legislation, or must every thing be immutably fixed in the Constitu-
tion?" Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 12, 1788, in id. at 306. See also [Web-
ster], America, N.Y. Daily Advertiser, Dec. 31, 1787, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra
note 1, at 198.
195. Convention Notes of James Madison, Aug. 16, 1787, in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
308-09.
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it will be necessary or safe, is involved in that of borrowing."1 96
Thereafter, it was another future Anti-Federalist, Luther Martin, who
pursued Mason's argument: "[I]t was impossible to look forward into
futurity so far as to decide, that events might not happen, that should
render the exercise of such a power absolutely necessary . ,, 197 Mar-
tin doubted whether, "if a war should take place, it would be possible
for this country to defend itself, without having recourse to paper
credit .... 1 9 8 One did not have to be a Federalist to argue against
constitutional restrictions that might become obsolete.
Similarly, broad military powers, including the power to raise a
standing army, were required by the possibility of foreign invasions
and other conflict. 199 David Epstein has shown that the Federalist
justified the Federal government's military authority as well as its
right to raise revenues on the ground that unanticipated and unfore-
seeable exigencies might arise.2°° The Federalist was not alone.
Among others, Massachusetts's Bowdoin argued that the military
power had to be "according as circumstances or exigencies may re-
quire": "[A]s human foresight cannot extend to many of them, and all
of them are in the womb of futurity, the quantum of the power cannot
be estimated. ' 201 The Constitution had to allow extensive military
powers, according to Duane of New York, since "the necessity...
might in future exist, of maintaining large armies and navies .... -202
196. Id. Gorham's view was shared by Madison. See id. at 310 n.*
197. Martin, Genuine Information, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note I, at 206.
198. Id. Note that some of Martin's assertions about what he said in the Convention were
disputed by Ellsworth in The Landholder, X, The Maryland Journal, Feb. 29, 1788, in P. FORD,
ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 182.
199. Shay's Rebellion had drawn attention to the danger of insurrection. See, e.g., Madison
in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 14, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 425; Iredell in
North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 26, 1788, in 4 id. at 96; Ellsworth, The Land-
holder, V The Connecticut Courant, Dec. 3, 1787 in P. FORD, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 157. See
also the guarantee clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, and the habeas corpus clause, U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
200. D. EPSTEIN, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF THE FEDERALIST 21, 41, 45, 46, 47 (1984).
201. Bowdoin in Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Jan. 23, 1788, in 2 J. ELLIOT, supra
note 1, at 84-85; see also Marshall in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 10, 1788, in 3 id. at
236; Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 11, 1788, in id. at 248-49; Innes in Vir-
ginia Ratification Convention, June 25, 1788, in id. at 635. In the South, a fear of slave rebellions
figured in arguments about the military. See, eg., Randolph in Virginia Ratification Convention,
June 9, 1788, in id. at 192.
202. Duane in New York Ratification Convention, July 1, 1788, in 2 id. at 379. Roger Sher-
man wrote:
Perhaps a provision that they should never raise troops in time of peace, might at some
period embarrass the public concerns and endanger the liberties of the people. It is possible
that in the infinite variety of events, it might become improper strictly to adhere to any one
provision that has ever been proposed to be stipulated.
Sherman, Letters of a Countryman, in P. FORD, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 222; see also Iredell in
North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 26, 1788, in 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 96;
Iredell, Answer to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution, in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS,
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Melancton Smith responded to the discussion of a navy that "it was
our duty to calculate for the present period, and not attempt to pro-
vide for the contingencies of two or three centuries to come. '203 More
commonly, Anti-Federalists disputed the likelihood of invasion and
noted the dangers of an army or the Constitution's version of the
militia.2o4
As James Stoner has argued, the need to permit adaptation to cir-
cumstances required discretionary congressional power over the judi-
ciary and its jurisdiction.20 5 Among the arguments made by
Federalists for broad congressional discretion over the establishment
of courts was that it was "exceedingly inconvenient, to fix the arrange-
ment in the Constitution itself, and not leave it to laws which may be
changed according to circumstances. '20 6 Mason "thought many cir-
cumstances might arise not now to be foreseen, which might render
supra note 1, at 365; Civis Rusticus, Va. Independent Chronicle, Jan. 30, 1788, in 8 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 338; Letter from George Nicholas, Feb. 16, 1788, in id. at 370;
A Citizen of Philadelphia, Remarks on the Address of Sixteen Members, Oct. 18, 1787, in 13 id.
at 302.
203. Smith in New York Ratification Convention, July 1, 1788, in 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1,
at 381.
204. See, eg., Mason in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 14, 1788, in 3 id. at 425-26
(arguing that social change would have a dangerous effect on the composition of the militia);
Tyler in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 25, 1788, in id. at 640.
In New York, Morris commented that "[tihe gentlemen, in all their zeal for liberty, do not
seem to see the danger to be apprehended from foreign power ... ." Morris in New York
Ratification Convention, June 24, 1788, in 2 id. at 297; see also Ellsworth, The Landholder, V,
The Connecticut Courant, Dec. 3, 1787, in P. FORD, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 157.
205. James Stoner has suggested that the "ambiguity in the text of the Constitution" may
have been due in part to a recognition that the judiciary and its jurisdiction might have to
change. Therefore, such matters were left to "legislative adjustment rather than constitutional
principle." Stoner, Constitutionalism and Judging in the Federalist, in SAVING THE REVOLU-
TION 203, 206 (C. Kesler ed. 1987). If Stoner meant "grant of discretion" rather than "ambigu-
ity," this article is in accord with his conclusion. Of course, article III contains ambiguities,
some of which probably were the consequence of a stalemate and compromise. The framers and
ratifiers, however, argued for legislative discretion rather than ambiguity as means of accommo-
dating changing circumstances.
206. Pendleton in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 18, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note
1, at 517; see also Letter from Edmund Pendleton to R.H. Lee, June 14, 1788, in 2 THE LETTERS
AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON 535; Sherman, The Letters of"A Citizen of New Haven,"
in P. FORD, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 235, 241. One writer asked, "Can you expect that the
number of courts and the times and places of holding them through all future ages should be
ascertained?" An Independent Freeholder, Winchester Va. Gazette, Jan. 18, 1788, in 8 Docu-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 312. When commenting on the judiciary in Jefferson's draft
of a constitution for Virginia, Madison wrote:
Much detail ought to [be] avoided in the constitutional regulation of this department, that
there may be room for changes which may be demanded by the progressive changes in the
state of our population. It is at least doubtful whether the number of Courts, the number of
Judges, or even the boundaries of Jurisdiction ought to be made unalterable but by a revisal
of the Constitution.
Letter From James Madison to John Brown, in 11 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 290 (1977),
Later, in 1802, Morris took a similar position. Remarks of G. Morris in Senate, Jan. 14, 1802, in
3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 392-93.
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such a power absolutely necessary. '20 7 Similarly, questions of juris-
diction were largely left to Congress.20 8
Of course, as is well known, article III's broad grant of discretion
was in part a product of compromise, but this, like other compromises
in the Constitution, was not inconsistent with what has been said
about permanence. In most instances, compromises in the drafting of
the Constitution apparently led to results Federalists considered com-
patible with their desire for a lasting document. Compromises that led
to increased federal discretion were particularly likely to accommo-
date Federalist concerns about permanence. In article III, for exam-
ple, those who sought to require establishment of at least some, albeit
unspecified, lower federal courts compromised and left lower courts
entirely to the discretion of Congress - a result perfectly consistent
with the goal of avoiding obsolescence.
Concerns about permanence led even to the creation of federal dis-
cretion at the expense of rights. This appears to have been the justifi-
cation for the power to suspend habeas corpus. 209 It clearly was one of
the several arguments for the Constitution's omission of the right to a
jury in civil cases. As a result of the complexity of the subject and the
different practices of the various states, it was difficult enough to for-
mulate a rule describing current jury rights in civil cases. The possibil-
ity of changes in circumstances posed still further problems.
Hamilton, it will be recalled, believed that "the changes which are
continually happening in the affairs of society may render a different
mode of determining questions of property preferable in many cases in
which that mode of trial now prevails. '210 Iredell argued:
there is a material difference between an article fixed in the Constitution,
and a regulation by law. An article in the Constitution, however incon-
venient it may prove by experience, can only be altered by altering the
Constitution itself, which manifestly is a thing that ought not be done
often. When regulated by law, it can easily be occasionally altered so as
best to suit the conveniences of the people. 211
207. Convention Notes of James Madison, July 18, 1787, in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
46.
208. See Wilson's Lectures, 2 WORKS OF J. WILSON, supra note 52, at 151-52; Sherman,
Letters of Citizen of New Haven, in P. FORD, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 241; see also supra note
206.
209. See Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, Oct. 17, 1788, in 11 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 299.
210. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 83 (Hamilton), at 573. For a larger quotation
from this passage, see supra text accompanying note 2.
211. Iredell in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 28, 1788, in 4 J. ELLIOT, supra
note 1, at 144-45; see also Iredell in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 29, 1788, in
id. at 165-66; Maclaine in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 28, 1789, in id. at 151.
Shortly after these statements about juries, Governor Johnston used similar language to discuss
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Congressional discretion was necessary to avoid a constitutional rule
that would become obsolete. As Madison said, the jury in civil cases
"must be ... left to the discretion of the legislature to modify it ac-
cording to circumstances. '212
By 1789, however, only two years later, Madison and many other
Federalists had come to accept a constitutional right to a jury in civil
cases. Madison introduced in the House of Representatives not only a
proposal for such a right but also what became the seventh amend-
ment's twenty-dollar value-in-controversy restriction. 213 Never-
theless, it should not be thought that Madison or other Federalists had
become less desirous of a permanent Constitution. By late 1788 and
1789, many Federalists, including Madison, were arguing that amend-
ments would serve a useful political purpose without causing serious
harm. As Madison explained when introducing his amendments to
the House, they would
be practicable... to obviate the objection [to the Constitution], so far as
to satisfy the public mind that their liberties will be perpetual, and this
without endangering any part of the constitution, which is considered as
essential to the existence of the Government by those who promoted its
adoption.214
Given his earlier comments about juries and about the changing value
of money, Madison must have been aware that he was establishing in
the Constitution something that was more properly a matter for legis-
lation, but he apparently did not believe the inflexibility of what be-
came the seventh amendment would endanger the continued existence
of the federal government.
The seventh amendment is an example of a compromise that, un-
like article III, probably seemed as if it would become at least partly
obsolete. Madison and other Federalists, however, were content with
this sort of compromise. Although the twenty-dollar requirement
would become trivial through inflation, and the right to a jury in civil
cases might become inappropriate in some instances, these types of
the supremacy clause. Johnston in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 29, 1788, in id.
at 187-88.
212. Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 20, 1788, in 3 id. at 537. Timothy
Pickering wrote:
So if the Convention had positively fixed a trial by jury in all the civil cases... it might have
been found as highly inconvenient in practice as the case above stated; but being fixed by the
constitution, the inconvenience must be endured ... until the Constitution itself should be
altered.
Letter from Timothy Pickering to Charles Tillinghast, Dec. 24, 1787, in 14 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 205.
213. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. Initially, the restriction concerned appeals.
214. House of Representatives Debate, June 8, 1789, in 2 B. SCHWARTZ, BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 1025-26.
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obsolescence apparently were considered inconvenient rather than
dangerous. Federalists could be satisfied with compromises that
would produce obsolescence, if the ensuing difficulties were relatively
minor.215
Thus, notwithstanding the occasional compromise, Federalists
thought of constitutional law as permanent, and therefore they ac-
cepted discretion in a host of provisions.21 6 Their repeated sacrifice of
constitutional limitations - even with respect to matters for which
they considered discretion otherwise undesirable - illustrates how
much Federalists desired to avoid obsolescence.
4. Anti-Federalists on the Avoidance of Obsolescence
Although espoused chiefly by Federalists, the necessity of avoiding
obsolescence met with little criticism from Anti-Federalists. Anti-
Federalists could not easily dispute the Federalist insistence upon a
constitution that would be permanent and able to survive.
Of course, some disapproved of the Federalists' concern about ob-
solescence. In addition to those Anti-Federalists who directly rejected
the goal of permanence, 217 a number of Anti-Federalists, like Harri-
son and Grayson, more cautiously suggested that America was not yet
ready for a strong federal government, even if one day it might be.218
They questioned whether the Constitution should create a powerful
federal government in anticipation of circumstances that had not yet
occurred and could not be predicted. As mentioned above, Melancton
215. Compromise may have been particularly necessary and acceptable in connection with
the Bill of Rights. Political circumstances made the amendments necessary, and the effects of
such potential obsolescence as was apparent in the amendments probably did not seem very
great.
216. The framers deliberately left many matters to the discretion of the federal and state
governments. Some examples have already been given, including the compensation of legislators
and judges, qualifications of candidates, the time and place of elections, revenue, the military,
and juries. Other subjects that prompted discussion of permanence included commerce, about
which Rutledge said: "As we are laying the foundation for a great empire, we ought to take a
permanent view of the subject and not look at the present moment only." Convention Notes of
James Madison, August 29, 1787, in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 452. On appeals to the
Supreme Court, see Webster, Examination, in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 53-54. On
the executive, see Roger Sherman in Convention Notes of James Madison, June 1, 1787, in 1 M.
FARRAND, supra note 1, at 65; and Charles Pinckney in the South Carolina House of Represent-
atives, Jan. 16, 1788, in 3 id. at 249. On the naturalization provision, see Hamilton in The
Convention Notes of James Madison, Aug. 13, 1787, in 2 id. at 268. On the necessary and
proper clause, see Iredell, Answer to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution, in P. FORD,
PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 356. On the Bill of Right's exclusion of a right not to be compelled
to bear arms, see Benson in the House of Representatives, Aug. 17, 1789, in 2 B. SCHWARTZ,
BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 1109. On other rights, see America [Webster], N.Y. Daily
Advertiser, Dec. 31, 1787, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 199. On the com-
mon law, see supra note 4.
217. See supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
218. See supra text accompanying note 102.
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Smith had a somewhat similar objection to the suggestion that the
United States should have a navy. He believed that
it was our duty to calculate for the present period, and not attempt to
provide for the contingencies of two or three centuries to come. In time,
events might take place which no human wisdom could foresee, and
which might totally defeat and render useless these provisions. He in-
sisted that the present state of the country alone ought to be considered.
In three or four hundred years, its population might amount to a hun-
dred millions: at this period, two or three great empires might be estab-
lished, totally different from our own.219
Reacting to the broad federal powers that the framers had accepted in
order to accommodate future developments, Smith and some other
Anti-Federalists argued that the Constitution should be adapted to
present circumstances. According to the "Federal Farmer":
[W]e ought to give power to the union, so far only as experience and
present circumstances shall direct, with a reasonable regard to time to
come. Should future circumstances, contrary to our expectations, re-
quire that further powers be transferred to the union, we can do it far
more easily, than get back those we may now imprudently give.220
Thus, the Federalist argument on permanency - that the Constitu-
tion should be drafted to survive future developments - did not es-
cape criticism.
On the whole, however, the policy of avoiding potentially obsoles-
cent language encountered remarkably little direct opposition. To
avoid obsolescence, Federalists had abandoned principles that Anti-
Federalists considered essential to liberty and republican government,
yet Anti-Federalists rarely denied the need for permanency. Even
when Federalists justified broad federal power on the ground that a
permanent rule could not otherwise be formulated, Anti-Federalists
and other opponents of federal discretion usually did not decry the
objective of a lasting constitution.
Why were the Anti-Federalists so quiet? Only proponents of the
Constitution had reason to discuss its permanence. Anti-Federalists
had no desire to praise the document for its permanence, yet they
could not condemn the notion of a permanent constitution. Anti-Fed-
eralists tended to believe that the permanence of liberty and republi-
canism required permanent written limitations on government.
219. M. Smith in New York Ratification Convention, July 1, 1788, in 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note
1, at 381-82.
220. He also said that it was safest "when we are sure we have given enough for ordinary
exigencies, to be extremely careful how we delegate powers, which, in common cases, must nec-
essarily be useless or abused, and of very uncertain effect in uncommon ones." Letters from the
Federal Farmer, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 336.
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Therefore, Anti-Federalists could not easily disagree with the goal of a
constitution drafted in a way that would allow it to be permanent.
Instead, Anti-Federalists employed other arguments. Some mini-
mized the danger of obsolescence, arguing that the Federalists mis-
perceived the likely course of future events. 221 They also suggested
alternative language, which would be as permanent as, but less danger-
ous than, that of the Constitution. 222 Like the North Carolina delega-
tion, quoted above, 223 they wanted a constitution that would make
both government and liberty permanent. 224 As John Smilie said, "we
do not ... contend for forms which it is certain may exist long after
the substance has forever perished. ' 225 Permanency for the form of
government was an argument that was useful chiefly for Federalists,
but it was an assumption about which most other framers and ratifiers
typically agreed.
In sum, Anti-Federalists wanted a constitution that would perma-
nently incorporate or fix certain essential obstacles. This goal of fixing
limitations essential to liberty and republicanism was not necessarily
incompatible with the Federalist insistence on avoiding constitutional
obsolescence - indeed, the Federalists themselves shared the goal of
fixed limitations. As it happened, however, Anti-Federalist notions of
essential limitations included much that Federalists thought might
render the Constitution temporary. Consequently, Federalists and
Anti-Federalists had varying conceptions of what limitations should
be contained in the Constitution, but they almost uniformly wanted
their limitations to be established permanently. They wanted perma-
221. One Anti-Federalist explained that the vigor of the American people and the barrier
formed by the ocean made standing armies unnecessary. Essays by Dewitt, in 4 H. STORING,
supra note 1, at 38-39. For a similar position, see Essays of Brutus, in 2 id. at 403-04. On judicial
salaries, see Letters from the Federal Farmer, in id. at 318.
222. Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 id. at 301 (on the regulation of elections) & 284-85
(on apportionment); Essays of Brutus, in 2 id. at 416 (on standing armies) & 398-400 (on power
of taxation).
223. See supra text accompanying note 127.
224. Ratifiers were urged to inquire "where and how the essential powers shall be lodged to
secure government, and to secure true liberty." Letters from the Federal Farmer, 2 H. STORING,
supra note 1, at 232. Cornelius wrote: "I most ardently wish for an efficient, firm, and perma-
nent system of government; and at the same time, that the people at large may enjoy as much
liberty and ease, as may be consistent with such a government." Cornelius, Essay, in 4 id. at 146.
225. John Smilie in Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Nov. 28, 1787, in 2 DOCUMEN-
TARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 410. The Constitution's guarantee of the form of republicanism
was hardly reassuring. See, eg., Tredwell in New York Ratification Convention, July 2, 1788, in
2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 403; Lenoir in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 30,
1788, in 4 id. at 202; Essays of Centinel, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 146, 151, 156-57;
Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 id. at 276; Essays of Brutus, in 2 id. at 386; Symmes, Letter
to Capt. Peter Osgoode, Jr., in 4 id. at 57; A Federal Republican, A Review of the Constitution....
in 3 id. at 78; Essays by the Impartial Examiner, in 5 id. at 179, 189; Letters from A Countryman,
in 6 id. at 84; G. Clinton in New York Ratification Convention, July 11, 1788, in 6 id. at 184-85.
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nency for the limitations of the Constitution, and they wanted it for
liberty and the republicanism of the government.
The next and concluding two Parts of this article examine the rela-
tionship of amendment and of language to the framers' and ratifiers'
understanding of permanency.
V. AMENDMENT
According to Gordon S. Wood and William E. Nelson, the amend-
ment provisions in American constitutions were understood by con-
temporaries to permit, among other things, adaptation of those
constitutions to changes in American society.226 Apparently, to the
extent the framers and ratifiers thought adaptation of the Constitution
either necessary or desirable, they considered amendment the means
by which such adaptation should occur. The vast majority of the
framers and ratifiers, however, seem to have assumed that - notwith-
standing the possibility of using amendments to adapt the Constitution
constitutions could and should be permanent.
Of those who recognized a need for adaptation, most thought such
adaptation should occur by amendment. Webster wanted constitu-
tional change to occur by simple legislative enactment - in other
words, almost no constitution;227 Jefferson wanted no constitution or
other law to remain in effect for more than thirty-four years. 228 How-
ever, others who indicated adaptation might be necessary or desirable
appear to have assumed that amendment would be the means of
changing the law.229
A great majority of the framers and ratifiers - even most of those
who understood that amendments could be used for adaptation -
wanted a permanent constitution. As seen in their discussions of per-
manence, they sought a perfectible document rather than one that
would merely be well suited to its circumstances. 230 Although framers
226. G. WOOD, supra note 48, at 613-14; Nelson, supra note 87, at 507, 509-10.
227. Webster thought amendment too cumbersome and inefficient to permit prompt adapta-
tion of the Constitution. Indeed, he questioned the right of one generation to impose a constitu-
tion on the next. See supra notes 141-44.
228. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Sept. 6, 1789, in 15 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERESON 396, 398 n.15 (1958).
229. As discussed above, Federalists were quite explicit about this. See supra notes 137-40.
Anti-Federalists were, of course, less willing to acknowledge that amendments would be possible,
but they did not want judicial adaptation. See supra text accompanying note 102.
230. By far the greatest number of references to amendment indicate that the framers and
ratifiers viewed amendment, not necessarily as a means of adapting, but as an instrument for
perfecting the Constitution. See, e.g., Convention Notes of James Madison, July 5, 1787 (com-
ments of G. Bedford), in 1 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 532; Convention Notes of James
Madison, June 5, 1787 (comments of E. Gerry), id. at 123; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No.
85 (Hamilton), at 594; No. 14 (Madison), at 89; No. 37 (Madison), at 233; No. 43 (Madison), at
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and ratifiers who thought adaptation might be necessary believed
amendments should be used for this purpose, they typically hoped ad-
aptation would not be required and preferred to think of amendments
as the means of perfecting the Constitution - of eliminating defects in
a potentially permanent scheme. Edward Carrington not only as-
sumed adaptation to be inconsistent with permanence but also per-
ceived dangers in the process of repeated amendments:
The work once well done will be done forever, but patched up in accom-
modation to the whim of the day, it will soon require the hand of the
cobbler again, and in every unfortunate experiment, the materials are
rendered the less fit for that Monument of Civil liberty which we wish to
erect.
2 3 1
When examining the amendment provisions of some post-Revolution-
ary state constitutions, Cecelia Kenyon concluded that "their authors
intended them to be used for 'perfecting' purposes - that is, cor-
recting defects in the original constitutions that might be revealed by
experience - not as means to adapt the constitutions to future
change, growth, or progress in the society or the people. '232 The same
can be said of the bulk of the framers and ratifiers of the federal
Constitution.
296; Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 20, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at
531; Convention Notes of James Madison, June 11, 1787 (comments of G. Mason), in 1 M.
FARRAND, supra note 1, at 202-03; Pinckney, Observations, May 28, 1787, in 3 id. at 121; Speech
by Wilson, in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 161; Dickinson, Letters of Fabius, in id. at
181; Letter from Rufus King to Theophilus Parsons, Feb. 20, 1788, in 1 LIFE AND CORRESPON-
DENCE OF RUFUS KING 321 (R. King ed. 1894). In a passage in his essay The Rise ofArts and
Sciences, Hume wrote that constitutions can only be improved with time as inconveniencies are
brought to light. Hamilton quoted that portion of Hume's essay in the last paragraph of the
Federalist. Although most assertions of the perfecting role of amendment were made in the
course of the debate about the Constitution's defects, such statements were in accord with the
view that the Constitution could be and should be made permanent.
M. Lienesch writes: "Paradoxical as it seems, eighteenth century science made allowance for
both theoretical permanence and practical improvement .... With the acceptance of an amend-
ment procedure, they could argue that their system would provide both permanence and the
possibility of reform." M. LIENESCH, supra note 32, at 135-37.
Anti-Federalists who wanted a gradual process of amendment were not thereby necessarily
abandoning the goal of permanence. The clearest example was Luther Martin, who advocated
continual amendment of the Constitution "from time to time as experience might point out its
imperfections." This would be done " 'till it could be made competent to every exigence of State,
and afford at the same time ample security to Liberty and general Welfare." L. Martin in the
Maryland House of Delegates, Nov. 29, 1787, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 152. Clearly,
Martin urged a gradual process of perfecting the Constitution. See also Martin, Genuine Infor-
mation, in 3 id. at 179-80; Letter from Lachland McIntosh to John Wereat, Dec. 17, 1787, in 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 260; A Letter From a Delegate Who Has Catched
Cold, in 5 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 270; Letter from the Rev. James Madison to James
Madison, Oct. 1, 1787, in 10 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 185 (1977).
Note that many Federalists feared Anti-Federalists would seek destructive amendments.
231. Letter from Edward Carrington to James Madison, June 13, 1787, in 10 PAPERS OF
JAMES MADISON 52.
- 232. Kenyon, Constitutionalism in Revolutionary America, in CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra
note 77, at 115.
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VI. INDETERMINACY
As is clear from the evidence examined above, Federalists hoped
that the Constitution would accommodate social change by excluding
anything dependent upon temporary circumstances and instead rely-
ing on features of government and society that were permanent. The
unlikely possibility remains, however, that Federalists wanted their
use of generalities, principles, or vague language to permit constitu-
tional law to be altered or adjusted to keep pace with the development
of America's economy, values, and other social conditions. The con-
trary is strongly suggested both by the consent theory of constitutional
law and by the extensive efforts of Federalists to make the Constitu-
tion permanent - to exclude from it language and even whole provi-
sions that might have to be changed according to circumstances.
Additional evidence as to whether indeterminacy was to be a means of
adaptation can be found in Federalist opinions about constitutional
language.
With respect to Anti-Federalists, it has been seen that although
they did not dissent from the Federalist notion of permanency, they
had their own perspective on the subject. They wanted to fix in the
Constitution barriers that would protect the social foundations of lib-
erty and, moreover, would protect liberty even once its social founda-
tions had begun to crumble. As with the Federalists, it seems most
improbable that they wanted these barriers to be flexible in response to
changes in society. Nevertheless, their thoughts on language must be
examined for further evidence on the subject.
In the remainder of this article, an examination of language will
confirm that the framers and ratifiers, both Federalists and Anti-Fed-
eralists, did not want constitutional language - whether through
vagueness, principles, or generalities - to be a source of indetermi-
nacy. They assumed they were establishing fixed rather than flexible
law.2 33 Of course, disagreements about the degree to which clarity
233. Garry Wills argues that Madison assumed the Constitution should be a flexibly inter-
preted "living document." G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA 54 (1981). In support of this, he
presents three arguments. For his argument about the necessary-and-proper clause, see hifra text
at note 275. For his argument about "liquidation" of language, see infra note 267. The third
argument is addressed here.
According to Wills, the Constitutional Convention was called to propose alterations to the
Articles of Confederation but produced a new document instead. To justify the Convention's
proposal, writes Wills, Madison in Federalist Number 40 had to take a very broad interpretation
of the Convention's initial authorization. Wills views this example of broad interpretation as a
"grant of freedom to interpret." G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA 51 (1981). Even if a
"grant," however, it was not a grant to interpret freely. This is clear from the fact that Madison
justified his interpretation by reference to rules of construction. More important, Madison ar-
gued that the people had a right to abolish or change their constitution. As a result, it seems
difficult to draw conclusions from Federalist No. 40 about Madison's opinions on constitutional
[Vol. 88:239
The Constitution and Social Change
was achieved by the Constitution and about the meaning of its words
were common from the start, but on the need for determinate language
there was little dispute.
A. Vagueness
1. The Epistemological Foundations of Language
A variety of traditions encouraged Americans to seek clarity in
language.234 Seventeenth- and eighteenth-century political disputes
about the effect of statutes and charters, religious quarrels over the
meaning of the Bible, and the inclinations and habits of lawyers had all
for centuries inculcated an appreciation of linguistic precision. These
traditions are sufficiently known that they need only be mentioned
here as among the reasons that the framers and ratifiers were pre-
disposed to desire clarity. However, another American perspective on
language, derived from the epistemology of John Locke, may be less
familiar and therefore requires a brief examination. Although the
framers and ratifiers had little time or inclination to discuss epistemo-
logical theories underlying the language of the Constitution, at least
one of them found it useful to do so, and it is significant that he turned
to Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding.
In Federalist Number 37, Madison introduced the Federalist's
analysis of the Constitution by encouraging Americans to examine the
Constitution with a "spirit of moderation" - persons of a temperate
character would recognize that a "faultless plan was not to be ex-
pected. ' 235 In particular, they would perceive that "many allowances
ought to be made for the difficulties inherent in the very nature of the
undertaking . ,,236 Madison then proceeded to examine a variety of
these difficulties faced by the Convention. Among these was the diffi-
culty of accurately defining federal and state authority, and it was in
connection with this that Madison wrote one of the most elegant and
sophisticated accounts of constitutional imprecision.
Although it is recognized that Federalist Number 37 reflects Lock-
ean assumptions, the degree to which Madison's analysis was deriva-
interpretation. What the people may do with their constitution and what judges may do with it
are hardly comparable.
234. It is possible for the words "vague," "inexact," "unclear," and "imprecise" to have
slightly different meanings. Since this article has no occasion to make such distinctions, it uses
the words as synonyms. Similarly, no distinction is made between "clear" and "precise."
For Anti-Federalist views on vagueness, see Kenyon, Men of Little Faith: The Anti-Federal-
ists on the Nature of Representative Government, 12 WM. & MARY Q. 3, 21-22 (1955) [hereinafter
Kenyon, Men of Little Faith].
235. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 37 (Madison), at 232.
236. Id. at 233.
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tive has not been pursued. 237 In fact, Madison paraphrased Locke's
arguments about the inevitable imprecision arising from human ideas,
faculties, and language. 238 Locke had argued that ideas were either
"simple" or "complex," simple ideas being produced by single sensa-
tions, and complex ideas requiring combinations of the simple.239 This
analysis allowed Madison to justify the vagueness of the Constitution's
distinction between state and federal power, for Locke had shown that
some imprecision in such matters was unavoidable. According to
Locke and now Madison, political principles are complex ideas that
are liable to be indistinctly conceived, and the indistinctness of these
complex ideas inevitably produces obscurity. Continuing to draw on
Locke, Madison noted that a second source of uncertainty was the
imperfection of "human faculties." 240 A third explanation of vague-
ness, also derived from Locke, concerned the "vehicle of ideas," lan-
guage. Although language can provide a word for each simple idea, it
is not "so copious as to supply words and phrases for every complex
idea. '241 As a result, a word is often used for more than one idea and
thereby creates additional vagueness "according to the complexity and
novelty of the objects defined." The drafters had to contend with all
three of these sources of "vague and incorrect definitions" - the "in-
distinctness" of complex ideas or objects, the "imperfection of the or-
gan of conception," and the "inadequateness of the vehicle of
ideas." 242 Consequently, "a certain degree of obscurity" was inevita-
ble.243 To illustrate this point, Madison borrowed not only Locke's
237. R.L. Ketcham speculated about the possible influence of Locke's Essay upon Madison's
Federalist Number 1. He did not, however, notice Madison's use of it in number 37. He wrote
that "[tihere is no explicit reference to the Essay in Madison's extant writings." Ketcham, James
Madison and the Nature of Man, 19 J. HIST. IDEAS 62, 71-73 & n.31 (1958). James Farr writes
that Madison in Federalist Number 37 "gave vent to the widely held Lockean and Humean view
that 'words ... express ideas.'" Farr, Conceptual Change and Constitutional Innovation, in
CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 13, 16 (T. Ball & J. Pocock eds. 1988). With
greater precision, D.F. Epstein has described the passage in number 37 as "a short essay concern-
ing human understanding." D. EPSTEIN, supra note 200, at 114. As will be seen, Madison in
Federalist Number 37 directly borrowed Locke's very arguments and language.
Stephen Conrad has examined Wilson's epistemology concerning morals. Conrad, supra note
53, at 359. Morton White has discussed Locke's epistemology of self-evident principles and its
influence upon Jefferson, Hamilton, and other revolutionaries. See M. WHITE, supra note 65, at
61-96.
238. This is yet another example of Madison's ability to employ with economy ideas that
another author had discussed at length. On Madison's facility in this regard, see Adair, supra
note 53, at 104-05.
239. J. LOCKE, ESSAY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING bk. 11 (1690).
240. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 37 (Madison), at 235-36, drawing on J. LOCKE,
supra note 239, at bk. IV, ch. iii, § 23.
241. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 37 (Madison), at 236, drawing on J. LOCKE, supra
note 239, at bk. III, ch. iii.
242. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 37 (Madison), at 237.
243. Id. at 237.
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arguments but also his most startling example: "When the Almighty
himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his
meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful, by the
cloudy medium through which it is communicated."' 244 It was a
thought with which Locke no doubt had already caught the attention
of many eighteenth-century Americans.
Like Locke, however, Madison had no inclination to surrender to
the imprecision of language. Locke had sought to determine the ca-
pacity of humans to understand themselves and their surroundings.
Therefore, he had investigated the imperfection of ideas, faculties, and
language and the extent to which they could be freed from obscurity.
Madison borrowed from Locke to show the impossibility of absolute
precision in language, but he also shared with Locke a belief that lan-
guage could be somewhat precise and that precision was desirable.
For example, in Federalist Number 37, Madison aimed to discourage
hopes for a "faultless" demarcation of federal and state jurisdictions,
and during the ratification debates he pointed out that "precision was
not so easily obtained as may be imagined. '245 In both instances,
however, he appears to have assumed that precision in constitutional
language was desirable whenever possible. Hence, the aptness of
Madison's borrowing from Locke.246
Any discussion of the epistemology underlying constitutional lan-
244. Id. at 236-37. Locke wrote that "the will of God, when clothed in words, [was] liable to
that doubt and uncertainty which unavoidably attends that sort of conveyance .. " J. LOCKE,
supra note 239, at bk. III, ch. ix, § 23. Locke's Essay may also lurk behind other passages of The
Federalist Number 3Z At the beginning of that number, Madison argues that a "just estimate"
of the Constitution requires a "spirit of moderation." THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 37
(Madison), at 231.
245. Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June, 20, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note
1, at 531-32. In defense of Congress' power over the militia, he insisted that "[niothing can be
more certain and positive than this." Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 14,
1788, in 3 id. at 424.
246. Locke's Essay had raised the possibility that language could only possess the various
meanings attributed to it by different readers. Prior commented, "If no Mans Ideas be perfectly
the same, Locks Human Understanding may be fit only for the Meditation of Lock himself." K.
MACLEAN, JOHN LOCKE AND ENGLISH LITERATURE OF THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 111
(1936). However, Locke wrote to William Molyneux:
If I could think that discourses and arguments to the understanding were like the several
sorts of cates [food] to different palates and stomachs, some nauseous and destructive to one,
which are pleasant and restorative to another; I should no more think of books and study,
and should think my time better imploy'd at push-pin than in reading or writing. But I am
convine'd of the contrary: I know there is truth opposite to falshood, that it may be found if
people will, and is worth the seeking, and is not only the most valuable, but the pleasantest
thing in the world.
Letter from John Locke to William Molyneaux, Jan. 1698, quoted in Kloppenberg, The Virtues
of Liberalism: Christianity, Republicanism, and Ethics in Early American Political Discourse, 74
J. AM. HIST. 9, 16 n.9 (1987). Locke and apparently most of his eighteenth-century readers were
not resigned to an anarchy of meaning. They believed that language could be made relatively
precise.
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guage was most unusual in the late eighteenth century, yet Madison's
analysis is a reminder of Locke's influence upon American epistemo-
logical thought in that period. 24 7 Locke's Essay occupies a prominent
place in surviving, pre-1791 American library lists.248 It served as a
text at some American schools,249 and its ideas probably reached other
Americans through Isaac Watts' Logick of 1725.250 To the extent that
Americans engaged in epistemological thought about language, in-
cluding constitutional language, they began with the remarkable argu-
ments in Locke's Essay. 251  Perhaps more important, the Essay
contributed much to eighteenth-century American assumptions about
language.252 Thus, Locke's Essay should be considered together with
the traditions mentioned above as one of the various intellectual influ-
ences that probably encouraged Americans - particularly, in the case
of the Essay, well-educated Americans - to distrust imprecision and
uncertainty in language.
2. Vagueness and Interpretation
Not surprisingly, the framers and ratifiers appear to have assumed
that they should try to avoid vagueness or imprecision in the Constitu-
tion. In at least two colloquies during the framing convention, future
Federalists and Anti-Federalists sought to eliminate vagueness from
247. The epistemological works of Berkeley and Hume apparently were not as widely influ-
ential in America in the eighteenth century. Berkeley's Treatise Concerning the Principles of
Human Knowledge and Hume's Inquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals appear relatively
infrequently in eighteenth-century American library lists. Berkeley's book turns up 13 times and
Hume's 7 times in 121 pre-1791 lists. Lundberg & May, supra note 59. Note that Madison
studied Berkelean criticisms of Locke at Donald Robertson's school. See 1 . BRANT, JAMES
MADISON 61 (1941).
248. Lundberg & May, supra note 59, at 268; see also Lutz, The Relative Influence of Euro-
pean Writers on Late Eighteenth Century American Political Thought, 78 AM. POL. Scl. REV.
189, 196 (1984).
249. A. HADDOW, supra note 71, at 15, 53, 82. For evidence that the Essay was used at
Princeton and at Donald Robertson's school, see 11. BRANT, JAMES MADISON 61, 76-77 (1941).
Jonathan Edwards read the Essay at Yale and found in it "greater pleasure 'than the most greedy
miser finds, when gathering up handfuls of silver and gold, from some newly discovered trea-
sure.'" K. MACLEAN, supra note 246, at 7.
250. I. WATTS, LOGICK: OR, THE RIGHT USE OF REASON IN THE ENQUIRY AFTER TRUTH
(1725). Watts sent copies to libraries in Connecticut and Massachusetts. W. HOWELL, EIGHT-
EENTH CENTURY BRITISH LOGIC AND RHETORIC 341-42, 345 (1971).
251. Locke's ideas dominated eighteenth-century views on epistemology and language. For
his influence in America, see P. MILLER, ERRAND INTO THE WILDERNESS 168 (1956). For his
influence in England, see W. HOWELL, supra note 250, at 264-98, passim.
252. For Americans' Lockean assumptions about language, see supra note 237. A similar
argument has been made about Lockean assumptions in England. See K. MACLEAN, supra note
246. MacLean examines how leading eighteenth-century English essayists and novelists em-
ployed or rejected Locke's epistemological ideas, and he thereby suggests that educated English-
men frequently assumed or knew of some basic Lockean tenets.
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the Constitution's provisions. 25 3 In both the framing and the ratifica-
tion debates, everyone who spoke or wrote about a lack of clarity ar-
gued on the assumption that it was undesirable.
Anti-Federalists vigorously attacked the Constitution on the
ground of vagueness. 254 Cecelia Kenyon has written:
In recent years the Constitution has been much admired for its brevity,
its generality, its freedom from the minutiae which characterized nine-
teenth-century constitutions. These qualities were feared and not ad-
mired by the Anti-Federalists. They wanted detailed explicitness which
would confine the discretion of Congressional majorities within narrow
boundaries. 255
Anti-Federalists claimed that uncertainties in the text would permit
"different constructions," including dangerous ones. For example, as
will be seen below, Anti-Federalists feared reliance upon constructive
or implied rights.
Similarly, some of the most prominent Anti-Federalist writers
raised the spectre of judges who would expand the Constitution's pro-
visions for federal authority (congressional and judicial). Judges
would accomplish this by employing various devices, including their
equitable powers, the "general and indefinite terms" of the Constitu-
tion, and arguments based on the document's "reason and spirit. '2 5 6
"Brutus" wrote that federal judges would adjust constitutional law to
meet new circumstances. Judges, he explained, were empowered to
construe the Constitution in equity. Citing Grotius, Brutus wrote that
equity is
"the correction of that, wherein the law, by reason of its universality, is
deficient["]; for since in laws all cases cannot be foreseen, or expressed, it
is necessary, that when the decrees of the law cannot be applied to par-
ticular cases, there should some where be a power vested of defining
those circumstances, which had they been foreseen the legislator would
253. Convention Notes of James Madison, Aug. 16, 1787, in 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
305; id. at 316 (Aug. 17, 1787); Dickinson, Plan of Government, in M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
90 (Supp. 1987).
254. For just a few of many more examples, see Letter from Elbridge Gerry to President of
the Senate and Speaker of the House of Representatives of Massachusetts, Oct. 18, 1787, in 3 M.
FARRAND, supra note 1, at 128; Letter from Edmund Randolph to the Speaker of the Virginia
House of Delegates, Oct. 10, 1787, in id. at 127; M. Smith in New York Ratification Convention,
June 17, 1788, in 2 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 243; Caldwell in North Carolina Ratification
Convention, July 23, 1788, in 4 id. at 187; Resolution in North Carolina Ratification Convention,
July 23, 1788, in id. at 242; Galloway in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 23, 1788,
in id. at 70; Bloodworth in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 23, 1788, in id. at 34 &
50; Letters of Cato, in P. FORD, ESSAYS, supra note 1, at 265; Spencer in North Carolina Ratifica-
tion Convention, July 23, 1788, in 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 54, 65, 68.
255. Kenyon, Men of Little Faith, supra note 234, at 3, 21-22.
256. Essays of Brutus, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 420; see also id. at 417-28, 436-42;
Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 315-16, 322-23; Clinton,
Notes of Speeches.... in 6 1. STORING, supra note 1, at 184.
November 1989]
Michigan Law Review
have expressed .... 257
Brutus warned that federal judges, in the guise of interpretation, might
alter the meaning of the Constitution to expand federal power.258 One
Anti-Federalist concluded that the judiciary was the most dangerous
branch.2 59
In response to the allegations of vagueness and Anti-Federalist
fears of different or dangerous constructions, Federalists insisted that
the Constitution was clear 260 or at least as clear as possible in light of
both linguistic and political difficulties. 261 As has been seen, Madison
257. Essays of Brutus, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 419-20. He explained that the
judges "will be able to extend the limits of the general government gradually, and by insensible
degrees, and to accommodate themselves to the temper of the people." Id. at 441; see also Letters
from the Federal Farmer, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 244.
258. According to another Anti-Federalist, the judges "may by a Number of legal Decisions,
make what Constitution they Please for the united States." Letter from Samuel Osgood to Sa-
muel Adams, Jan. 5, 1788, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 265; see also A
Minority of the Maryland Ratifying Convention, 5 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 95.
Some expressed hope for language that would not require any interpretation. See Powell,
supra note 7, at 889-94.
259. Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 316; see also A
Columbian Patriot, Observations on the Constitution, in 16 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
1, at 279.
Everything known about the framers' and ratifiers' general perceptions of the judiciary sug-
gests that they did not desire that branch to construe the Constitution in a way that would alter
its meaning, let alone in a way that would flexibly adjust it to changing circumstances. It is well
known that the framers and ratifiers desired a judiciary that would be restricted to the limited
role of applying rather than making law.
260. Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 2, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1,
at 424 (on subject of defense); T. McKean in Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Nov. 28,
1787, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 413 (on subject of legislative article); Mid-
dlesex Gazette, Oct. 22, 1787, 3 id. at 395 (on whole Constitution); Wilson in Pennsylvania
Ratification Convention, Dec. 7, 1787, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 163 (on subject of
treason); C. Strong in Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Jan. 16, 1788, in 3 M. FARRAND,
supra note 1, at 248; Spaight in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 24, 1788, in 4 J.
ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 210; Iredell in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 24, 1788, in
id. at 171-72; Webster, Examination, in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note I, at 53. According to
one writer, the Constitution "intentionally with precision defines and limits" the powers of the
"rulers." Thus, it "firmly and stably fixeth the boundaries of their authority, beyond which they
cannot pass, unless in violation of the Constitution ...." Anti-Cincinnatus, Northampton
Hampshire Gazette, Dec. 19, 1787, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 37. An-
other sought to "exhibit clear and permanent marks and lines ofseparate sovereignty." A Free-
man I [T. Coxe], Pennsylvania Gazette, Jan. 23, 1788, in id. at 455.
261. See, e.g, Wilson in Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, in 2 DOCUMENTARY His-
TORY, supra note 1, at 355, 493; R. King in Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Jan, 24,
1788, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 268; Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June
15, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 438; Letter from Governeur Morris to Timothy Picker-
ing, Dec. 22, 1814, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 420; THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No.
83 (Hamilton), at 572-73; Parson in Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Jan. 25, 1788, in 2 J.
ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 104; Dickinson, Letters of Fabius, in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note
1, at 174.
In a discussion of federal discretion, Jasper Yates spoke about "ambiguity" as if he thought it
desirable. In fact, he was referring to the desirability of some discretion. J. Yates in Penn-
sylvania Ratification Convention, Jan. 5, 1788, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at
438.
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was particularly eloquent on the inevitability of imprecision. He took
this position, however, to suggest that the Constitution was as precise
as it could be made.262
Even while protesting that some lack of clarity was unavoidable,
Federalists revealed their expectations that interpretation would lead
to certainty. Madison argued in the middle of his Lockean analysis of
imprecision that obscure points in the Constitution would be resolved
and made certain by case law: "All new laws, though penned with the
greatest technical skill, and passed on the fullest and most mature de-
liberation, are considered as more or less obscure and equivocal, until
their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by a series of particular
discussions and adjudications. ' 263 As Madison explained to Samuel
Johnston in 1789, the "exposition of the Constitution" would be a
"copious source" of difficulties "until its meaning on all great points
shall have been settled by precedents." 264 Madison's words - "ascer-
tain," "settle," and "liquidate" - all indicate that he expected vague-
ness in the Constitution to be resolved and made certain rather than
that it would be an opportunity for flexibility and judicial adaptation
of the Constitution to changing exigencies.265 It may be no coinci-
dence that Hamilton not only had similar thoughts but expressed them
in similar language: "The erection of a new government, whatever
care or wisdom may distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate
questions of intricacy and nicety .... 'Tis time only that can mature
and perfect so compound a system [and] ... liquidate the meaning of
all the parts .. . . 266 Because it would be liquidated, even a lack of
clarity allowed hope for certainty.267
262. See supra text accompanying note 235.
263. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 37 (Madison), at 236.
264. Letter from James Madison to Samuel Johnston, June 21, 1789, in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES
MADISON 250 (1979). Johnston agreed with Madison. See Letter from Samuel Johnston to
James Madison, July 8, 1789, in id. at 285. More than 30 years later, Madison again explained:
It could not but happen, and was foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that difficulties
and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and phrases neces-
sarily used in such a charter; ... and that it might require a regular course of practice to
liquidate and settle the meaning of some of them.
Letter from James Madison to Judge Roane, Sept. 2, 1819, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
435. Later, Madison wrote that "[t]he extent of the powers to be vested, also tho' expressed in
loose terms, evidently had reference to limitations & definitions, to be made in the progress of the
work, distinguishing it from a plenary & Consolidated Govt." Letter from James Madison to
N.P. Trist, Dec. 1831, in id. at 517.
265. On this subject, see Kay, Adherence to the Original Intentions in Constitutional Adjudi-
cation: Three Objections and Responses, 82 Nw. U. L. REV. 226, 277 (1988); Powell, supra note
7, at 885, 939-41. "Liquidate" means to ascertain or fix; to make clear or plain; to remove
ambiguity. OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1012 (2d ed. 1989).
266. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 82 (Hamilton), at 553; see also id., No. 78 (Hamil-
ton), at 525.
267. See also Nathan Dane's discussion of how the initial organization of the government
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Although only Madison and Hamilton appear to have descanted
on the liquidation of meaning, other Federalists also argued that inter-
pretation would resolve difficulties. Federalists explained repeatedly
how each alleged uncertainty had or would be given an acceptable,
fixed signification. Interpretation of the Constitution would settle un-
certainties rather than use them to permit flexibility. 268
This conclusion is not inconsistent with the well-known fact that
the framers and ratifiers occasionally referred to a "liberal interpreta-
tion." The Anti-Federalists who used this phrase to mean a broad
interpretation clearly were critical of such a construction. 269 More-
over, although a few leading Federalists advocated a "liberal construc-
tion" of the Constitution, they did so while trying to convince their
opponents that the Constitution had an identifiable and acceptable in-
terpretation. They were not suggesting that constitutional law should
be flexible.
For example, Randolph argued for a liberal construction in the
course of justifying the "necessary and proper" provision, which (as he
noted) Anti-Federalists had labelled the "sweeping clause." Randolph
would cure ambiguities. Letter from Nathan Dane to Caleb Strong, Oct. 10, 1787, in 13 DocU-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 356. Abraham Baldwin later said:
[I]t was not supposed by the makers of it at the time, but that some subjects were left a little
ambiguous and uncertain. It was a greater thing to get so many difficult subjects definitely
settled at once.... The few that were left a little unsettled might, without any great risk, be
settled by practice or by amendments in the progress of the Government.
A. Baldwin in the House of Representatives, March 14, 1796, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
370.
According to Wills, Madison's discussion of the liquidation of meaning is evidence that
Madison desired a "broad construction" and a "living document." G. WILLS, EXPLAINING
AMERICA 54 (1981). He bases this conclusion on two rather tenuous assumptions, namely, that
Madison believed future construction of the Constitution should be the product of compromises,
and that such a belief is the same as a belief in a "living constitution." Wills cites no evidence for
either proposition. True, Madison referred to the compromises in the 1787 Convention as proof
that a spirit of reasonableness would prevail in construction of the document. That is not, how-
ever, evidence of his desire for compromise in constitutional adjudication, let alone for flexible
interpretation or a "living document."
268. Alexander Contee Hanson responded directly to the Anti-Federalist argument that fed-
eral courts would use fictions to expand their jurisdiction. Fictions, said Hanson, "were inge-
nious devices, to remedy defects in the common law, without the aid of parliament." Hanson,
Remarks, in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 239-40. "[C]an any man seriously imagine,"
he asked,
that fiction will be permitted, to give the judges a power of legislation, denied to congress
itself? Wherefore should the judges, holding their commissions during good behaviour, be
guilty of such gross falsehood, perjury, and breach of trust? Would there not be a general
revolt against such barefaced impudent innovations.
Id. at 240.
269. Brutus referred to a "liberal construction," meaning a broad interpretation. See Essays
of Brutus, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 427. For other usages, see Essays by A Farmer, 4 id.
at 209; Essays by an Impartial Examiner, 5 id. at 174. James Monroe criticized the Constitution
because it did not satisfy his wish "to see the right of impeachment, extended upon as liberal
ground as possible." Monroe, Some Observations on the Constitution, in 5 H. STORING, supra
note 1, at 296; Ramsay, 1 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 175.
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conceived that "the construction which had been put on this clause by
the advocates of the Constitution was too narrow, and that the con-
struction put upon it by the other party was extravagant. ' 270 In argu-
ing against the excessively narrow interpretation, Randolph explained:
"A constitution differs from a law; for a law only embraces one thing,
but a constitution embraces a number of things, and is to have a more
liberal construction." Whereas "European constitutions" sometimes
consisted of a series of "detached" laws or customs, the new federal
Constitution (like other American constitutions) was "singular" and
therefore had to "embrace a number of things." As a result, it "is to
have a more liberal construction. ' 271 Clearly, Randolph thought the
proper interpretation was more generous than that propounded by
other Federalists, but he also attacked the Anti-Federalist construc-
tion, which he believed was too broad. Although he argued that the
nature of a single constitution required a liberal interpretation, he did
not suggest that constitutional law should be alterable in response to
circumstances.
Madison also asked for a "liberal interpretation," but he appar-
ently did not mean one that was broad. He said that the difficulty of
drafting the Constitution's language concerning executive power
claims the indulgence of a fair and liberal interpretation. I will not deny
that, according to my view of the subject, a more accurate attention
might place it in terms which would exclude some of the objections now
made to it. But if we take a liberal construction, I think we shall find
nothing dangerous or inadmissible in it.272
Objections had been taken to the scope of executive power. Appar-
ently, Madison thought a liberal construction of the language would
not be so broad as to be dangerous. Thus, when urging "the indul-
gence" of a "liberal" construction, Madison probably meant an inter-
pretation that would be fair or natural or that would be made in a
generous spirit.273 Hence, a "fair and liberal interpretation.
'274
270. Randolph in Virgin Ratification Convention, June 15, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note
1, at 463.
271. Id.
272. Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 20, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note
1, at 531.
273. Madison's use of "liberal" in the sense of "natural," is coherent with the possibility that
he was also suggesting a nontechnical interpretation.
An example of the use of the word "liberal" to mean "natural" is provided by the Anti-
Federalist who justified his interpretation of the Constitution on the ground "that it is not a
forced, but a very liberal construction .... " Consider Arms, Malichi Maynard, and Samuel
Field, Reasons for Dissent, in 4 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 263. For evidence that Federalists
used "liberal" to suggest, inter alia, "nontechnical," see infra note 274. In this connection, note
that Hamilton argued for a "natural and obvious" rather than a "technical" interpretation. THE
FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 83 (Hamilton), at 560.
274. Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 20, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note
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Madison's account of a "liberal" interpretation did not suggest that
constitutional law should change with the development of society.
According to Garry Wills' analysis of Federalist Number 44,
Madison advocated the broadest possible construction of the neces-
sary-and-proper clause and thereby indicated his desire "for a very
adaptable and flexible instrument reflecting the needs of social
man. '275 In fact, Madison did not argue in Federalist Number 44 for
the broadest possible construction of the necessary-and-proper clause.
Rather, he sought to justify the broad discretion that Anti-Federalists
thought it expressly granted to Congress. He did this by explaining
that alternative formulations would have been even less satisfactory. 276
Wills does not mention that Madison concluded the relevant passage
of the Federalist by drawing attention to the remedies, judicial and
political, that would be available if Congress were to "misconstrue"
the clause and were to "exercise powers not warranted by its true
meaning. '277 Of course, Madison understood that what was "neces-
sary and proper" would change with circumstances. This was, how-
ever, something those words accomplished expressly. Madison argued
that, unlike a positive enumeration of the necessary and proper pow-
ers, the Constitution's language was "accommodated ... to all the
possible changes which futurity may produce." Similarly, Iredell jus-
tified the language as being designed to permit Congress to provide for
unforeseeable contingencies. 278 Both of these Federalists were advo-
cating permanent rather than indeterminate language.
1, at 531. He then turned to the problems connected with technical terms. It is possible that in
so doing he was continuing to discuss some of the language that required a liberal interpretation.
If so, Madison's understanding of the reasons for a liberal interpretation were connected to the
nature of the Constitution, as were Randolph's, and a "liberal construction" would imply a non-
technical one. Many years later, Madison pointed out that the government of the United States
was "a novelty & a compound" and therefore "had no technical terms or phrases appropriate to
it; and that old terms were to be used in new senses, explained by the context or by the facts of
the case." Letter from James Madison to N.P. Trist, Dec. 1831, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1,
at 517.
275. G. WILLS, EXPLAINING AMERICA 47, 54 (1981).
276. Wills also says that Madison was arguing against his own tactical interests. Id. at 52.
277. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 2, No. 44 (Madison), at 305. Madison wrote:
In the first instance, the success of the usurpation will depend on the executive and judiciary
departments, which are to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the last
resort, a remedy must be obtained from the people, who can by the election of more faithful
representatives, annul the acts of the usurpers.
Id. at 305; see also Madison in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 2, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT,
supra note 1, at 438.
278. Iredell, Answer to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution, in P. FORD, PAM-
PHLETS, supra note 1, at 356.
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3. Vagueness and Rights -
In case it may be thought that rights were thought of differently
than other parts of the Constitution, it should be noted that both Fed-
eralists and Anti-Federalists indicated a desire to avoid vagueness in
the protection of rights.
Although they frequently discussed the Constitution as if it had
not provided for most rights, the framers and ratifiers also at times
addressed the Constitution's treatment of rights in terms of vagueness.
Some Federalists insisted that the 1787 text of the Constitution defined
federal powers with relative precision and thereby provided protection
for the people's rights.2 79 According to Anti-Federalists, however, the
Constitution's definition of federal power left only uncertain protec-
tion for rights. Anti-Federalists complained that rights existed under
the Constitution only by "construction" or "implication, s280 and
therefore they wanted amendments to establish rights "clearly,". "ex-
pressly," and "explicitly. '281 A bill of rights was needed so that the
279. See, e.g., Iredell in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 28, 1788, in 4 J. EL-
LIOT, supra note 1, at 148-49; Maclaine in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 28,
1788, in id. at 140-41; Dana in Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Jan. 26, 1788, in 2 id. at
108-09 (regarding habeas corpus). For discussion of this point of view, see Rossum, The Federal-
ist's Understanding of the Constitution as a Bill ofRights, in SAVING THE REVOLUTION 219-33
(C. Kesler ed. 1987).
280. Henry in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 5, 7, 12 & 14, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT,
supra note 1, at 46, 149, 318, 422; Mason in Virginia Ratification Convention, June 23, 1788, in
id. at 585; Williams in New York Ratification Convention, June 27, 1788, in 2 id. at 338 (regard-
ing the rights of states); Letters of Centinel, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 147; Letters from
the Federal Farmer, in id. at 324. One Anti-Federalist wrote that without a bill of rights the
Constitution "will render our priviledges as undefined as... are those of the subjects of England;
which are only to be 'collected from meer opinions of the learned and contradictory authors.'"
Essay by One of the Common People, in 4 id. at 120. Another said he had not expected that the
right to ajury in civil cases would be "left dependent on the arbitrary exposition of future judges,
who, when it may suit the arbitrary views of the ruling powers will explain it away at pleasure."
Essays by Cincinnatus, in 6 id. at 12.
281. The Federal Farmer wrote that people "like to be express and explicit about their essen-
tial rights"; he wanted to establish rights "beyond dispute." Letters from the Federal Farmer, in
2 id. at 324, 329. "These rights should be made the basis of every constitution: and if a people be
so situated, or have such different opinions that they cannot agree in ascertaining and fixing
them, it is a very strong argument against their attempting to form one entire society .... Id. at
232. Brutus wrote:
When a building is to be erected which is intended to stand for ages, the foundation should
be firmly laid. The constitution proposed to your acceptance, is designed not for yourselves
alone, but for generations yet unborn. The principles, therefore upon which the social com-
pact is founded, ought to have been clearly and precisely stated, and the most express and
full declaration of rights to have been made - But on this subject there is almost an entire
silence.
Essays of Brutus, in id. at 372. For just some of the other examples, see Tyler in the Virginia
Ratification Convention, June 25, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 642; Dawson in Virginia
Ratification Convention, June 25, 1788, in id. at 612; Henry in Virginia Ratification Convention,
June 20, 1788, in 3 id. 10 at 541; Jones in New York Ratification Convention, June 25, 1788, in 2
id. at 325; Thompson in Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Jan. 23, 1788, in id. at 80; Ma-
son in Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Feb. 1, 1788, in id. at 137 (regarding habeas
corpus); Lenoir in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 30, 1788, in 4 id. at 202; Spencer
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measure of the people's rights would not depend upon judicial
construction. 282
To a limited degree, attitudes about vagueness are apparent in the
meager surviving debates on the Bill of Rights. During ratification of
the Constitution, various enumerations of rights were demanded, but
the exact formulation of a bill of rights was not yet an issue and so was
not much discussed. The 1789 Congress, however, drafted the Bill of
Rights and therefore debated its language in some detail. In all known
instances, allegations of uncertainty apparently were pursued or were
considered either insubstantial or insoluble.28 3  For example,
Livermore complained about the vagueness of the "cruel-and-unusual-
punishment" language, but he seems to have been ignored by his col-
leagues. Conceivably, they did not perceive or did not care about the
lack of clarity. More probably, they could think of no better, alterna-
tive language and felt a political need to include the provision.2 84 No
one at any point in the debates about rights is recorded as having sug-
gested that vagueness was desirable.
The ninth and tenth amendments include what seem to be obvious
in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 28 & 29, 1788, in id. at 137, 153; Bloodworth in
North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 29, 1788, in id. at 167; Dissent of Minority in
Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Dec. 18, 1788, in 2 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
1, at 630; Smith, An Address to the People of the State of New York, in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS,
supra note 1, at 113; R.H. Lee in Continental Congress, Sept. 27, 1787, in 13 DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY, supra note 1, at 238-39; Z, Boston Independent Chronicle, Dec. 6, 1787, in 14 DocU-
MENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 359.
282. Initially, Madison had seen no need for a bill of rights, since he perceived no difference
between a grant of limited power to the federal government and a statement of rights belonging
to the people and the states. As is well known, however, he came to acknowledge the usefulness
of an enumeration of rights as a means of further defining and strengthening limitations on fed-
eral power. In the House or Representatives, he was the chief proponent and drafter of the Bill
of Rights.
283. For example, on juries from the "vicinage," see Letter from James Madison to Edmund
Pendleton, Sept. 23, 1789, in B. SCHWARTZ, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 1, at 1166. On the
right to bear arms, see Stone, Benson, and Gerry in the House of Representatives, Aug. 17, 1789,
in id. at 1109. Elbridge Gerry in the House said that the amendment "ought to be 'deny or
impair,' for the word 'disparage' was not of plain import ...." He then moved to make the
alteration, but he was not seconded. See id. at 1112; see also infra note 284.
284. 2 B. SCHWARTZ, BILL OF RIGHTS, at 1111-12. Earlier, Iredell had said that "cruel and
unusual" was vague. Indeed, he thought that if included in the Constitution it "would have been
too vague to have been of any consequence." Iredell also objected to the alternatives:
If... the Convention had enumerated a vast variety of cruel punishments, and prohibited
the use of any of them .... and if our government had been disposed to be cruel their
invention would only have been put to a little more trouble .... If to avoid this difficulty,
they had determined... positively what punishments should [be used], this must have led
them into a labyrinth of detail which in the original constitution of a government would
have appeared perfectly ridiculous, and not left a room for such changes, according to cir-
cumstances, as must be in the power of every Legislature that is rationally formed.
Iredell, Answer to Mr. Mason's Objections to the New Constitution, in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS,
supra note 1, at 360. On this subject, Webster was caustic. See [Webster], America, N.Y. Daily
Advertiser, Dec. 31, 1787, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 199.
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sources of vagueness, but at the time they were drafted and ratified
they apparently did not cause concern on this ground.28 5 The tenth
amendment, which reserved to the people and the states powers not
granted by the Constitution, grew out of Anti-Federalist demands for
greater precision about the extent of federal power. The Articles of
Confederation had reserved to the states all powers not given to Con-
gress, and during ratification some Anti-Federalists complained about
the failure of the Constitution to include such a provision.286 A clause
reserving powers would, they thought, help to define and limit federal
power.287
The ninth amendment arose from Federalist objections to a bill of
rights, but like the tenth amendment it was perceived as a means of
clarifying federal power. During ratification, some Federalists said a
bill of rights was futile, since no one could foresee what invasions of
rights would occur in the future and therefore a bill of rights could not
be made permanent. 288 A related and more common Federalist argu-
285. An explanation of why article IV's "privileges and immunities" language did not seem
particularly vague is suggested infra at note 314.
286. See, e.g., Lenoir in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 30, 1788, in 4 J. EL-
LIOT, supra note 1, at 206; Amendments to the Constitution, No. 1, North Carolina Ratification
Convention, Aug. 1, 1788, in id. at 244; Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 H. STORING, supra
note 1, at 324. Note, however, that the tenth amendment, unlike the Articles of Confederation,
did not speak of "expressly" delegated powers.
287. One Anti-Federalist said, perhaps rhetorically, that such an amendment would have
been a satisfactory substitute for a bill of rights. Spencer in North Carolina Ratification Conven-
tion, July 29, 1788, in 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 152, 163.
288. Iredell said:
A bill of rights, as I conceive, would not only be incongruous, but dangerous. No man, let
his ingenuity be what it will, could enumerate all the individual rights not relinquished by
this Constitution. Suppose, therefore, an enumeration of a great many, but an omission of
some, and that, long after all traces of our present disputes were at an end, any of the
omitted rights should be invaded, and the invasion be complained of; what would be the
plausible answer of the government to such a complaint? Would they not naturally say,
"We live at a great distance from the time when this Constitution was established. We can
judge of it much better by the ideas of it entertained at the time, than by any ideas of our
own. The bill of rights, passed at that time, showed that the people did not think every
power retained which was not given, else this bill of rights was not only useless, but absurd.
But we are not at liberty to charge an absurdity upon our ancestors, who have given such
strong proofs of their good sense, as well as their attachment to liberty. So long as the rights
enumerated in the bill of rights remain unviolated, you have no reason to complain. This is
not one of them." Thus a bill of rights might operate as a snare rather than a protection. If
we had formed a general legislature, with undefined powers, a bill of rights would not only
have been proper, but necessary; and it would have then operated as an exception to the
legislative authority in such particulars. ... But where they [i.e., powers of legislation] are
powers of a particular nature, and expressly defined, as in the case of the Constitution before
us, I think, for the reasons I have given, a bill of rights is not only unnecessary, but would be
absurd and dangerous.
Iredell in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 28, 1788, in id. at 149. An anonymous
Federalist wrote:
Suppose such a bill of rights formed, and the Constitution ratified and in exercise. An ad-
ventitious circumstance arises, for which no provision has been made in the Constitution,
and is wholly left out of the bill of rights; from whence must the power flow to remedy or
provide against the evil. By the Constitution there is no power vested in the government; by
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ment was that an enumeration of rights would be construed to dispar-
age unenumerated rights and to imply unenumerated federal
powers.289 Federalists insisted that the enumeration of federal powers
provided a clear boundary between federal power and the people's
rights and that an enumeration of rights would be used to imply the
existence of congressional powers where rights were not mentioned. It
was to counter these possibilities and, perhaps, to avoid charges of
hypocrisy,290 that Madison proposed what became the ninth amend-
ment. The ninth amendment was not on the whole perceived as
vague, because the unenumerated rights to which it referred were de-
fined by the enumeration of congressional powers.29' The unenumer-
the bill of rights, the people have lamented the sovereignty retained by them. I believe every
man of common sense would say that the people, or the sovereign power, cannot be affected
by any such declaration of rights, they being the source of all power in the government;
whatever they have not given away still remains inherent in them.
Reply to George-Mason's Objections to the Constitution, New Jersey Journal, Dec. 19, 1787, in 3
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 154. According to Pendleton, if a bill of rights were
adopted, "in the progress of things, [we may] discover some great and Important [right], which
we don't now think off.]" Letter from Edmund Pendleton to R.H. Lee, June 14, 1788, in 2
LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMUND PENDLETON, at 533 (1967); see also Sherry, The Founders'
Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1164 (1987) (quoting Pendleton).
One of these quotations, Pendleton's, is cited by Sherry as evidence of a belief in mutable
rights. In fact, Pendleton's language does not appear to have such a meaning. The words "dis-
cover" and "think of" suggest that Pendleton assumed Americans had a great many rights and
might fail to enumerate all that they might one day need to assert. Pendleton's argument and the
others quoted here aimed to discourage adoption of a bill of rights and have nothing to do with
the mutability of rights, enumerated or not.
As proof that "[tihe inherent rights of the people ... were not thought to be static," Sherry
also quotes Wilson on the "progressive" development of natural law. See Sherry, supra, at 1164
(quoting I WORKS OF J. WILSON, supra note 52, at 126-27). In fact, when Wilson wrote this
about natural law he was not referring to constitutional or other legal rights. Instead, as he made
explicit, he was discussing general laws or rules of "morals" and "[o]ur progress in virtue." See 1
WORKS OF J. WILSON, supra note 52, at 127.
289. Madison said in the House of Representatives: "[I]t might follow, by implication, that
those rights which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure." 2 B. SCHWARTZ, BILL OF RIGHTS,
supra note 1, at 1031 (June 8, 1789); see also Maclaine in North Carolina Ratification Conven-
tion, July 28, 1788, in 4 J. ELLIOT, supra note I, at 140-41; Gov. Johnston in North Carolina
Ratification Convention, July 28, 1788, in id. at 142; Iredell in North Carolina Ratification Con-
vention, July 28, 1788, in id. at 149; Reply to George Mason's Objections to the Constitution, New
Jersey Journal, Dec. 19, 1787; in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1, at 154.
290. During ratification, Madison and other Federalists had argued against a bill of rights by
citing its dangers. Consequently, Madison would have appeared hypocritical if later he had ad-
vocated the Bill of Rights without also proposing remedies for the risks of which he had com-
plained. Nevertheless, there is no reason to doubt Madison's sincerity in wanting a bill of rights.
See Rumble, supra note 110, at 122, 133.
291. In the Virginia Assembly, Randolph argued that the word "retained" in what became
the ninth amendment was too vague. See Letter from Hardin Burnley to James Madison, Nov.
28, 1789, in 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 456 (1979) (cited by L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 281 (1988)). Instead of the ninth amendment, Randolph
preferred language prohibiting Congress from extending its own power. Randolph's alternative
version indicates that Randolph shared the traditional understanding of the amendment's pur-
pose, even if he thought the language inadequate. Randolph's alternative language also reveals
that Randolph did not think the ninth amendment vague in the sense that it was an independent
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ated rights consisted of the freedom left by the absence of federal
authority.292
Thus, both Federalists and Anti-Federalists argued on the assump-
tion that certainty and precision were desirable. Of course, many
framers probably preferred a lack of clarity to a stalemate. Moreover,
the framers and ratifiers may have agreed to the words but differed on
the meaning. Nevertheless, they apparently thought constitutions, in-
cluding the United States Constitution, should be as clear as possible.
They did not desire vagueness, least of all as a means of allowing con-
stitutional law to adapt to social changes.
B. Principles
A "principle" often denotes an underlying idea or justification
typically one that is general or nondetailed. Conceivably, therefore,
the framers and ratifiers thought the Constitution contained principles
that were indeterminate and that would permit constitutional law to
be mutable according to circumstances. In fact, when the framers and
source of undefined federal rights - the sense in which today it is frequently considered vague.
For a different perspective on this, see L. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT AND THE FRAMERS CONSTI-
TUTION 281 (1988).
292. This is the traditional interpretation of the ninth amendment. For more on the ninth
amendment, see Kay, supra note 265, at 269-73. Kay writes: "There is no extrinsic evidence
whatsoever that the enactors thought that the ninth amendment might provide for an ongoing
... redefinition of rights." Id. at 270.
A recent article argues that the "founders" did not consider the Constitution the exclusive
source of constitutional law and, in particular, that they did not think the Constitution the sole
source of rights. See Sherry, supra note 288. In support of this position, Sherry asserts that in its
debates on the first ten amendments, the "House simply did not see much need for particularized
enumeration of even the most unquestioned rights, because such rights clearly existed whether or
not they were enumerated." Id. at 1165. An express enumeration of essential rights was, how-
ever, the very purpose of the Bill of Rights.
Sherry contrasts two views of the Constitution: Was it fundamental law because it was a
declaration of natural law and right? Or was it fundamental law because it was the positive act of
the people? Sherry argues that the framers in the summer of 1787 were in the process of in-
venting the latter point of view and consequently still retained the "older" perspective. Id. at
1146-55. As a result, according to Sherry, they thought natural law a source of constitutional
law, independent of the Constitution. Sherry's argument is problematic for several reasons.
First, it does not adequately acknowledge American assumptions about contractual limitations
on government and the sovereignty of the people, particularly as apparent from pamphlets and
articles c. 1765-1790 and the various constitutions of the decade prior to 1787. Second, the
article mistakes the role of "natural law" in the eighteenth century. It fails to recognize the
degree to which "natural law" was considered to be an explanation of morality - not legally
enforceable except to the extent embodied in positive law - and it ignores the distinction drawn
by various modern natural law treatises between "natural" law and "fundamental" law. Third,
Sherry's article treats the notion of natural right as if it were thought largely incompatible with,
and superior to, a positive conception of law. Americans believed that the establishment of gov-
ernment required individuals to give up part of their natural liberty - a sacrifice particularly
appropriate when forming a government in which the people would be sovereign. Although
"life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness" might be inalienable, the surrender of a large part of
one's natural liberty to government was designed precisely to preserve that liberty. See J.
GOUGH, supra note 22; Berns, supra note 48, at 58-66.
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ratifiers mentioned "principles" in connection with the Constitution,
they frequently meant, not ideas in the Constitution, but ideas that
underlay or justified it.293 Although they also discussed principles
contained in the Constitution, they did not thereby indicate any inter-
est in indeterminacy or flexible constitutional law.294
When the framers and ratifiers referred to principles in the Consti-
tution, they sometimes meant objectives or ideas that were not stated
in individual provisions or limitations but were, nevertheless, said to
be in the Constitution. Such a principle, for example, was the idea
that the federal government should regulate the things that concerned
the union.295 In discussing this sort of principle, the framers and ra-
tifiers did not suggest that principles would or should facilitate adapta-
tion of constitutional law.
Frequently, the word "principles" was used to denote individual
clauses or limitations contained in the Constitution. When framers
and ratifiers referred to such "principles" and indicated that the prin-
ciples were vague, they expressed distinct disapproval. More often,
when they talked of "principles" in the sense of the document's lan-
guage, they spoke without disapproval and even favorably of the prin-
ciples and did not suggest that they were indeterminate. They did not
indicate that such principles could or should permit flexibility in con-
stitutional law.
For example, Anti-Federalists often referred to rights as "princi-
ples." Rights, it will be recalled, were to be precisely and expressly
stated in order to preserve liberty and republican government, even
after the social foundations of those objectives had decayed. Occasion-
ally, Anti-Federalist discussions of constitutional limitations and
rights were explicit about the relationship of such principles to social
changes. James Monroe pointed out that "fundamental principles
form a check, even when the spirit of the times hath changed, indeed
293. This use of the term is significant, for it indicates that the framers and ratifiers often
thought of principles as general, theoretical justifications or objectives that were distinct from the
Constitution. Note also that in their discussions of principles relating to the Constitution, fram-
ers and ratifiers often left unclear whether they were using "principles" to refer to language in the
document or to principles that underlay the language.
294. Robert Palmer argues, on the basis of the structure of the Constitution, that the Bill of
Rights was understood to contain nonprincipled restraints on power rather than principles the
meaning of which would change with time. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions, in
LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUB-
LIC 55 (1987). This article argues that the Constitution and the Bill of Rights were understood to
contain or embody principles, but that such principles were not thought to be means of flexibility
in constitutional law. Except with respect to Palmer's use of "principles" to mean ideas that are
necessarily indeterminate, this article is not inconsistent with Palmer's conclusions.
295. See Ramsay, An Address to the Freemen of South Carolina on the Federal Constitution,
in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note 1, at 374.
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they retard and controul it. ' '296 Another Anti-Federalist argued:
"[I]n laying down a political system it is safer to rely on principles
than upon precedents [ie., the practices of governments], because the
former are fixed and immutable, while the latter vary with men,
places, times and circumstances. ' 297 These references to principles
did not suggest that principles in the Constitution should be means of
flexibility in application or interpretation, let alone opportunities for
adaptation to social change. Indeed, for Anti-Federalists who were
referring to rights, principles would withstand and perhaps even delay
the effects of change in American society.
C. General Language
Similarly, general language was not desired as a means of provid-
ing indeterminacy for an adaptable constitutional law. When used to
connote vague words or broad powers in the Constitution, "general"
language was a term of criticism. 298 Thus, for example, an Anti-Fed-
eralist complained of a clause being "general" rather than "clear and
unequivocal. '299
When used, however, to suggest an absence of details rather than
broad powers or indeterminacy, "general" language was not criticized.
The examples of, among other things, previous constitutional docu-
ments suggested that constitutions should be stated generally. 30° Gen-
eral language could also be necessary to prevent obsolescence. As
Hamilton explained when objecting to a list of the objects of revenue,
"it would be absurd to fix it in the Constitution, both because it would
be too extensive and intricate, and because alteration of the circum-
stances must render a change of the division indispensable. Constitu-
tions should consist only of general provisions: the reason is, that they
must necessarily be permanent .... ,,30 1 It was in the nature of consti-
tutions to be general, to exclude references to particular matters or
details.3 02
296. Monroe, Some Observations on the Constitution, in 5 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 292.
297. Essays by William Penn, in 3 id. at 175.
298. See, ag., Essays of Brutus, in 2 id. at 367, 421; Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 id.
at 235, 325; Symmes, Letter to Captain Peter Osgoode, Jr., 4 id. at 62; Monroe, Some Observa-
tions on the Constitution, in 5 id. at 291-92.
299. Bloodworth in North Carolina Ratification Convention, July 25, 1788, in 4 J., ELLIOT,
supra note 1, at 68.
300. The most recent and prominent English example, the Bill of Rights of 1689, was partic-
ularly general.
301. Hamilton in New York Ratification Convention, June 28, 1788, in 2 J. ELLIOT, supra
note 1, at 364.
302. See also text infra accompanying note 315. Madison argued that if the Constitution
had established the common law and had therefore attempted to distinguish those parts of the
November 1989]
Michigan Law Review
On occasion, principles and notions of generality converged. Both
Federalists and Anti-Federalists talked of including within the Consti-
tution certain "general principles" - sometimes apparently in an at-
tempt to emphasize that they meant principles that did not prescribe
particulars. They sometimes needed to convey this meaning when dis-
cussing constitutional principles that would accommodate different
state laws and practices by setting general restrictions and leaving de-
tails for legislation. A Federalist writer said that it was necessary "to
fix general principles, which were, in a certain degree, accommodated
to all the states. ' 30 3 Another Federalist explained that the principle of
trial by jury was not extended to civil cases in order to accommodate
the different practices or demands of the states:
The right of trial by jury most certainly is not taken away, neither is
there anything in the Constitution that looks to that point; it is alto-
gether left to the general government to dilate the subject as they please.
It is in their power, by a law to be enacted for that purpose, to suit the
temper and dispositions of the different states as they please. The Con-
stitution could only establish general principles; the extending and en-
larging them to particular cases will be the business of the future
Congress. 3°4
The extension of the Constitution's principles was the task of Con-
gress.30 5 Using a similar approach on behalf of the opposite position,
an Anti-Federalist suggested - albeit without using the word "princi-
ples" - a general clause that would provide for civil juries without
listing the detailed practices of the states:
[I]nstead of the clause of forty or fifty words relative to this subject, why
not use the language that has always been used in this country, and say,
"the people of the United States shall always be entitled to the trial byjury." This would shew the people still hold the right sacred, and enjoin
it upon congress substantially to preserve the jury trial in all cases, ac-
cording to the usage and custom of the country.306
common law that would not be adopted in America, then "they must have formed a digest of
laws, instead of a Constitution." Letter from James Madison to George Washington, Oct. 18,
1787, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 130.
303. Unitas, Pennsylvania Mercury, Jan. 5, 1788, in 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note
1, at 195 (first printed in Trenton Mercury, Jan. 1, 1788).
304. Reply to George Mason's Objections to the Constitution, New Jersey Journal, Dec. 15,
1787, in id. at 158.
305. Pelatiah Webster wrote: "These powers of controul by the federal head or authority,
are defined in the new constitution, as minutely as may be, in their principle; and any detail of
them which may become necessary, is committed to the wisdom of Congress." Webster, Reply to
Brutus (Nov. 4, 1787), in P. FORD, PAMPHLETS, supra note I, at 121; see also Letter from Henry
Knox, Sept. 1787 (referring to "great" principles), in 13 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note 1,
at 279.
306. Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 327. Mason said,
"The jury cases cannot be specified. A general principle laid down on this and some other points
would be sufficient." Convention Notes of James Madison, Sept. 12, 1787, in 2 M. FARRAND,
supra note 1, at 587. Anti-Federalists also used other language to address the problem of differ-
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He generally conceded that "we can fix only general principles, and, of
necessity, must trust something to the wisdom and integrity of the ad-
ministration. ' 30 7 These were arguments about the need for limitations
that governed only general and important aspects of a subject. Like
other discussions of principles, the references to general principles sug-
gest that the framers and ratifiers saw neither indeterminacy in such
general limitations nor opportunities for flexibility.30 8
D. The Compatibility of Precision with Principles
and General Language
The evidence examined here is curious, for it indicates that men
who acknowledged and even insisted upon the need for precise consti-
tutional language, especially with respect to rights, referred to histori-
cal, common law rights and other portions of the Constitution as
"principles" and sometimes called for "general language." From
some perspectives, this may appear incongruous.
One explanation is that the word "principle" was frequently and
almost deliberately misapplied. In the late eighteenth century the
term was pretentiously applied to all sorts of highly detailed rules -
including, as has been seen, historical common law rights.30 9 (It is for
this reason that framers and ratifiers frequently felt obliged to speak of
"general principles" when referring to what we can simply call "prin-
ciples.") The misuse of the word "principle" was much facilitated by
legal terms of art, which then, as now, compacted vast amounts of
erudition into a succinct phrase or word. Thus, to some extent, the
apparent inconsistency of the framers and ratifiers who expected clar-
ences between the rights contained in the states' constitutions: "Although various in form, they
are certainly not contradictory in substance." Essays by a Farmer, in 5 H. STORING, supra note
1, at 13.
307. Of course, he went on to say: "But the question is, do we not trust too much[?]" Letters
from the Federal Farmer, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 275; see also id. at 249, 321. For a
similar but less explicit statement, see Letters of a Republican Federalist, in 4 id. at 164.
308. For other examples of the phrase, albeit not in reference to the Constitution's language,
s~e Letter from Edmund Randolph to David Shepherd, July 25, 1787, in M. FARRAND, supra
note 1, at 182 (Supp. 1987); Dickinson, Notes for a Speech, (June 30, 1787), in id. at 135 (Supp.
1987). The Federal Farmer thought the Constitution should not leave rights to "general princi-
ples and logical inferences." Letters from the Federal Farmer, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at
326. Apparently, he meant, not principles contained in the Constitution, but the principle of
construction that what was not granted to the federal government was reserved to the people.
309. Rights were not the only such "principles." Pendleton thought the apportionmeat ratio
a "principle unequivocably fixed in the Constitution." Pendleton in Virginia Ratification Con-
vention, June 5, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 41. When discussing qualifications of
members of Congress, David Ramsay referred to the "principles ... laid down" in article I,
section 5. 1 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 175.
One ratifier proclaimed: "legislators have at length [Le., at last] condescended to speak the
language of philosophy .... Ames in Massachusetts Ratification Convention, Feb. 4, 1788, in 2
J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 155.
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ity in principles was an illusion, since a detailed rule could parade
under the denomination of a "principle. '310
A further explanation arises from the preexisting nature of Ameri-
can constitutional rights. Both the Constitution and the first eight
amendments identified, for the most part, known, existing rights and
therefore could refer to those rights in what might be considered gen-
eral language. The rights included in those documents were fre-
quently thought of as common law rights. Deviations between what
was claimed and what was thought to be inherited were not yet sub-
stantial, and therefore, like the English Bill of Rights a century earlier,
the American Bill of Rights was considered largely a declaration of
what the people already possessed.31' Hence, the unusual opportunity
for language both general and precise.312
The Bill of Rights could be especially general in its language, be-
cause, as Robert Palmer has observed, it did not have to redefine
rights. Of course, it was understood to "define" both rights and fed-
eral power in the sense that it would establish with greater clarity the
boundary between the two.313 Moreover, it was particular in the sense
of listing particular rights. Its language, however, could be relatively
general. Whereas the 1787 Constitution had to clarify or alter the ex-
isting understandings of some rights in order to settle the authority of
the federal government, the Bill of Rights typically was expected to
identify rights without modifying current understandings of them.314
310. The word "maxim" could also be misused in this way. See, e.g., Mason in Virginia
Ratification Convention, June 18, 1788, in 3 J. ELLIOT, supra note 1, at 508.
311. The Federal Farmer wrote: "We do not by declarations change the nature of things, or
create new truths, but we give existence, or at least establish in the minds of the people truths and
principles which they might never otherwise have thought of, or soon forgot." Letters from the
Federal Farmer, in 2 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 324. J.F. Mercer - a congressional candi-
date in Maryland - supported "those declaratory acts and amendments, which will effectually
guard the great and fundamental rights of the people." 2 FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra
note 1, 160 (Dec. 20, 1789). Note also that whenever a "right" is mentioned in the Bill of Rights,
the words "the right" are used.
312. During the drafting of the Bill of Rights, Madison warned his colleagues in the House of
Representatives of
the difficulties arising from discussing and proposing abstract propositions, of which the
judgment may not be convinced. I venture to say, that if we confine ourselves to an enumer-
ation of simple, acknowledged principles, the ratification will meet with but little difficulty.
Amendments of a doubtful nature will have a tendency to prejudice the whole system ....
The House of Representatives Debates, Aug. 15, 1789, in B. SCHWARTZ, BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 1, at 1096; see also Notes for Speech in Congress, 12 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON, 193 (circa
June 8, 1789); Letter from William Eustis to Jonathon Jackson, Dec. 6, 1788, in 1 FIRST FED-
ERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, 588.
313. See, e.g., A Marylander, To the Inhabitants of Baltimore Town, Sept. 12, 1787, in 2
FIRST FEDERAL ELECTIONS, supra note 1, at 145.
314. Of course the nature and extent of even existing rights could be subject to a difference of
opinion. Therefore, the first ten amendments occasionally had to delve into details, or sometimes
- when a difference of opinion could not be resolved - the amendments had to remain general
to avoid the disagreement (a possible example being "cruel and unusual punishment"). This
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For this purpose, relatively few words were needed.
These two explanations - the misapplication of the word "princi-
ple" and the luxury of being able to declare rights - suggest why
framers and ratifiers could expect precision from "principles" and
from "general language" about rights. They are, however, incomplete
explanations, because some framers and ratifiers appear to have be-
lieved that principles and general language, whether or not concerning
rights, could really be precise. Anti-Federalists who criticized the
Constitution's language for its lack of simplicity and clarity thereby
revealed their expectation that it could have had both attributes. Fed-
eralists had similar ideas. A document of the Committee of Detail
began by declaring that "[i]n the draught of a fundamental constitu-
tion, two things deserve attention .... " The second of these con-
cerned language:
2. To use simple and precise language, and general propositions, ac-
cording to the example of the constitutions of the several states. 315
Although to some ears the reference to simplicity and general proposi-
tions may seem inconsistent with the call for precision, to the drafters
of this document, it clearly was not.
Simplicity and precision were associated with one another in sev-
eral eighteenth-century intellectual contexts.316 One such context was
article, however, here simply attempts to show that it was possible for framers and ratifiers to
perceive most of the language in the Bill of Rights as general and yet relatively determinate.
The structural reasons for including rights in the original Constitution are discussed by
Palmer, supra note 294, at 88. The Constitution established the definition of several rights with
considerable particularity in order to modify or clarify those rights and the corresponding federal
power. This explains the language of the rights contained in the body of the Constitution.. Un-
like most of the first ten amendments, the rights mentioned in the 1787 text did not simply refer
to existing rights. Instead, the 1787 Constitution redefined older rights. For example, the right
to a jury in civil cases was, as has been seen, carefully excluded. See supra text accompanying
notes 210-12. The right of habeas corpus was stated in a way that expressly granted the federal
government the power of suspension, which had been so vigorously contested in seventeenth-
century England. The definition of treason restricted the definition of the offense and elevated to
constitutional status some of the procedural rights contained in the 1696 Treason Trials Act.
(Wilson commended the Constitution's definition of treason as "particular and accurate." Wil-
son in Pennsylvania Ratification Convention, Dec. 7, 1787, in 3 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at
163.) These were all attempts to modify traditional understandings of rights and government
power. For this, particularity was necessary.
In accord with this view of the relative particularity of the 1787 text as it related to rights,
note that the "priviledges and immunities" clause simply restated a portion of article four of the
Articles of Confederation. The Constitution did not have to modify that right and therefore
could refer to it in the same brief or general language as the Articles of Confederation.
315. The version of this proposition reproduced above is the product of deletions in the man-
uscript. Prior to such alteration, the word "several" preceded the word "constitutions," and
after the sentence quoted came the following: "For the construction of a constitution of neces-
sarrily [sic] differs from that of law." 2 M. FARRAND, supra note 1, at 137. For the first of these
"two things [that] deserve attention," see supra text accompanying note 129. Incidentally, con-
temporaries appear to have wanted state constitutions, particularly their bills of rights, to be
"precise" and "unambiguous." W. ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS 146 (1980).
316. On this subject, see Powell, supra note 7, at 888-902.
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the common law itself and the tradition of the ancient constitution. In
the late fifteenth century, according to Hale, pleading had been "short
yet perspicuous. ' 317 Well aware of Hale's example, many eighteenth-
century lawyers contrasted the clear and simple pleading of the older
common law against the complexity of modem practice. Wilson
waxed eloquent on the importance of certainty in "all good adminis-
tration of law" and then added "that the common law is equally re-
markable for the simplicity as for the accuracy of its forms."'3t 8
In addition to this common law tradition, a variety of other influ-
ences encouraged a natural interest in accurate language that was eas-
ily comprehensible. 31 9 Expectations of easily understood language
were raised by Roman law, republican sentiments, some aspects of
Protestantism, and a distaste for lawyers, who thrived on what baffled
others. 320 Anti-Federalists urged not only that the Constitution's lan-
guage should have been more clear but also occasionally that it should
have been more "plain," "simple," or "common. '321 In so doing, they
apparently assumed that ordinary and simple language would promote
clarity and ease of understanding, especially among the uneducated or
unsophisticated. 322
Even developments in the sciences may have stimulated Americans
to associate precision with principles and simple or general lan-
guage. 323 Just as the rules governing the movements of the planets
were discovered to be relatively simple and general, so too accurate
descriptions of moral and now positive law could be expected to have
such traits. Moreover, the attempt to make law mimic the moral and
317. M. HALE, supra note 28, at I11.
318. Lectures, in 2 WORKS OF J. WILSON, supra note 52, at 453.
319. Other factors may have included the continental experiments in preventing interpreta-
tion or commentaries.
320. Of course, these traditions could provoke varied responses. For example, Roman law
could be associated with clear generalizations. It also could be feared for containing vague gener-
alizations. See, e.g., W. LIVINGSTON, THE INDEPENDENT REFLECTOR 252-53 (M. Klein ed.
1963) (June 7, 1753).
321. One Anti-Federalist wanted a bill of rights "in such general terms; so expressive, so
clear, and at the same time so short, as never to require either comment or interpretations."
Letter from a Delegate nho Has Catched Cold, in 5 H. STORING, supra note 1, at 273.
322. Some Anti-Federalists - but not clearly many of them - took this view to the extreme
of insisting that a well-drafted constitution would need no interpretation. This extreme position
is discussed by Powell, supra note 7. Note, however, that some of the Anti-Federalists who
concluded that ordinary people would not understand the Constitution based such complaints on
the ambiguity of the Constitution and the complexity of its structures rather than on the absence
of plain or simple language. See, e.g., Letter from Samuel Osgood to Samuel Adams, Jan. 5,
1788, in 15 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY, supra note I, at 264; L. Martin, Address No. 3, Md.
Journal, March 28, 1788, in 16 id. at 499.
323. For analysis of scientific approaches to law, see D. BOORSTIN, supra note 24, at 12-30;
Hoeflich, supra note 22; Shapiro, supra note 24.
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natural sciences encouraged the common habit, discussed above, of
asserting that common law and historical rights were "principles. ' '324
Pretentious language rarely can transform something into what it is
not, but it can have consequences. In this instance, it contributed to
the belief that principles could be as precise as Anglo-American his-
torical rights.325 This and the other ideas mentioned here encouraged
the framers and ratifiers to think that principles and simple or general
language could be clear.
Although many complained that the generalities and principles in
the proposed Constitution were vague, almost all of the framers and
ratifiers argued on the assumption that principles and general lan-
guage in a constitution could be relatively precise. They thought of
constitutional law as permanent and did not want vagueness, princi-
ples, or general language to be opportunities for a flexible constitu-
tional law that could change according to circumstances.
CONCLUSION
The framers and ratifiers did not want the Constitution to change
in adaptation to the economic, political, cultural, or moral develop-
ments of American society. On the contrary, both Federalists and
Anti-Federalists wanted a permanent constitution. Anti-Federalists
typically clung to traditional notions of what was fundamental to lib-
erty and republican government and sought to establish or fix those
essentials on a permanent basis, notwithstanding and sometimes even
in defense against the social changes they anticipated. Federalists did
not generally disagree with the objective of establishing provisions fun-
damental to free government. However, they also strove for a consti-
tution that would survive changes in American society and therefore
attempted to exclude from the Constitution all that might become ob-
solete. Their fear of obsolescence affected their understanding of what
was essential and led them to abandon many provisions their oppo-
nents would not. In so doing, Federalists hoped to establish perma-
nently the relatively few elements of free government that, to their
minds, belonged in a constitution. Anti-Federalists tended to accept
the goal of a lasting, survivable constitution but not the cost, which
was the sacrifice of provisions they considered essential to liberty and
republican government. Thus, Federalists and Anti-Federalists agreed
324. See supra text accompanying notes 296-97, 303-08.
325. It also affected the perception and interpretation of constitutional rights, but that is
another story.
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on the necessity of a permanent constitution; they differed about how
to achieve it and about the provisions it should contain.
Just as constitutional law was assumed to be permanent, so too law
that could not be permanent - that would have to be adapted to
changing circumstances - could only be nonconstitutional law. This
assumption underlay the Federalists' willingness to have relatively few
constraints in the Constitution and to permit Congress broad discre-
tion. It also underlay the difficulties encountered by Anti-Federalists
when responding to Federalist arguments against impermanent provi-
sions. Law that would have to be mutable could not be constitutional
law.
Consistently with their views on the nature of the Constitution, the
framers and ratifiers did not desire vagueness, principles, or general
language to be sources of indeterminacy that would permit constitu-
tional law to evolve or otherwise change in accord with the continuing
development of American society. Although a number of them recog-
nized that adaptation of constitutional law might be necessary, they
assumed it should occur by amendment and preferred that the need
for adaptation be avoided.
The late eighteenth-century ideas discussed in this article occurred
during what could be considered a transitional phase in the develop-
ment of Anglo-American conceptions of law. As suggested in Part I,
the tradition that law and particularly constitutional law should re-
main largely unaltered has gradually been displaced by the expectation
that law must change with the alterations of society. In the late eight-
eenth century, what would become the modem point of view was rap-
idly acquiring adherents, but the older approach was still widely
appreciated. As a result, the framers and ratifiers had the opportunity
to integrate this twofold intellectual inheritance. At least some of
them perceived nonconstitutional law in accord with the modern, de-
velopmental perspective. Yet for constitutional law, almost all of
them took approaches consistent with the older understanding, which
emphasized the unchanging character of law. Constitutional law was
permanent.
To the extent it lasted, this understanding of constitutional law as
permanent was largely an American perspective. On the other side of
the Atlantic, shortly after the framers and ratifiers created our Consti-
tution, the great English defender of America, Edmund Burke, pre-
pared his defense of England's unwritten constitution. Following the
example of Hale, Burke thought the English constitution, like the
common law of which it was a part, consisted of custom that slowly
and insensibly adapted to changing circumstances. It developed with
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English society yet remained legitimate by virtue of its apparent antiq-
uity. Through the writing of Burke, such a view eventually came to
define English constitutional law; and that perspective could suit Eng-
land - a relatively small, homogenous society in which tradition was
still a source of authority and men and women were accustomed to
defer to the elite arbiters of tradition. Americans, however, had re-
cently asserted independence, they lived in a relatively diverse and
egalitarian society, and they looked to themselves as the ultimate
source of political authority. For them, a very different conception of
constitutional law seemed appropriate. Constitutional law was perma-
nent law. It did not change according to circumstances.
